It seems the current state of prediction is only slightly better than the state of image recognition pre multiple level NNs
There might be still a theoretical jump that's needed
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It seems the current state of prediction is only slightly better than the state of image recognition pre multiple level NNs
There might be still a theoretical jump that's needed
If page 33 depicts the working of the brain on a very high level, the world model (or simulator) residing inside the agent must contain a model/simulator of the agent itself. Could this give rise to self perception or consiousness?
If page 33 depicts the working of the brain on a very high level, the world model (or simulator) residing inside the agent must contain a model/simulator of the agent itself. Could this give rise to self perception or consiousness?
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-representat...
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-higher/
https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/self-representational-approac...
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness05/L...
If page 33 depicts the working of the brain on a very high level, the world model (or simulator) residing inside the agent must contain a model/simulator of the agent itself. Could this give rise to self perception or consiousness?
So consciousness was not raised at this point. But that doesn't mean that it couldn't be an emergent property.
[1] Am at NIPS and attended the speech.
If page 33 depicts the working of the brain on a very high level, the world model (or simulator) residing inside the agent must contain a model/simulator of the agent itself. Could this give rise to self perception or consiousness?
this is an excellent point. This model has to be recursive and may be depth of recursion has something to do with self-perception?
a) Self-perception does not seem like consciousness to me at all. In meditation, if done properly, there is very little self left. It feels more like pure awareness. It is almost the opposite of the model of the self that the brain constructs.
b) I fail to see how the fact that a mechanism refers to itself should somehow give rise to the feeling of conciousness. Why would it? Nobody would predict consciousness from that if we would not already know it exists and it's easy to imagine a device that has a model of itself and is not self-aware.
I understand the need to somehow fit this into our scientific framework, and the idea that "consciousness is just what it feels to have a brain" is the best thing we have, but I don't think it explains anything. There is something we are missing.
These slides remind me of the worst PowerPoints ever.