Edit: just saw this post was from September. Author probably made thousands in rewards circulating this vulnerability.
Reading Uber’s Internal Emails: Bug Bounty report worth $10K
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Re: Reading Uber’s Internal Emails: Bug Bounty report worth $10K
#12Totally just curious. The law for "exceeds authorized access" is 20 years in prison. I think uber has a bug fixing program. Maybe sendgrid does? Do the DNS carriers? Does his ISP? I read the law. If one of these companies refutes access - this guy is facing 20 years [1]? W(why)TF do people do this? The US government is notoriously creative in these prosecutions [3]. Companies refute access all the time to not look li…
Uber's bug bounty program seems like explicit permission to me. The twist here, as you mention, is that it is sendgrid's infrastructure. Chasing bug bounties does seem a bit risky in this "cloud" era where it's not just one entity running the targeted service.
Re: Reading Uber’s Internal Emails: Bug Bounty report worth $10K
#13Earlier quoted context omitted.
Uber's bug bounty program seems like explicit permission to me. The twist here, as you mention, is that it is sendgrid's infrastructure. Chasing bug bounties does seem a bit risky in this "cloud" era where it's not just one entity running the targeted service.
It is not listed as an in-scope domain on Uber's bug bounty policy. You would have to argue that the access was unintentional - that you believed you had authorization to access the server from Uber and that Uber had the ability to assign that authorization on behalf of SendGrid.
Re: Reading Uber’s Internal Emails: Bug Bounty report worth $10K
#14Then they had the gall to try to convince me on the phone that it must have been my fault (after our blog post about it blew up).
Needless to say, I think they are terrible.
Previous HN discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7476836
Re: Reading Uber’s Internal Emails: Bug Bounty report worth $10K
#15Sendgrid allowed attackers to social engineer control of my company's account and intercept password resets, despite an explicit warning from us a week prior (we received a chat transcript of the failed attempt and let them know that it was not us and someone was actively trying to social engineer access to our account). Then they had the gall to try to convince me on the phone that it must have been my fault (after…
I haven't used them in years, so I'm not sure if they are still the low cost leader, but they are definitely the kind of thing where you get what you pay for. Their lack of investment in product and infrastructure showed for the years I used them, and their slowness in delivering updates was incredibly frustrating.
Re: Reading Uber’s Internal Emails: Bug Bounty report worth $10K
#16The vulnerability is that any SendGrid user could configure a webhook callback which would POST back all received emails for any domain which had its MX set to 'mx.sendgrid.net'. OP exploited this against Uber to receive copies of their emails.
Presumably there was no way to tell from one account that another account is web-hooking your email out from under you. So you have to wonder, if it's as easy as just typing the domain you want to listen in on.... who else was getting all their emails tapped this way?
From Sendgrid's documentation;
Setup
The following steps are required to begin
parsing email:
Point the MX Record of a Domain/Hostname or
Subdomain to mx.sendgrid.net
Associate the Domain/Hostname and the URL in
the Parse API settings page.
Shocking omission by Sendgrid, where's their write-up and apology?Re: Reading Uber’s Internal Emails: Bug Bounty report worth $10K
#17Totally just curious. The law for "exceeds authorized access" is 20 years in prison. I think uber has a bug fixing program. Maybe sendgrid does? Do the DNS carriers? Does his ISP? I read the law. If one of these companies refutes access - this guy is facing 20 years [1]? W(why)TF do people do this? The US government is notoriously creative in these prosecutions [3]. Companies refute access all the time to not look li…
Re: Reading Uber’s Internal Emails: Bug Bounty report worth $10K
#18The last time there was a SendGrid article on here, the feedback from the community was far from kind [0]. I again re-iterate that SendGrid has no business sending emails [1]. [0]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12142728 [1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12145019
Re: Reading Uber’s Internal Emails: Bug Bounty report worth $10K
#19I found this write-up a bit confusing and hard to follow. The vulnerability is that any SendGrid user could configure a webhook callback which would POST back all received emails for any domain which had its MX set to 'mx.sendgrid.net'. OP exploited this against Uber to receive copies of their emails. Presumably there was no way to tell from one account that another account is web-hooking your email out from under yo…
Re: Reading Uber’s Internal Emails: Bug Bounty report worth $10K
#20A bug bounty incentivizes people to look for bugs. But when you find an interesting bug like this you have the option of either having the possibility of making millions from the social engineering possibilities alone, or claiming the bug bounty and get $10k. Of course claiming the bounty is the moral thing to do, but some people with both the skill and motivation to do bug bounties are bound to have lower moral standards.