"Separately, we previously disclosed that our outside forensic experts were investigating the creation of forged cookies that could allow an intruder to access users’ accounts without a password. Based on the ongoing investigation, we believe an unauthorized third party accessed our proprietary code to learn how to forge cookies." So that exactly explains how my Yahoo account was used to send spam despite having a pa…
Are you sure they actually logged in to your account to send spam (are the spam emails visible in your sent folder), or could it be that someone is just spoofing the SMTP MAIL FROM / email From: header?
Yahoo discloses hack of 1B accounts
281–290 of 596 posts
Re: Yahoo discloses hack of 1B accounts
#282Earlier quoted context omitted.
Agree, but a collision even for md5 is a relatively rare event. When brute-forcing the bcrypt hash, this would reduce the attempts you would need to try against a given hash, but only by a very small factor. With a reasonable work factor, I would assume it would still make a brute force attack impractical at scale. I didn't do the test, but I'd expect that there wouldn't be more than a handful of collisions for the m…
I've done it before on a 1 billion word / password list and didn't get any collisions.
Re: Yahoo discloses hack of 1B accounts
#283Earlier quoted context omitted.
> "Passing the password through MD5 reduces the complexity to 128 bits, you can't get that back." Assuming that the new hash is secure (and sha512 is generally agreed to be secure), then, given a specific sha512 hash, the original MD5 hash can only be determined via rainbow tables, which is a Big-O operation. Even though entropy is reduced, it's still a significant work to determine the original MD5 hash (significant…
In this case an attacker isn't looking for a collision (which would mean creating two passwords with the same hash, and what hash that is doesn't matter). The attacker needs a password with a specific hash, and the best reported attack for that is around 2^128.
Personally, I'm willing to chance that my password will be discovered via a brute-force attack within the next 0.65 billion billion years [1]
[1] http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/2847/how-long-wou...
Re: Yahoo discloses hack of 1B accounts
#284Earlier quoted context omitted.
... "offshore workers" are not a race. You realize offshore workers could be the same race as the person posting right?
Given the context, you know damn well what he means - it's coded speech and I refuse to believe that you're that naive.
Re: Yahoo discloses hack of 1B accounts
#285So yeah, Yahoo's been hacked. Duh...
Finance and Flickr are about all Yahoo is good for any more, and I think my portfolio page loads (instead of 404'ing) maybe 1/2 the time I request it...
(God I really hope they dont mess with flickr though...)
Re: Yahoo discloses hack of 1B accounts
#286Earlier quoted context omitted.
But would it require users to change their password? The way I would have implemented it, but would be keen to know how secure it is, is that you start with the md5 of the password ( md5(password) ). You then bcrypt or scrypt that md5 ( bcrypt(md5(password)) ) and replace the md5 in your database with the bcrypt hash. When a user logs in, all you need to do is to calculate the md5 first then check that md5 against th…
It's one way to do it, which is okay sometimes. The other way is to add a new empty column for bcrypt. The next time the user logs in, you save the bcrypt hash and you remove the MD5 hash. Over time, the active users will be migrated to the new scheme. The only issue is the abandoned accounts, they'll keep the old weak scheme.
Re: Yahoo discloses hack of 1B accounts
#287Earlier quoted context omitted.
As a data point: when I was a teenage code monkey in 2004 writing PHP I already understood that unsalted MD5 is unsafe. According to Wikipedia: * 2004 it became possible to find MD5 collisions at a rate of one per hour on a cluster * 2005 it became possible to do this within "a few hours" on a consumer laptop * 2006 it became possible to do this within one minute * nowadays it's possible to do this "within seconds" P…
MD5 collisions are probably not important for passwords.
The MD5 collisions attack usually done by researchers: They want to generate 2 files with the same MD5 hash (they can put anything they want in these files).
This kind of attack doesn't affect passwords. The user picked one file (i.e. the password), you don't know it, you can't change it, you can't choose it.
Re: Yahoo discloses hack of 1B accounts
#288Earlier quoted context omitted.
... "offshore workers" are not a race. You realize offshore workers could be the same race as the person posting right?
This is technically true, which is the best kind of true. Swap in nationalist, chauvinist. It's utterly clear what was meant by racism above, in spite of your semantics.
Re: Yahoo discloses hack of 1B accounts
#289Technically; no. Bureacratically; maybe. Given the skill and self direction of offshore workers; impossibly.
Re: Yahoo discloses hack of 1B accounts
#290Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've done it before on a 1 billion word / password list and didn't get any collisions.
That being said md5 does generate collisions. I was playing with the IMDB movie database that you can download. They use a combination of the title and the year as a primary key. I tried using an md5 instead to save space (but giving a reproducible ID instead if an identity column), and got many collisions. No collision with SHA256.