221–230 of 240 posts
Why can't they just receive, encrypt with my public key, let my client decrypt with private?
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Moxie is not impressed with lavabit as lavabit's entire security model relied on "we totally promise we won't look at your private key." https://moxie.org/blog/lavabit-critique/ >Unlike the design of most secure servers, which are ciphertext in and ciphertext out, this is the inverse: plaintext in and plaintext out. The server stores your password for authentication, uses that same password for an encryption key, and…
Did you RTFA? You can keep your private key private now, or, like always, just run your own server and not have to worry about ever trusting anyone with anything. Though "Paranoid" mode in DIME seems to accomplish the same thing.
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I thought that too, until i bought a cheap netbook that came with windows (7? Student edition? I cannot remember). I plugged in a mouse and windows said it needed to connect to the internet to download the driver for my MS optical mouse. I practically fell out of my chair laughing.
The "driver" is for adding a gui for doing things like customizing buttons and sensitivity and stuff, not to make the basic mouse work.
this vs protonmail.ch?
this vs protonmail.ch?
If you NEED encryption, don't use email. From: https://blog.fastmail.com/2016/12/10/why-we-dont-offer-pgp/ What's the tradeoff? If the server doesn't have access to the content of emails, then it reverts to a featureless blob store: Search isn't possible Previews can't be calculated If you lose your private key, we can't recover your email Spam checking on content isn't possible To access mail on multiple devices, th…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
If an attacker can tell which part of the index was modified, that gives them enough information to decrypt the index and e-mails. Clients would always have to download+upload the full index (which needs to be re-encrypted with a new IV). This is a huge problem - the index can easily be hundreds of MB for a large mailbox.
Technically if a client has a full index version X (in plaintext), it could modify X to get X+1, compute a binary diff between X and (X+1) - encrypt and upload the diff. Another client on index version X could download the diff, and get index (X+1). Some desktop client should probably do compaction from time to time.
Why does their server need your private key? (Except "paranoid" level - I'm much more concerned about handing my private key over to them than anything to with email, why's that paranoid?!) Why can't they just receive, encrypt with my public key, let my client decrypt with private?
Sensible choices in a nutshell: If you live in a 5-eyes nation, don't use or buy services hosted or operated from a 5 eyes nation. If you don't live in a 5 eyes nation, only use services hosted and operated from Iceland or Switzerland.( Nation states are the #1 threat, and your own nation is always the most dangerous one. )
> If you live in a 5-eyes nation, don't use or buy services hosted or operated from a 5 eyes nation The 5 eyes spy globally. U.S. citizens are the only ones with legal protection and (limited) recourse for U.S. government spying, AFAIK. If a U.S. citizen uses a French or Icelandic mail host, I suspect the U.S. foreign intelligence agencies have free reign to spy on them. I wonder what the limits are for the FBI and o…
Why does their server need your private key? (Except "paranoid" level - I'm much more concerned about handing my private key over to them than anything to with email, why's that paranoid?!) Why can't they just receive, encrypt with my public key, let my client decrypt with private?
What would be the point of that? That portion of the traffic is already encrypted if you do encrypted IMAP.
Given a symmetric key, it can only be outgoing, but again - why would you do that on the server?