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I'm giving up on PGP

blog.filippo.io

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Re: I'm giving up on PGP

#91
post #5

After all that, he was only getting two encrypted emails a year! Damn. That's crazy.

Stuff to secure has moved away from email while gpg stays primarily an email project.

The concept of a git repo means I don't need to sign anything, I'll just roll back if I pull the wrong thing. Socialization at work hasn't atomized enough that my only human contact with a coworker would be a gpg signed commit anyway.

The concept of software distribution being a tar.gz.gpg or verifiable md5 file is obsolete. Behind the scenes something like apt-get does sign things but how to integrate its list of keys with the end user is a mystery, its essentially magic. Besides it provides no security due to lack of MITM attacks in practice.

Can't use weak OS unless its behind a firewall and/or accessed thru the VPN at which case plain text is about as strong as the weak OS and the VPN or physical LAN security is "good enough". So plain text files on a networked fileserver perhaps relying on login and permissions but mostly on audits and fire anyone who does something naughty.

Everyone needs version control no one understands it but some (repeat, some) devs. The office workers have a similar relationship with encryption. Also with databases, given that the corporate standard database is Excel. Talk till you're blue in the face, it will change nothing. Good idea, not good here. If you think office workers need encryption, you're probably wrong, but it doesn't matter because they definitely won't listen anyway. They're too busy making closed siloed databases with Excel.

Can't use GPG to encrypt web traffic, there's a whole SSL https infrastructure for that. The cloud resource can be assumed to be completely government(s) (and hacker) penetrated at all times. Just a business decision to tolerate that. I could use encryption and signing to make sure the traffic isn't interfered with before the NSA logs their plain text version for all time, but why make their jobs easier?

Theft by monitoring data streaming along has pragmatically never been an issue, its always someone stealing entire (copied) mass storage units at a time or violating some higher level business protocol of "look don't touch" or even "don't touch" but its all plain text for various business reasons. So encrypting transmissions is a waste of time, VPN exists more for AAA not to prevent monitoring. Multiple governments and corporations have full access to both endpoints anyway.

Email is mostly (exclusively?) used for public mailing lists, and corporate receipt/alert traffic, none of which is benefited by encryption. Its been awhile since I had an old fashioned email conversation on email. Everyone loves texting and messaging none of which can use encryption usefully.

Anyone with physical access to the device can pown it completely, theres no point in a purely software solution you're just wasting time.

Very few people had an application in business or real life in say 1970 for nuclear grade encryption. Nothing has changed to 2017 other than its trivial to provide if someone needs it. Many people want it because its cool but it does nothing useful for them so its definitely a want not need.

Re: I'm giving up on PGP

#92
PGP may have broken down for the author, but it's still used in a lot of places. For example, to communicate with our bankers at work, every email has to be properly encrypted and signed - or it goes into a blackhole. The only way to exchange public keys(initially) is in person. Once that is done, new keys are provided from that person, and the WoT expands.

tldr; it doesn't work for the author, but it does work for lots of individuals and even more companies with secrets to protect.

Re: I'm giving up on PGP

#94
post #62
post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

From my experience - the only PGP users I've spoken to were all on Keybase or interested in a Keybase invite. It was about 6 people for the entirety of last year - and 3 people this year...it certainly has a problem of "almost nobody uses it" but Keybase seems to have eased things slightly - or at least made it easier to discover people who also use PGP. I see the two problems being "People don't bother with the clun…

Keybase has clearly moved away from PGP. They want to use Saltpack whenever possible, NaCl based encryption. They want to solve the problem of multiple devices and not having to share the private key between all of them. As far as I know they are working on a messaging app as well.

They also have the KBFS which is very interesting. But yes, very clearly pivoted away from PGP and are working on other problems.

Re: I'm giving up on PGP

#95

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"How do you distribute the one time pad " Well you hand it over to the person you want to communicate with when you see them? Obviously that doesn't work in many use cases, but in many other cases it does: many of the most important secrets are typically shared with people you already know and have met before, no?

Like when I buy a new laptop from new egg, or contact Laura Poitras with a hot scoop...

No.

But when you discuss the real secrets with a journalist or business partner in another country. Email communication with family members, business partners.

Potentially web traffic with your company's or bank's website, why not.

Re: I'm giving up on PGP

#96
One perfectly valid way so solve the web of trust issue with PGP is to simply ignore the web of trust issue with PGP. Just stick your pubkey on your website and you are done. You just understand that there is a very low chance that any encrypted email from an unknown entity is actually from a composite entity. If you think that you are of interest to entities that have the ability to MITM your pubkey, you might want to mention the problem to potential unknown email senders as a disclaimer on your web page. In practice an entity with the power to MITM pubkeys is not going to use the facility unless they are really really sure as they are eventually going to get caught at it.

Things like Signal and Whatapp don't solve the web of trust issue either so you are not any worse off by using the head in the sand approach.

Re: I'm giving up on PGP

#97
post #62
post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

From my experience - the only PGP users I've spoken to were all on Keybase or interested in a Keybase invite. It was about 6 people for the entirety of last year - and 3 people this year...it certainly has a problem of "almost nobody uses it" but Keybase seems to have eased things slightly - or at least made it easier to discover people who also use PGP. I see the two problems being "People don't bother with the clun…

Keybase has clearly moved away from PGP. They want to use Saltpack whenever possible, NaCl based encryption. They want to solve the problem of multiple devices and not having to share the private key between all of them. As far as I know they are working on a messaging app as well.

I admit my ignorance of saltpack and keybase's implementation of it, but don't they propose storing the key for you? That seems to create a trust issue, which is precisely what the author is complaining people don't pay attention to, trust.

On the other hand, perhaps the argument for this would be a "trusted 3rd party" model (a la S/MIME).

Re: I'm giving up on PGP

#98

I find very interesting the point about the split between what WoT was supposed to be, in theory, and what little it represents, in practice, in terms of practices about key verification. It has been said many times that the lack of adoption of pgp in mail was due to the average user not being able to grasp the concepts behind the proper operation for key management, but the article points to common practices among "…

Is there anything that enables key exchange via smartphones? Ideally it should be as easy as a meatbag handshake.

Basically, if you can swap contacts via NFC then the pgp keys should go along with it.

It may have some theoretical weaknesses such as the exchange being MITMable if the users don't verify something on their screens, but I think having many more edges in the graph would make up for it since you might already have an expectation for that key through friends-of-friends paths.

Re: I'm giving up on PGP

#99
post #73

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're right, long-term identity keys are bad. Long-term identity keys are not a concept mandated by PGP, they are a result of how people use PGP or how PGP is implemented in a third party app. No part of PGP requires you to use a key more than once. This phenomenon is a result of a consensus of people deciding on a terrible operations strategy over a long period of time. Edit: this comes to mind https://gist.github.…

Agreed, I link to that Gist exactly in the "Moving Forward" section ;)

I must have missed that.

I don't understand what the point of your blog post is, in this case. You understand why PGP is needed and how it's important, how to use it correctly, etc, yet you "give up" on it because no one you know uses it correctly.

Is that it?

By the way, how are you going to send someone a 5GB file securely using Signal?

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