The Coming War in the Middle East (2013)
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The Coming War in the Middle East (2013)
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Re: The Coming War in the Middle East (2013)
#2Re: The Coming War in the Middle East (2013)
#3Re: The Coming War in the Middle East (2013)
#4And how do we as a civilization in the 21st century prevent foreign meddling and funding of armed groups?
Re: The Coming War in the Middle East (2013)
#5And how do we as a civilization in the 21st century prevent foreign meddling and funding of armed groups?
Re: The Coming War in the Middle East (2013)
#6And how do we as a civilization in the 21st century prevent foreign meddling and funding of armed groups?
Re: The Coming War in the Middle East (2013)
#7Re: The Coming War in the Middle East (2013)
#8This article should have a (2013) tag at the end of it. But yeah, the Hoover Institute predicted this fight pretty damn well.
The Syrian war, which we have a heavy hand in - before and after it began, started in 2011. That article was written in 2013. And did you check the bio of the author.
It's easy to predict a war after it has started and when you have inside knowledge and a hand in how the war should proceed and end.
Re: The Coming War in the Middle East (2013)
#9They were not completely correct. They seem to underestimate the stability and staying power of Jordan. Both US and Israel help to make sure that Jordan is protected. Stability of monarchies are typically underestimated.
Syria's government has not fallen, and Nusra (now Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) never managed to unify the rebel to any great extend and build a real powerful land and tax base. Thanks to Russia and Iran Syria is (very) slowly winning the fight against the rebels.
Looking from Saudi Arabia into Yemen we see as somewhat different picture now. Al Qaeda has a solid branch in Yemen but they have been very much infused into the culture and politics of the region. They lack real reach and hitting power for global jihad. They are to busy marrying tribal chiefs daughters and smuggling (mostly gas).
The real issue for the Saudis in Yemen is not Al-Qaeda (who are in the South) but rather the Hutti rebels that live right along the border to Saudi Arabia. These guys have been extremely successful and Saudi Arabia does not like it at all, they are spending Billions to fight them, much more then they spend to fight Al-Qaeda in Yemen.
They seem to view the Hutti mostly as a Iranian Proxy (maybe future proxy) even while the evidence for this is currently rather thin. The Hutti seem to want Iranian support but the Iranians seem to think that even without much direct support the Hutti are already doing a good job. Saudia Arabia is spending money like nobody buissness and the Iranians handle the same conflict with a tight budget.
Its the other way around in Iraq/Syria, there Iran is blowing the money and the Saudis can be rather conservative.
One interesting thing for everybody to know is also the strong decentralisation of Al-Quida, groups like ISIS and al-Sham (Nusra) do their own thing now. Al-Quida in Yemen is also not a very good branch of Al-Quida central.
Re: The Coming War in the Middle East (2013)
#10This article should have a (2013) tag at the end of it. But yeah, the Hoover Institute predicted this fight pretty damn well.
It's easy to predict a war long after it has started. It's like predicting WW II in 1942. The Syrian war, which we have a heavy hand in - before and after it began, started in 2011. That article was written in 2013. And did you check the bio of the author. It's easy to predict a war after it has started and when you have inside knowledge and a hand in how the war should proceed and end.
In 2011, the US was in the process of normalizing relations with the assad regime. Obama had appointed a new ambassador the year before. Clinton thought assad was a 'reformer.'
The war broke out for a very simple reason: assad's forces kept shooting peaceful protesters.
Despite assad's violence, the Revolution remained largely peaceful for several months. It became a full-blown war almost a year after it began, when it became clear assad was not interested in reform, much less stopping the killings.