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I have a tongue-in-cheek theory: Those who think there's not a "hard problem of consciousness" or hand-wave it away with purely materialist explanations probably aren't conscious. Folks. We have p-zombies in our midst...
I have a tongue-in-cheek theory: Those who think there's not a "hard problem of consciousness" or hand-wave it away with purely materialist explanations probably aren't conscious. Folks. We have p-zombies in our midst...
Can't the same argument be used to show that consciousness is a whole bunch of things that it clearly is not. Just arguing that consciousness has certain attributes and it shares those attributes with something else, doesn't make consciousness an example of that something else. I think there is a general trend towards thinking of consciousness as an emergent phenomenon which exists when a system is complex enough and…
Perhaps there is no "why" of consciousness. There doesn't need to be a reason for it. If we take evolution as a given, properties of organisms arise either because having that property makes you more likely to survive in some environment, or as a side effect of other properties.
We like to think that consciousness is special, because it "feels" special. But it's likely just some consequence of complexity.
As for when it occurs, i think there's a bit too much black and white thinking going on there. For one, most people probably wrongly assume that humans are fully self aware. If you spend a minute thinking about it, you'll realise how little we're actually aware of in ourselves. Therefore we're on some spectrum of self awareness. "Less conscious" beings would feel a little less self aware, and "more conscious" beings would be more self aware. It's unlikely there's a defined point where you "become" self aware.
To illustrate the point. When would you say you are "drunk"? What's the right definition of drunk? Is it when you start to feel any effect at all? Is it when you have the first sip? Or is it when you can no longer walk? Most people usually think of such words as "tipsy", which would come some time before drunk. Or maybe even "blackout" which is associated with drunk but is usually somehow more so.
What this makes clear is that there's less a problem with working out "what is consciousness and when does it happen", and more a problem of how we have evolved to discuss concepts.
This is why we're only just coming to terms with the non-binary nature of many concepts. It's not innate in us to recognise gradations. It's innate to draw lines between things and categorise them. But that doesn't mean that such classification applies so well to the universe.
You need to study some actual neuroscience. some things to remember: - neurons are not linear. - neurons are not time-invariant. - neurons are not causal. - neurons and actual anatomical connectivity do not map well to electronics-inspired wiring diagrams. (see: dendritic arbor) - anatomical structure does not imply functional connectivity. - functional connectivity does not imply anatomy! - synaptic junctions respon…
Why not? Isn't the brain a biological machine?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's just survival - when a species gets good enough at survival, it learns to adapt to the environment. First, it's just simple reflex, trigger and response, but with evolution, species have become more capable to adapt. We, humans, need to adapt not just to nature, but also to the human society and technology, and human consciousness is just that function. Without it we would be dead of hunger and thirst in 3 days.…
Ok, so would an algorithm that uses genetic programming have a consciousness like we do? Would it be capable of feeling pain? This is what I'm interested in, but what the theory presented here fails to explain.
It would also need to be embodied and responsible for its own survival, more generally, otherwise it's just a computer running software, in a lack of external context.
I have a tongue-in-cheek theory: Those who think there's not a "hard problem of consciousness" or hand-wave it away with purely materialist explanations probably aren't conscious. Folks. We have p-zombies in our midst...
You need to study some actual neuroscience. some things to remember: - neurons are not linear. - neurons are not time-invariant. - neurons are not causal. - neurons and actual anatomical connectivity do not map well to electronics-inspired wiring diagrams. (see: dendritic arbor) - anatomical structure does not imply functional connectivity. - functional connectivity does not imply anatomy! - synaptic junctions respon…
> which you shouldn't Why not? Isn't the brain a biological machine?
Can't the same argument be used to show that consciousness is a whole bunch of things that it clearly is not. Just arguing that consciousness has certain attributes and it shares those attributes with something else, doesn't make consciousness an example of that something else. I think there is a general trend towards thinking of consciousness as an emergent phenomenon which exists when a system is complex enough and…
To me, to be 'conscious' is to be able to make decisions. Presented with all our sensory data, memories, knowledge etc the brain creates possible models of the future every millisecond, and passes them to the conscious component which is where we choose how to proceed.
After a time, it doesn't even have to ask us anymore as it just replays past decisions. For example walking, driving a car, reading words etc
Earlier quoted context omitted.
the same input does not always produce the same output. IN fact it's guaranteed not to for at least three reasons: - repeatedly presenting the same input to a neuron has a response that depends on neurotransmitter reuptake rates. If the synapse isn't "recovered", you get a different spike rate out. - neurons fire stochastically in the absence of stimulus. Responses to small stimuli are indistinguishable from noise. -…
Right, but these properties don't make neurons acausal, it makes them stateful and sensitive to noise which is not explicitly modelled as an input in your view. You can model noise as a constant input variable though, which preserves causality, just not determinism.
Great explanation, makes perfect sense to me! My own heory is pretty much the same. Just like you can experience other internal sensations in your body when nerves send signals that are recognized by the brain, the brain can recognize it's own signals. I highly recommend to read Godel Escher Bach(if you dont have time - just read the introduction to get the general idea). In this book author explains how the meaning…
There's no reason for a brain of a dog or a mouse to not be able to observe/experience itself. It's model is probably simpler, but I bet it exists.
Like before you have learned how to code, your brain dedicated only a tiny amount of neurons to represent the concept of "programming", or "building a website". But as you gain experience, the model of this stuff becomes more complex. I imagine that brains that have less neurons can still recognize their own signals("be coonscious") , but their map of their brains would have a "smaller resolution".
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As I grow older and learn things, I notice that I get better at "meta" thinking, that is having a map/model of my own thought processes. When I'm trying to figure something out, I'm also paying attention to the mental operations my brain goes through as it tries to figure something out.
The perfect example of it is writing fiction. When you begin learning to write, and are just trying to type a certain amount of words per day(to practice), you are doing it without any "self awareness", your brain generates words/ideas, and that's all there is to it, you don't know how.
But as you get better, and pay attention to what your brain does as you write, you develop a neural network that represents the process of writing, the operations your brain needs to go through to craft a story. Because in the case of writing fiction this model is complex, it is really easy to notice. Like I can feel the neural network in my brain that repressnts the programming concepts that I've learned, I can also feel the neural network that represents mental operations I need to go through to generate a story.
Good writers have a more complex and "correct" map of mental processes they need, so they can competently craft stories any time they want. But you can also learn to write well without "meta" thinking. Then your brain just strengthens the correct mental pathways as you practice(without "meta" thinking), so you can be good at writing without understanding how.
I think that this is a really cool example, where you can directly experience a brain building a map of itself and then using it.