Goldman Sachs Drops Out of R3 Blockchain Group • Hacker News Board

Re: Goldman Sachs Drops Out of R3 Blockchain Group

#91

Post by murbard2 » Tue, Nov 22, 2016, 10:45 PM UTC

jaekwon wrote: post #86

murbard2 wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you want a deterministic smart contract language, you're better off avoiding the EVM, or worse, Solidity. Tezos (plug, plug, I'm the lead on the project) has a VM with a full formal specification, and even a rudimentary embedding in Coq. It's statically typed and purely functional. https://tezos.com/language.txt

We should plug Tendermint into Tezos as well.

My thinking for v2 is to use Honey Badger BFT, with multi party computation for bonding / unbonding

Overall I agree with Tendermint (and contra Casper or DFinity) that it's better to just drop availability and to have a less subjective security model. It sucks to get stuck if the validator set becomes compromised, but it's not the end of the world.

Re: Goldman Sachs Drops Out of R3 Blockchain Group

#92

Post by jaekwon » Wed, Nov 23, 2016, 2:04 AM UTC

murbard2 wrote: post #91

jaekwon wrote: post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We should plug Tendermint into Tezos as well.

My thinking for v2 is to use Honey Badger BFT, with multi party computation for bonding / unbonding Overall I agree with Tendermint (and contra Casper or DFinity) that it's better to just drop availability and to have a less subjective security model. It sucks to get stuck if the validator set becomes compromised, but it's not the end of the world.

Whats the benefit of HB over Tendermint? There's a good reason we don't use threshold signatures... to guarantee accountability. We could add threshold signatures on top of Tendermint, but for most use cases this isn't very helpful (yet).

In any case, building on TMSP will make Texas future proof to any consensus engine that favors safety. Let's discuss.

Re: Goldman Sachs Drops Out of R3 Blockchain Group

#93

Post by murbard2 » Wed, Nov 23, 2016, 5:22 PM UTC

jaekwon wrote: post #92

murbard2 wrote: post #91

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My thinking for v2 is to use Honey Badger BFT, with multi party computation for bonding / unbonding Overall I agree with Tendermint (and contra Casper or DFinity) that it's better to just drop availability and to have a less subjective security model. It sucks to get stuck if the validator set becomes compromised, but it's not the end of the world.

Whats the benefit of HB over Tendermint? There's a good reason we don't use threshold signatures... to guarantee accountability. We could add threshold signatures on top of Tendermint, but for most use cases this isn't very helpful (yet). In any case, building on TMSP will make Texas future proof to any consensus engine that favors safety. Let's discuss.

Yes, getting accountability needs to be addressed, we're looking at several ways. Makes no sense to build on TMSP, governance that introspects over the consensus mechanism is a key feature. We aspire to be a utility, not a vassal.