Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm not sure what attack you're talking about then. If someone steals my key and points my IPNS location to a new file, I'd likely still be hosting the files right? > you need to actually encourage archiving of data to get resilient against attacks. Yes, but this feels like a distinct issue. Neither of these things are enough on their own (encouraging mirrors or providing the tech to distribute the hosting).
>I'd likely still be hosting the files right? Yes but the entire web points to the wrong files since you no longer own the IPNS location. It's similar to loosing access to your DNS configuration or loosing your GPG keys to an attacker.
Along with a link to all previous versions if there's a chain. And anyone pointing to a specific version will still see that rather than the new one.
> It's similar to loosing access to your DNS configuration
Yes.
> or loosing your GPG keys to an attacker.
I think that's a bit strong.
> >I think there was some discussion about having there be a chain
> Still same problem, if the private key gets leaked, a malicious attacker can manipulate the entries on the chain.
I'm really not sure that's right, IPNS doesn't give you the ability to edit content.