Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Every exploit shop considers Spidermonkey to be a security clusterfuck yet it's still in use. Can you elaborate why SpiderMonkey is worse than Chakra, JavaScriptCore, and V8? SpiderMonkey has approximately the same security track record as all of them. I think you're conflating the lack of sandboxing and some mistaken security-related decisions in the Firefox chrome with some sort of intrinsic security problem in t…
It's not just the lack of sandboxing, Spidermonkey is qualitatively worse than V8. The metric used is ease of finding exploitable bugs _without taking sandboxing into account_. I do not know where you get your security track record from, but there is a big asymmetry in public-vs-private information on the matter. Most of the research into exploitation happens behind closed doors and the general public is not privy to…
No, there isn't. Security bugs are made public in both Bugzilla and chromium.org once enough time has passed. Both engines have been around for years and years, so there's been plenty of time to gather data.
Sorry, but I'm not going to just trust "I can't link to anything because it's secret".
The only security-related feature that V8 has that SpiderMonkey doesn't is limited constant blinding in the non-optimizing JIT only. This is a cosmetic feature that does little, because an attacker can trivially subvert it. See: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=677272#c58
> Reducing the attack surface is meaningless when the attack surface is humongous, yet people keep reiterating the same old fallacies.
How are we going to get the attack surface down unless we reduce it?
> Mozilla has said nothing about starting again on solid foundations.
1. What do you think Servo is?
2. Who else is talking about "starting again on solid foundations"?