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About backdoors in crypto messengers

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Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#21

Post by jacobush »

em3rgent0rdr wrote: post #11
binaryapparatus wrote: post #5

It seems that if you really want proper secure channel you need to write one yourself. Anything out there is subject to being compromised. Is there open source alternative for Signal?

also on F-Droid you can find "Silence" which is a fork of "Signal" but only for SMS texts.

True, but you still need to be aware of who your potential adversary is. If it is someone with access to SMS network texts logs, these encrypted texts will light up like a Christmas tree for someone looking for something unusual.

Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#22

Post by larma »

3pt14159 wrote: post #17
Sir_Cmpwn wrote: post #6

>tl;dr: There is a “backdoor” in Signal nobody cares about, only Google can use it. Speak for yourself. This backdoor is the reason why I don't use Signal.

Doesn't Google have root anyway? They could backdoor your OS and grant a third party access to phone through that.

No, see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13435152

Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#23

Post by dbalan »

Some observations, 1. At this point its extremely hard to use XMPP - there are too many competing standards that implements encryption (of which a subset has forward secrecy), and if sender server doesn't implement any the other end does, usually falls back to plain text, one can disable it - but this is just too much overhead for a regular user. (food for thought [1])

2. Again, reminder from countless HN comments - there is a PR in works to make GCM optional[2], as soon as its merged, this will be solved

3. Maps seems to the real problem here: this could be disabled after 2? (otherwise, whats the point?)

[1] https://whispersystems.org/blog/the-ecosystem-is-moving/ [2] https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/pull/5962

edit: formatting, forward secrecy not e2e

Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#24

Post by jordskott »

roddux wrote: post #8

The backdoor referred to can be applied to any Android app that uses Google Maps. Also mentioned is that using the built-in Google keyboard is a vulnerability, because in theory it gives Google the ability to keylog you. I supposed this boils down to knowing your adversaries. If you number Google amongst that list, life is going to be really difficult - no matter who you are.

I guess it mostly boils down to Moxie and his ridiculous claims of how much more secure Signal is when compared to other solutions (like XMPP and anything based on PGP).

Don't get me wrong, I understand the design and user experience decisions of making Signal depending on GCM but Moxie just loves to bash on XMPP and federated protocols and putting Signal on a pedestal of exemplary security.

I admire the dedication on putting together the Axolotl protocol but I hate when he mixes his business interests with secure crypto solutions, because by the end of the day that is what he wants, to sell Axolotl to companies like Google and WhatsApp. And of course, bashing on XMPP is just a business pitch to those companies.

Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#25

Post by BuuQu9hu »

Sir_Cmpwn wrote: post #15
verroq wrote: post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You don't use Signal because your phone manufacturer can put a backdoor in the OS or hardware? Why even use a phone?

I don't use Signal because of Google Play Services, which is the backdoor this article refers to. I'm reasonably confident that my phone's OS is uncompromised and I take the radio problem into consideration as part of my threat model and change my behaviors on my phone accordingly. I have also made some progress on using OsmocomBB as a radio baseband, and on building a custom phone that treats the radio as hostile an…

Which device are you using OsmocomBB on? Which custom device are you building?

Neo900 looks pretty good for baseband isolation.

The phone network and the protocols for connecting to it are pretty user hostile no matter how open and secure the phone and baseband are though.

Don't forget the SIM card runs its own insecure OS that people have hacked before and you just can't replace that.

Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#26

Post by Sir_Cmpwn »

BuuQu9hu wrote: post #25
Sir_Cmpwn wrote: post #15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't use Signal because of Google Play Services, which is the backdoor this article refers to. I'm reasonably confident that my phone's OS is uncompromised and I take the radio problem into consideration as part of my threat model and change my behaviors on my phone accordingly. I have also made some progress on using OsmocomBB as a radio baseband, and on building a custom phone that treats the radio as hostile an…

Which device are you using OsmocomBB on? Which custom device are you building? Neo900 looks pretty good for baseband isolation. The phone network and the protocols for connecting to it are pretty user hostile no matter how open and secure the phone and baseband are though. Don't forget the SIM card runs its own insecure OS that people have hacked before and you just can't replace that.

>Which device are you using OsmocomBB on?

A Motorola C139.

>Which custom device are you building?

A, uh, custom one.

>The phone network and the protocols for connecting to it are pretty user hostile no matter how open and secure the phone and baseband are though.

>Don't forget the SIM card runs its own insecure OS that people have hacked before and you just can't replace that.

Yeah, I'm keeping both of those things in mind. There won't be any assumption that your phone calls or SMS will be secure, but rather that your mainboard OS is secure _from_ the radio and that you don't have to worry about discussions had near your phone and such.

Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#28

Post by lima »

dbalan wrote: post #23

Some observations, 1. At this point its extremely hard to use XMPP - there are too many competing standards that implements encryption (of which a subset has forward secrecy), and if sender server doesn't implement any the other end does, usually falls back to plain text, one can disable it - but this is just too much overhead for a regular user. (food for thought [1]) 2. Again, reminder from countless HN comments -…

Conversations is a great XMPP client. It works very well, support inline images, stream resumption and everything.

The OMEMO standard brings the Signal protocol to XMPP and it works great. I use Conversations for my hacker friends who refuse to install Signal (GCM dependency!) and surprisingly, I'm not missing a lot.

Now we only need a desktop client that supports the same features... And iOS (but TextSecure is making progress there)

Re: About backdoors in crypto messengers

#29

Post by tokenizerrr »

larma wrote: post #20
_b8r0 wrote: post #4

If you're considering Google an adversary, perhaps you shouldn't use stock Android, or any of their software. If you're considering Google an adversary, and use a version of Android without Google support, you can't use Signal anyway.

Even with stock Android, on devices != Pixel or Nexus, Google parts are sandboxed in a way making it hard for them to access private app data. The only way would be to deliver a different app through play store which is easy to discover as it breaks the cryptographic signature and must be done on first install (android uses TOFU). So without the mentioned issues through Play Services and Gboard, Google would not be a…

They can patch the sandbox out in an update, right?
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