They are trying to say that an intentionally placed backdoor is not a backdoor? ha ha
There is no WhatsApp 'backdoor'
231–240 of 437 posts
Re: There is no WhatsApp 'backdoor'
#232Color me still-unconvinced. This retort does not address the fundamental point made in the Guardian piece: > “[Some] might say that this vulnerability could only be abused to snoop on ‘single’ targeted messages, not entire conversations. This is not true if you consider that the WhatsApp server can just forward messages without sending the ‘message was received by recipient’ notification (or the double tick), which u…
Adding to this reply, here is the actual complaint that generated the guardian's article:
https://tobi.rocks/2016/04/whats-app-retransmission-vulnerab...
Re: There is no WhatsApp 'backdoor'
#233The real "Whatsapp Backdoor" is that, by default, the app stores a backup of all your messages on "teh cloud". On android, that's google.
So google can play "eve", and every run of the mill script kiddie that can get your google credentials may "restore" your messages. How convenient.
And that's the default settings. So, even if you turn it off, "mallory" can steal the credentials of your contact and snoop into your conversation that way.
Re: There is no WhatsApp 'backdoor'
#234Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can demonstrate the presence of a vulnerability in closed source software but there's no way to demonstrate (or even provide evidence of) the absence of any vulnerabilities.
That's identically true of open-source software. To put it in the theoretical terms you're probably most comfortable with: the programming language used to represent a computer program has nothing fundamentally to do with whether it can be verified. Obviously some languages are easier to verify programs in than others, but the gap between assembly and C in ordinary compiled programs is surprisingly small. Open vs. cl…
tptacek,
Over the years interacting with you here on HN, I think this basically sums up the worldview that puts you and I at odds:
> Open vs. closed-source software is a concern orthogonal to verifiability.
Is there a place where you have written at length, defending this assertion?
I am open to it. But it does not resonate with my understanding, nor my (substantial, I think) experience in deployments of open- and closed-source software with specific respect to verifiability.
Re: There is no WhatsApp 'backdoor'
#235Earlier quoted context omitted.
> This allows WhatsApp to MITM. Whatapps can rekey both Alice and Bob, decrypt both their messages from that point onwards (incl unsent messages) and forward them re-encrypted with their real keys. The only notification might be that rekeying warning, if the users have turned it on. In this scenario even the double-checkmarks are present. This is contrary to WhatsApp's claim that even they cannot snoop. You've just d…
> The notification that you see in WhatsApp, Signal, SSH, PGP, or whatever is the defense. That defense, which happens to be the only defense, is turned off by default in WhatsApp. You seem to argue they do so because it's bad UX to present such notification by default. That's - in my humble opinion - like suggesting browsers should turn off TLS chain errors by default because it's bad UX and just proceed with the co…
Do browsers tell you about certificate reissues by default?
Re: There is no WhatsApp 'backdoor'
#236What is the user supposed to do when they get notified of a "safety number changed" message? How do they verify they've not just been MITM? Honest question... I don't use whatsapp or signal at all.
I would simply ask if they got a new phone or re-installed WhatsApp. A few would inquisitively ask "Yes, how did you know?", then I would explain them to them the notification I got.
This can be triggered by the other side changing phones/devices. How do you explain this to the stupids?
Re: There is no WhatsApp 'backdoor'
#237Earlier quoted context omitted.
> This allows WhatsApp to MITM. Whatapps can rekey both Alice and Bob, decrypt both their messages from that point onwards (incl unsent messages) and forward them re-encrypted with their real keys. The only notification might be that rekeying warning, if the users have turned it on. In this scenario even the double-checkmarks are present. This is contrary to WhatsApp's claim that even they cannot snoop. You've just d…
> The notification that you see in WhatsApp, Signal, SSH, PGP, or whatever is the defense. That defense, which happens to be the only defense, is turned off by default in WhatsApp. You seem to argue they do so because it's bad UX to present such notification by default. That's - in my humble opinion - like suggesting browsers should turn off TLS chain errors by default because it's bad UX and just proceed with the co…
> That defense, which happens to be the only defense, is turned off by default in WhatsApp.
> You seem to argue they do so because it's bad UX to present such notification by default. That's - in my humble opinion - like suggesting browsers should turn off TLS chain errors by default because it's bad UX and just proceed with the connection as if nothing happened...
One thing we've learned over the years is that security warnings should not be displayed to consumers under "normal" (eg. non-critical) circumstances, otherwise it creates a condition of "warning fatigue."
TLS certificate errors are not something that should happen under normal circumstances. When a TLS certificate fails to validate, something is really wrong. As we've gotten better about ensuring those conditions, browsers have made it harder and harder to get past the warnings, because they're not warnings anymore -- they're error conditions.
Key changes in a messenger are totally different. They happen under normal conditions, so putting them in people's faces by default has the potential to do more harm than good. If we can make them workable, systems like CONIKS or Key Transparency might be in our collective future, but if you don't like systems that are fundamentally "advisory" (don't tell you until after the fact), you're not going to like those new systems at all either.
For now, I think a fact of life is that most people will not verify keys whether the warnings are there or not, so I think what's most important is that the server can't tell who is and who isn't.
I'd love to hear other ideas about how to improve the UX of interactions like this, but I think they have to include a basis in the assumption that we can't fundamentally change human behavior and that we can't just teach everyone in the world to be like us.
Re: There is no WhatsApp 'backdoor'
#238Earlier quoted context omitted.
This allows WhatsApp to MITM. Whatapps can rekey both Alice and Bob, decrypt both their messages from that point onwards (incl unsent messages) and forward them re-encrypted with their real keys. The only notification might be that rekeying warning, if the users have turned it on. In this scenario even the double-checkmarks are present. This is contrary to WhatsApp's claim that even they cannot snoop. PS: I just chec…
> This allows WhatsApp to MITM. Whatapps can rekey both Alice and Bob, decrypt both their messages from that point onwards (incl unsent messages) and forward them re-encrypted with their real keys. The only notification might be that rekeying warning, if the users have turned it on. In this scenario even the double-checkmarks are present. This is contrary to WhatsApp's claim that even they cannot snoop. You've just d…
You're so hot and nerdy I want to suck your sick till your epileptic
Re: There is no WhatsApp 'backdoor'
#239Earlier quoted context omitted.
This allows WhatsApp to MITM. Whatapps can rekey both Alice and Bob, decrypt both their messages from that point onwards (incl unsent messages) and forward them re-encrypted with their real keys. The only notification might be that rekeying warning, if the users have turned it on. In this scenario even the double-checkmarks are present. This is contrary to WhatsApp's claim that even they cannot snoop. PS: I just chec…
> This allows WhatsApp to MITM. Whatapps can rekey both Alice and Bob, decrypt both their messages from that point onwards (incl unsent messages) and forward them re-encrypted with their real keys. The only notification might be that rekeying warning, if the users have turned it on. In this scenario even the double-checkmarks are present. This is contrary to WhatsApp's claim that even they cannot snoop. You've just d…
What would prevent WhatsApp from shipping a client where they control the rekeying notification setting remotely?
I suppose there must ultimately be some level of trust in WhatsApp that the client is doing what it says it is? Unless we're willing to sniff every piece of network traffic from it.
Re: There is no WhatsApp 'backdoor'
#240Earlier quoted context omitted.
This allows WhatsApp to MITM. Whatapps can rekey both Alice and Bob, decrypt both their messages from that point onwards (incl unsent messages) and forward them re-encrypted with their real keys. The only notification might be that rekeying warning, if the users have turned it on. In this scenario even the double-checkmarks are present. This is contrary to WhatsApp's claim that even they cannot snoop. PS: I just chec…
> This allows WhatsApp to MITM. Whatapps can rekey both Alice and Bob, decrypt both their messages from that point onwards (incl unsent messages) and forward them re-encrypted with their real keys. The only notification might be that rekeying warning, if the users have turned it on. In this scenario even the double-checkmarks are present. This is contrary to WhatsApp's claim that even they cannot snoop. You've just d…
Hey nerdy Moxie I wanna chow down on your phallus till u're fukin epileptic