After all that, he was only getting two encrypted emails a year! Damn. That's crazy.
I'm giving up on PGP
41–50 of 350 posts
Re: I'm giving up on PGP
#42I find very interesting the point about the split between what WoT was supposed to be, in theory, and what little it represents, in practice, in terms of practices about key verification. It has been said many times that the lack of adoption of pgp in mail was due to the average user not being able to grasp the concepts behind the proper operation for key management, but the article points to common practices among "…
"I wonder if pgp is fundamentally flawed, or we have a deep conceptual usability issue here." I think it's the key model that's fundamentally flawed rather than pgp itself, which I believe the author of the article is also asserting. In cryptography, it is often explained that despite the fact a one-time pad is guaranteed-secure (given various conditions I'm eliding), it is not practical in the vast majority of cases…
It already has this to a small extent. You can sign other stuff like domain DNS entries or HTTP servers (by hosting a file).
Re: I'm giving up on PGP
#43I've been thinking a lot about PGP and other encrypted messengers lately. It's incredibly hard to get a lot of people to agree on one messaging app besides default SMS. I wish there was an open source suite of tools for mobile/desktop that easily layered PGP on top of SMS/email experience and would fall back in the absence of keys. Perhaps bluetooth for swapping keys with friends. It's something that needs to be seam…
Carriers would need to change the way they handle SMS, and everything a carrier does is subject to state regulations. And states seem to like clear text.
Re: I'm giving up on PGP
#44Dark Mail seems to be dead. Are there any efforts to make e-mail secure by default and e2e encrypted?.
Commercial offerings for companies at https://www.prettyeasyprivacy.com/
(No, they are not, as far as I know “open core” – they are 100% free software.)
Re: I'm giving up on PGP
#45Dark Mail seems to be dead. Are there any efforts to make e-mail secure by default and e2e encrypted?.
Most interesting e2e projects have abandoned email, specifically SMTP, as a secure messaging platform. I would look outside SMTP-based solutions if I were to start using a different project (assuming doing so is an option... I hope it is!). My recommendation here is Signal: https://whispersystems.org/
I think what we're going to need is a new, non-SMTP protocol, which preserves all of the good things about email, while providing e2e encryption and (pseudonymous) identity assurance. I don't know enough to be involved in designing that protocol, though, other than saying what I want to see as an end-user.
Re: I'm giving up on PGP
#46To me, Keybase ( https://keybase.io ) seems to solve the "PGP has a bad user experience" problem correctly for like 90% of the population. You post proofs of your public key to known media (Twitter, Github, your website, etc.) which you control. These can be checked by anyone. Even if the remote person doesn't know they are talking to you (as a human entity), they know they are talking to the combined online persona…
Is keybase open source?
Re: I'm giving up on PGP
#47To me, Keybase ( https://keybase.io ) seems to solve the "PGP has a bad user experience" problem correctly for like 90% of the population. You post proofs of your public key to known media (Twitter, Github, your website, etc.) which you control. These can be checked by anyone. Even if the remote person doesn't know they are talking to you (as a human entity), they know they are talking to the combined online persona…
The killer is lack of good x-platform e-mail integration + difficulties in key management.
I was hoping keybase might take that on as well, but AFAIK that's not on their roadmap.
Re: I'm giving up on PGP
#48Then there is the main complaint:
> I haven't done a formal study, but I'm almost positive that everyone that used PGP to contact me has or would have done (if asked) one of the following:
> - pulled the best-looking key from a keyserver, most likely not even over TLS
> - used a different key if replied with "this is my new key"
> - resent the email unencrypted if provided an excuse like "I'm traveling"
I haven't done a formal study either, but no one I know that uses PGP would do any of these things under any circumstances. PGP works fine for myself and the group of people I know that use it, because we adhere to security protocols that are just as important -- if not more -- than using PGP itself.
Re: I'm giving up on PGP
#499/10 end users just don't understand that security and convenience are inversely related.
Security has to be usable, if it's not usable then (almost) no one will use it.
Re: I'm giving up on PGP
#50I find very interesting the point about the split between what WoT was supposed to be, in theory, and what little it represents, in practice, in terms of practices about key verification. It has been said many times that the lack of adoption of pgp in mail was due to the average user not being able to grasp the concepts behind the proper operation for key management, but the article points to common practices among "…
"I wonder if pgp is fundamentally flawed, or we have a deep conceptual usability issue here." I think it's the key model that's fundamentally flawed rather than pgp itself, which I believe the author of the article is also asserting. In cryptography, it is often explained that despite the fact a one-time pad is guaranteed-secure (given various conditions I'm eliding), it is not practical in the vast majority of cases…