Many people won't check the url when signing in if everything looks to be on the up and up. This is why I really liked one of the things Yahoo did which was create a sign-in seal. Every time you signed in Yahoo would display a custom image that you set and if that image wasn't there then something was probably wrong.
My bank (ING Direct) had that. And then they were bought by Capital One, who removed it.
We Got Phished
41–50 of 156 posts
Re: We Got Phished
#42For everyone else, I think the new 2fa Google App approach is better. When you go to login, your Google App pushes a notification to your phone and you have to click on it. This raises the bar to doing a simultaneous login, which isn't impossible, but even if it weeds out a large number of attacks for now, it's worth it!
Re: We Got Phished
#43It's worth nothing the new user-image-before-password-input for Google is an anti-phishing feature. Of course, most people won't think that deeply when prompted with a password request and a similar UI.
Re: We Got Phished
#44Re: We Got Phished
#45Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've been thinking about buying a YubiKey. Could you elaborate on how U2F protects against MitM and phishing?
U2F knows what domain you're using it with, and won't send an authentication token for google.com to phisher.com.
(I'm not arguing that PMs are >= to hardware 2FA, but they both will keep this exact thing from happening)
Re: We Got Phished
#46Earlier quoted context omitted.
Here's some more info on that: http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/19155/effectiven...
That's incredible. Not sure if I underestimated hackers ingenuity or underestimated how gullible people are..
Re: We Got Phished
#47Google needs to add some optional intelligence to Chrome so that when it comes across a site with suspiciously similar design as key google urls by on a unrenognized url, it should warn the user.
You can use Google's AMP that is hosted on their domain, to host a redirect, effectively using their domain to host the phishing attempt. Check the screenshots on http://motherboard.vice.com/read/how-hackers-broke-into-john...
> “We are approaching the point in this case where there are only two reasons for why people say there’s no good evidence,” Rid told me. “The first reason is because they don’t understand the evidence—because the don’t have the necessary technical knowledge. The second reason is they don’t want to understand the evidence.”
Is there anywhere we can see this evidence? Objectively I'm curious how an attack which consisted of basic phishing was determined to be definitively supported by the Russian government.
If they broke SHA-256 or coerced a Russian CA to generate a Google certificate, I'd agree... but using bitly and decades-old "click this link to reset your password" links? Come on.
Re: We Got Phished
#48That's an interesting way to put it...
Re: We Got Phished
#49Kudos to Exploratorium for sharing. Hopefully they're able to find a way to use it in their educational exhibits.
Re: We Got Phished
#502 factor authentication is key here. The ubikey is a gold standard for business - no one should do serious business without it! For everyone else, I think the new 2fa Google App approach is better. When you go to login, your Google App pushes a notification to your phone and you have to click on it. This raises the bar to doing a simultaneous login, which isn't impossible, but even if it weeds out a large number of a…
Google Authenticator doesn't do any kind of push notification when you log in. Each endpoint uses a shared secret (the server and the mobile app share that secret beforehand) to generate a time-limited code.