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About backdoors in crypto messengers

blogs.fsfe.org

31–40 of 71 posts

Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Actually, it is possible to use Signal on Android without Google using the opensource microG and Xposed framework (setup is a bit involved...but you can google that :P for a guide).

This still relies on Google's servers to support push messages FYI.

"without Google proprietary code on your phone"

Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

also on F-Droid you can find "Silence" which is a fork of "Signal" but only for SMS texts.

True, but you still need to be aware of who your potential adversary is. If it is someone with access to SMS network texts logs, these encrypted texts will light up like a Christmas tree for someone looking for something unusual.

The threat model is that google and cell phone networks are untrusted adversaries. So your same concern can be said about Signal messages going through Google servers under the surveillance of the NSA. Either way the adversary sees a bunch of suspicious encrypted messages, but can't read them. But if the user has proprietary google code installed on their phone (i.e. Google Play Services), then the backdoor which this blog is warning about is the fact that now your phone software is/could be potentially compromised.

Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#33
It difficult to see how a service that ties to your phone number can make any claim about privacy halfway seriously. This is reckless.

And worse tie itself to a company whose business model is based on creepily stalking you all over the internet and getting users psychologically accustomed to the fact they are under surveillance. These are serious escalations that go unnoticed because SV has become a magnet for those who want to profit from it.

A half way serious and sincere effort will be open source, not tied in any remote way to known surveillance companies, and based in a country that genuinely respects privacy.

Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#35
tl;dr: this is stupid.

People seem to love analyzing security of tiny corners of systems while ignoring the rest of the system, and entirely avoiding figuring out a scope for the security.

The post complains about Signal using a Google service, that Google could utilize (either now or through an update) for malicious activity. A Google service that without a fair share of poking around is only available on Google versions of Android. I mean, what.

While this is a more serious problem than the usual whine about GCM (Yes, notifications can give a lot of info, but in case of Signal, the info given is "You received something from some Signal user while you were offline"), it is still amazing how blind the analysis seem to the environment. If you cannot trust Google to provide a "non-evil" Google play services, why the flying fuck do you think the Google-provided (or manufacturer-under-tight-google-control-provided) OS is fine? They could backdoor the process isolation and poke around at Signal memory if they felt like it.

Now, if you are security conscious and willing to let go of the conveniences of selling your soul to Google, you would be running a non-Google'd version of Android without Google services. Your only valid complaint in this case, is that Signal depends on Google services to operate, which makes you unable to use it (without hacking Google back into your Android version, but if you do that you might just as well stick to a Google version).

Oh, and what about the black box binary drivers you are using on your super-secure handset? Baseband? CPU (ME anyone?)? SIM card?

Before you talk about security, figure out what you are trying to protect against, and start from the top. You look like an idiot if you complain about breakable windows but do not notice that the door is open.

Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#36
post #9

It seems that if you really want proper secure channel you need to write one yourself. Anything out there is subject to being compromised. Is there open source alternative for Signal?

You don't have to look far. The actual Signal client source is licensed under GPLv3. Edit: And server code under AGPLv3.

well LibreSignal was shut down because Moxie didn't like them using WhisperSystem's servers. I guess the libre community could figure out how to setup and fund an alternative server, but since Signal's server code isn't federated, then I don't believe there would be a straightforward way to send messages between the two systems.

https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issueco...

Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#37
>This code is included by calling the createPackageContext-method together with the flags CONTEXT_INCLUDE_CODE and CONTEXT_IGNORE_SECURITY. The latter is a requirement as the android system would deny loading code from untrustworthy sources otherwise (for a good reason). The code is then executed in the Signal process, which includes access to the Signal history database and the crypto keys.

---------------------------

Glad someone points out the technical details of why many people had doubts about signal. Unfortunately, Moxie will dismiss it, and his following will claim "it affects other apps too" as if that makes it any better. "Other apps do it too" is not the standard a "privacy" app should aim for.

Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#38

tl;dr: this is stupid. People seem to love analyzing security of tiny corners of systems while ignoring the rest of the system, and entirely avoiding figuring out a scope for the security. The post complains about Signal using a Google service, that Google could utilize (either now or through an update) for malicious activity. A Google service that without a fair share of poking around is only available on Google ver…

Your entire comment is based around the "but there are bigger problems" argument.

That's like saying you shouldn't fix your leaking engine, if your brakes don't work.

Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#39
post #13

>tl;dr: There is a “backdoor” in Signal nobody cares about, only Google can use it. Speak for yourself. This backdoor is the reason why I don't use Signal.

You don't use Signal because your phone manufacturer can put a backdoor in the OS or hardware? Why even use a phone?

So we should just aim for no security at all then? Why is it that every time someone points out a security flaw, people say "well then don't use a phone?" As if we shouldn't strive for improvements unless everything is 100% secure.
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