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Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

hardenedlinux.org

21–30 of 81 posts

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#22

rootkit is defined by google search as "a set of software tools that enable an unauthorized user to gain control of a computer system without being detected." * A set of software tools: Check * Unauthorized user: Check Caveat: user is not authorized by you, but by someone else (Intel) * Gain control of a computer system without being detected. Can access your machine while it appears to be "powered off" but plugged i…

AFAIK the remote network access ("AMT") has to be specifically enabled.

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#23
post #14
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Just reboot after neutralization. "With ME neutralized, the MEI interface disappears from the PCI bus, and the integrated NIC ceases to work, but will resume to work after a reboot."

The phrasing there is confusing. Does the NIC break because the ME is neutralized? Then rebooting again with the ME neutralized will break the NIC again. Why would the NIC only break once after the ME is neutralized? The system is started from a fully powered-off state after the ME firmware is updated. Maybe the NIC has some sort of non-volatile state that gets updated when the ME fails to initialize, and then the NI…

This was confusing to me as well. I'm parsing this as the NIC doesn't work after a cold boot, but does after a warm boot.

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#24
post #22

rootkit is defined by google search as "a set of software tools that enable an unauthorized user to gain control of a computer system without being detected." * A set of software tools: Check * Unauthorized user: Check Caveat: user is not authorized by you, but by someone else (Intel) * Gain control of a computer system without being detected. Can access your machine while it appears to be "powered off" but plugged i…

AFAIK the remote network access ("AMT") has to be specifically enabled.

Some of the paranoia around ME is the possibility of undocumented commands or magic byte sequences in software or via network interface that give an attacker invisible control of the ME without the user enabling AMT. The NIC is probably still powered and active for WoL.

It's also conceivable that a state-level adversary could have hidden arbitrary DMA instructions in a NIC firmware, that only activate with a signed request embedded in a random packet. Some of the largest firmware blobs on Linux systems are for NICs.

Most people aren't facing state-level targeted attacks, but without open firmware, it's nearly impossible to know for sure if one is vulnerable. And, with botnets and worms, it only takes one non-state-level attacker discovering the backdoor for everyone to be affected.

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#25
post #14
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Just reboot after neutralization. "With ME neutralized, the MEI interface disappears from the PCI bus, and the integrated NIC ceases to work, but will resume to work after a reboot."

The phrasing there is confusing. Does the NIC break because the ME is neutralized? Then rebooting again with the ME neutralized will break the NIC again. Why would the NIC only break once after the ME is neutralized? The system is started from a fully powered-off state after the ME firmware is updated. Maybe the NIC has some sort of non-volatile state that gets updated when the ME fails to initialize, and then the NI…

Apologies this is interpretation not actual experience, so grains of salt.

It's not strictly clear to me, but reading through what they're doing, the ME isn't re-engaged or its unclear how it recovers itself.

Unless the ME is operating with a recovery binary somewhere that isn't covered by Nicola's neutralizer and the subsequent flashing, I don't think it comes back in to normal operation.

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#27

Has Intel ever commented about this issue of removing ME? Surely, at least 1 Intel staffer reads HN and they must have discussed this internally. Unless they just brush this off as negligible (a couple thousand paranoid/"extremist" users) ?

Their discussion may have consisted of "too bad these extremists don't realize that the ME is harmless if you don't have an Intel NIC".

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#28
post #5
post #3

The ridiculous shit that needs to be done just to rid of some blob. RISC-V can't take the market over fast enough.

How much are you willing to pay for it? There's the Talos Secure Workstation, which has no such ME firmware (but costs ~$4.5k) [1]. A RISC-V desktop is pretty far out. There is an Arduino style microcontroller being made in silicon, though [2]. [1] https://www.crowdsupply.com/raptor-computing-systems/talos-s... [2] https://www.crowdsupply.com/onchip/open-v

> How much are you willing to pay for it?

Wrong question. Correct question would be: "How much are you willing and able to pay for it?" (for me it much more strongly fails because of the second criterion).

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#29
post #28
post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How much are you willing to pay for it? There's the Talos Secure Workstation, which has no such ME firmware (but costs ~$4.5k) [1]. A RISC-V desktop is pretty far out. There is an Arduino style microcontroller being made in silicon, though [2]. [1] https://www.crowdsupply.com/raptor-computing-systems/talos-s... [2] https://www.crowdsupply.com/onchip/open-v

> How much are you willing to pay for it? Wrong question. Correct question would be: "How much are you willing and able to pay for it?" (for me it much more strongly fails because of the second criterion).

If you're willing to pay more than you're able to, I think you need to reevaluate your approach to personal finance first.

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#30
post #5
post #3

The ridiculous shit that needs to be done just to rid of some blob. RISC-V can't take the market over fast enough.

How much are you willing to pay for it? There's the Talos Secure Workstation, which has no such ME firmware (but costs ~$4.5k) [1]. A RISC-V desktop is pretty far out. There is an Arduino style microcontroller being made in silicon, though [2]. [1] https://www.crowdsupply.com/raptor-computing-systems/talos-s... [2] https://www.crowdsupply.com/onchip/open-v

Not really. They're talking Raspberry PI type devices based on RISC-V on the market by late 2017.

Source: MeetBSDCon 2016, update on RISC-V by the team who designed it.

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