Earlier quoted context omitted.
It doesn't take much of an imagination to attack this. The older I get in tech the more I realize we just go in circles re-implementing every bad idea over again for the same exact reasons each "generation". Ah well. TTL is TTL for a reason. It's simple. The publisher is in control, they set their TTL for 60 seconds so obviously they have robust DNS infrastructure they are confident in. They are also signaling with s…
Assume we serve the last known record after TTL. Here's the attack: - Compromise IP (maybe facebook.com) - DDoS nameservers - facebook removes IP from rotation - Users still connect to bad actor even though TTL expired "We have standards for a reason" is absolutely correct, and we can't start ignoring the standards because someone can't imagine why we need them _at this moment_
> Here's the attack:
> - Compromise IP (maybe facebook.com)
- Attacker generates or acquires counterfeit facebook.com certificate.
> - DDoS nameservers
> - facebook removes IP from rotation
> - Users still connect to bad actor even though TTL expired
I understand what you are saying, but this attack scenario is extraordinarily difficult as a means to attack users who have opted to configure their local DNS resolver to retain a last-known-good IP resolution. It involves commandeering an IP and counterfeiting Facebook's SSL/TLS certificate. As I have said elsewhere in this thread, all sites are currently vulnerable to such an attack today for the duration of their TTL window. So if this is a plausible attack vector, we could plausibly see it used now.