Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Worst case, they know and set up a phishing site. They'd need to specifically gain access to the last known good IP address, which might be different depending on which DNS resolver you talk to (geodistribution, when the record was last updated, etc). I wouldn't really consider that a realistic attack vector.
Withing a small hosting provider this might be pretty simple. Attacker might lease a bunch of new servers and get the IP that was recently released. Then they could launch a DDoS to force address resolution in their favor. It's a bit far-fetched, but a lot of very successful attacks seem that way until someone figures out a way to pull them off.
Sure, within a small host or ISP, that may be doable; even then, I'd consider it a stretch. But if we were to limit it to those constraints, when will this ever be exploited except as a PoC? No entity large enough to actually want to run this exploit on has an architecture where this would be feasible (due to things like geodistribution and load balancing), nor would be hosted on a provider so small that their IP pool can be exploited in the manner described. If I were an attacker, I'd focus on something with much bigger RoI.