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WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

theguardian.com

81–90 of 334 posts

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#81
post #66
post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

He never said it was. Google services aren't isolated like normal apps either, as far as I know they can access other app's data (when installing cyanogenmod, I had to install google apps in some weird way from the bootloader because it has to change protected things on the phone). His point of requiring google's stuff to be installed is valid, even if he wrote it thinking payload gets sent over it.

Even if you don't install Gapps, large parts of Android/CyanogenMod are from Google as well. How does installing Gapps make the security worse?

Good question.

Stock Android does not, by inspecting network traffic, contact Google servers.

Google play services and other GApps, do, and they can be exploited in this traffic, or told by Google to activate other backdoors.

Signal with GApps, Google can know which phones, and which users, are using Signal, thats a security vulnerability. Google can infer from their Google-messaging thing, that notifications are sent, and have a high probability of knowing if it is to Signal. Who talks when is leaked to Google.

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#82
post #42
post #37

Has anyone heard anything from Moxie Marlinspike on this? Would be interesting to hear his perspective - Open Whisper Systems helped out with the encryption.

Well there are two possible scenarios I can envisage. a) The issue was an oversight and simply a bug that needs to be fixed. The question is why FB doesn't want it fixed? b) Moxie knew that this issue existed but was NDA'ed into leaving it there for nefarious purposes. Now it's public knowledge, where do we go from here?

This exploit is not in the original Signal protocol, and was introduced by WhatsApp. Signal discards undelivered messages when the encryption key changes, WhatsApp implemented re-transmission because they think it improves usability. It does do that, and it also introduces this security risk.

It says so right in the article. Stop spreading FUD.

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I suspect that, i think server has ability to request any individual message to be transmitted with new key.

As I mentioned in my comment, any exploit that can only be performed by the server is essentially irrelevant as we already can't have perfect trust in the server. edit: I'll respond to everyone as I worded this poorly. What I mean is that an attack that can only be performed by Facebook/WhatsApp(depending on if you believe they are kept separate) is mostly irrelevant as they could always push an update to the App/Pla…

We can't have perfect trust in the server, so this feature being supported by the client breaks the security guarantees of WhatsApp's E2E encryption.

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#84

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As long as they manage the public keys for their users, they will be vulnerable to exactly this problem. Indeed, the most secure way is to generate and confirm each other's keys physically. The thought occurred to me that those whom you'd want to truly communicate securely with are likely people you have met via other means already --- including in person --- and so you should already have an effectively independent…

What about political dissidents trying to organize some event in a group where different people are brought in by others in a web of trust.

If A and B have already mutually validated each others' keys, and B and C have, then B can act as an intermediary to relay the key fingerprints.

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#85
post #35

I am flagging this article, as the headline and first few paragraphs are very misleading, based on my understanding from: https://tobi.rocks/2016/04/whats-app-retransmission-vulnerab... They make it sound like an intentional backdoor has been introduced to WhatsApp to facilitate monitoring. Rather, it seems like there's a weakness in the implementation, where if a message is undelivered, an attacker could trick the s…

> They make it sound like an intentional backdoor has been introduced to WhatsApp to facilitate monitoring. Rather, it seems like there's a weakness in the implementation If I wanted to install an intentional backdoor, I would do my best to make it look like merely a weakness in the implementation.

Sure, but this is now conspiracy theory logic that is impossible to disprove.

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#86
post #35

I am flagging this article, as the headline and first few paragraphs are very misleading, based on my understanding from: https://tobi.rocks/2016/04/whats-app-retransmission-vulnerab... They make it sound like an intentional backdoor has been introduced to WhatsApp to facilitate monitoring. Rather, it seems like there's a weakness in the implementation, where if a message is undelivered, an attacker could trick the s…

Agree, also think it's likely this is an intentional trade off: Alice sends Bob a message but Bob's phone is broken, so he gets a new one. The message is marked as not delivered. Since Bob's old keys are lost, WhatsApp needs to generate new ones. The trade off here allows in this scenario to accept new keys transparently. Not ideal from a security perspective but what would be the alternative? Bob meeting Alice so th…

Could do it like Signal - always alert the user when a key changes, and not resend messages until the user approves it (having checked the key fingerprint via some other channel, if so inclined).

As it stands now, you have to trust both the client app on your phone, and the WhatsApp server. The idea with e2e encryption was that you only have to trust the client app on your phone.

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#87
post #47

Well, I kind of feel that I have to repost my comment on this old thread[1] with regards to the government of Egypt blocking Signal application: "Isn't it "weird" that they chose to block Signal app and not the signal-protocol based Whatsapp? If Whatsapp really implements the same kind of security and privacy measures that Signal does, why is Whatsapp allowed to continue operating? If signal is preventing them spy on…

This is a nice idea, but it's also baseless speculation.

You're implying that WhatsApp, Inc. gave the Egyptian government the ability to remotely retrigger this backdoor whenever they want to (for those who haven't actually read the article: this backdoor only works when WhatsApp issues a key change for a conversation, and only then in certain circumstances). In other words, you imply that Egypt said "Hey WhatsApp, please actively hack into your Egyptian users' messages and send us the results" and WhatsApp said "ok sure here ya go".

It might be true, but Zuckerberg might be a FSB informant and I might be Elvis reincarnate. These are all baseless, yet not entirely implausible claims.

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#88
> […] In the WhatsApp case, chat data is end-to-end encrypted, and there is nothing the company can do to assist the FBI in reading already encrypted messages. This case would be about forcing WhatsApp to make an engineering change in the security of its software to create a new vulnerability -- one that they would be forced to push onto the user's device to allow the FBI to eavesdrop on future communications. This is a much further reach for the FBI, but potentially a reasonable additional step if they win the Apple case.

[1] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/03/possible_gove...

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#89
post #35

I am flagging this article, as the headline and first few paragraphs are very misleading, based on my understanding from: https://tobi.rocks/2016/04/whats-app-retransmission-vulnerab... They make it sound like an intentional backdoor has been introduced to WhatsApp to facilitate monitoring. Rather, it seems like there's a weakness in the implementation, where if a message is undelivered, an attacker could trick the s…

Agree, also think it's likely this is an intentional trade off: Alice sends Bob a message but Bob's phone is broken, so he gets a new one. The message is marked as not delivered. Since Bob's old keys are lost, WhatsApp needs to generate new ones. The trade off here allows in this scenario to accept new keys transparently. Not ideal from a security perspective but what would be the alternative? Bob meeting Alice so th…

>what would be the alternative

Alice getting a warning about key mismatch and a prompt for redelivery (or not) of the pending message. Bob-with-new-phone does not get to read Alice's messages to Bob without Alice at least having the ability to verify that Bob indeed changed phones. Yes, 99% of users will click "redeliver" without checking, but the ones for whom secrecy matters won't.

I think this is how Signal does it, and it is the only security conscious way to do it.

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#90
post #47

Well, I kind of feel that I have to repost my comment on this old thread[1] with regards to the government of Egypt blocking Signal application: "Isn't it "weird" that they chose to block Signal app and not the signal-protocol based Whatsapp? If Whatsapp really implements the same kind of security and privacy measures that Signal does, why is Whatsapp allowed to continue operating? If signal is preventing them spy on…

Good point, but there is an explanation: blocking WhatsApp would lead to more intense backlash. See what happened in Brazil.

Not to say it isn't both, but the price of blocking (one of) the most popular messaging apps is higher to a government than blocking one in the low low percentiles of usage.

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