HSMs are shit. In a previous role we used a major vendor's HSM to protect our private keys. VERY expensive kit, more expensive than the load balancers and servers combined. We needed to use Elliptic Curve keys for a particular customer - so it got even more expensive as we had to buy: 1. A license from the LB vendor to use the HSM 2. A licence from the HSM vendor to use EC with the LB. ... even though they trumpeted…
Why I don't like smartcards, HSMs, YubiKeys, etc.
61–70 of 139 posts
Re: Why I don't like smartcards, HSMs, YubiKeys, etc.
#62What is the problem to take a 10$ stm32f discovery board and use it as TPM. There are different flash protections: 1) you can read/write flash via JTAG 2) you can only write flash, but not read the old one 3) you can't rewrite flash, neigher can you read it. You will still have to implement USB communication, but there is already a lib from STM for it. Some models also have generous flash (in MB ranges). You can use…
Re: Why I don't like smartcards, HSMs, YubiKeys, etc.
#63https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_security_module
Please expand your acronyms.
Re: Why I don't like smartcards, HSMs, YubiKeys, etc.
#64Re: Why I don't like smartcards, HSMs, YubiKeys, etc.
#65 The feature table also lists various supported
applications, demonstrating the interest of the
manufacturer in programming the device for specific
applications, rather than providing a platform for others
to do so. (Imagine if manufacturers of USB drives made USB
drives for text files and USB drives for image files and
USB drives for MP3 files and so on, and the idea of selling
a USB block device was alien to these people. If you wanted
to store a new kind of file on a USB drive, you had to
convince the manufacturer to implement support for it.) The
draw of the Nitrokey then is the possibility the
manufacturer merely incidentally allows alternate firmware
to be flashed, rather than the manufacturer explicitly
capitalising on the premise of an HSM as a general-purpose
platform.
Great point, and completely lost on manufacturers.Re: Why I don't like smartcards, HSMs, YubiKeys, etc.
#66What is the problem to take a 10$ stm32f discovery board and use it as TPM. There are different flash protections: 1) you can read/write flash via JTAG 2) you can only write flash, but not read the old one 3) you can't rewrite flash, neigher can you read it. You will still have to implement USB communication, but there is already a lib from STM for it. Some models also have generous flash (in MB ranges). You can use…
Send me a locked STM32F1 chip and I'll send you back the binary contained in it. Not kidding. The problem with general purpose MCUs is that they are trivial to break.
Re: Why I don't like smartcards, HSMs, YubiKeys, etc.
#67Could something like this be built using ARM's TrustZone features?
Re: Why I don't like smartcards, HSMs, YubiKeys, etc.
#68Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why do you have your HSM where Heartbleed matters?
This exactly. You use a HSM so it doesn't matter if your server gets popped.
In the case where an HSM is used for e.g. database encryption, one absolutely still cares.
The attacker can politely ask the HSM to decrypt all the data. On the bright side, you didn't lose the key, and your HSM should at least securely log the fact that all your data just walked out the door.
For SSL offload the situation is less dire, but it is totally realistic that heartbleed might cause issues for a system with HSM assisted offload (e.g. leaking plaintext) because the protocol processing happens in software. Any sane architecture should protect the actual private key though.
In general, the right way to think about HSMs is that they protect your keys, not your data. If you care more about the data than the keys, you absolutely need to care about the security of your host.
Re: Why I don't like smartcards, HSMs, YubiKeys, etc.
#69Earlier quoted context omitted.
Both Smart Cards and HSMs can (and frequently do) contain FIPS validated cryptographic modules and can be USB devices. What seems to set them apart is content capacity and speed. A "HSM" can usually store dozens, hundreds, or even tens of thousands of keys and can do numerous cryptographic operations per second. Most "smart cards" can only store a few keys and frequently 1-2 operations per second. Many HSMs also add…
> The other key feature usually found in HSMs but not smart cards is backup/cloning without exporting the key (in PKCS#11 terms). This means that the key can be moved between HSMs with all the protections in place. I've yet to see a smart card that does this. How does this work? Can an attacker buy an identical HSM, back up the key, and restore it onto the new HSM?