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Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

ietf.org

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Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#91

Post by 4ad »

anonymousDan wrote: post #89
4ad wrote: post #72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They don't MITM, they record sessions and later decrypt out-of-band as needed. With TLS 1.3, they would need to MITM, which require infrastructure changes and potentially affects the performance. They are complaining TLS 1.3 forces them to do work they otherwise wouldn't have to do.

But how doe they get access to the keys for the session without modifying the end hosts or MITM'ing the traffic?

> without modifying the end hosts

They have full control of the end hosts. That's why the group policy forces you to use Internet Explorer instead of letting you use Firefox.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#92

Post by XorNot »

Nursie wrote: post #73
4ad wrote: post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Apparently you never had a card skimmed I did! Just a few days ago! And it's a chip card, but doesn't matter since the skimmer used the information in the magstripe online. > Your card is cancelled and you have to wait some days for a replacement (requiring also that you update it everywhere) The new card arrived minutes ago! And that only because they had to send it to a different country. I would have gotten one…

There isn't enough information on the chip to perform online transactions, the CVV is not present. I call shenanigans.

The CVV is optional depending on the type of transaction you're authorized to make.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#93

Post by 4ad »

XorNot wrote: post #92
Nursie wrote: post #73

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There isn't enough information on the chip to perform online transactions, the CVV is not present. I call shenanigans.

The CVV is optional depending on the type of transaction you're authorized to make.

In particular, Amazon does not require a CVV.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#94

Post by _0w8t »

lexman0 wrote: post #18

There are a lot of keyboard warriors in this thread. This guy puts forward a rational argument for big business. Unless you have extensive experience in this area, perhaps you shouldn't be so quick to judge "oh they are just spying on their users". The simple answer to this question is that if a way is not given for businesses to decrypt their own traffic that they generated and encrypted, they simply won't encrypt i…

In my experience the only thing the banking industry cares is convince for themselves.

For example, I heard exactly the same arguments against forward security. On surface they look reasonable with all the complains how it would be difficult to decrypt and re-encrypt again at end points to forward the traffic for scanning.

But then the same bank uses Akamai to defend against DoS and let Akamai decrypts all the traffic so the bank can use Acamai's infrastructure for caching and minimize load on own systems.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#95

Post by xg15 »

drvdevd wrote: post #62
blazespin wrote: post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The guy is basically complaining that they have to change all their infra over to MITM versus just decrypting traffic with private keys. He is right, it will be expensive. And he has a right to complain. Should the working group ignore him? It's a tough call. You risk forking standards when you start to do that.

I think the working group should ignore him because he ultimately wants to save a buck now and shoot himself in the foot, he just doesn't realize it yet. The enterprise as walled garden approach to security seems quite out of date and is harmful to all parties involved. Like it or not, the Internet at large has made our life one big WAN party, and we need to come to terms with that sooner rather than later.

That clashes big time with the fact that more users than ever are online today with no clue at all about security. (And it's not practical to change that)

So how would that new approach look? The de-facto solution today is that security is more and more delegated to device vendors and cloud providers. But that seems worse to me than delegating it to the admins of your organization that you know and trust.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#96

Post by xg15 »

kybernetyk wrote: post #75
lexman0 wrote: post #18

There are a lot of keyboard warriors in this thread. This guy puts forward a rational argument for big business. Unless you have extensive experience in this area, perhaps you shouldn't be so quick to judge "oh they are just spying on their users". The simple answer to this question is that if a way is not given for businesses to decrypt their own traffic that they generated and encrypted, they simply won't encrypt i…

>Take this example: A regulation says... Then the regulations are faulty and need updating to be on par with reality.

Because why? The idea that an organization shots be able to monitor its own traffic seems quite reasonable to me.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#97

Post by ghshephard »

jrockway wrote: post #5

I don't understand why the banks need to change TLS 1.3 to spy on their employees. When I was working at a bank, there were literally no routes from the Intranet to the Internet. Everything went through a proxy that blocked 95% of the Internet. Had to run a proxy server on jrock.us in order to get anything done. (They just bought the list of sites to block, and jrock.us never ended up on it. Blacklisting, very good s…

To be clear, you did have a route to the internet from the intranet, it was just proxied through your bank's proxy server. Presumably you could run TLS through that Proxy Server?

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#98

Post by anonymousDan »

4ad wrote: post #91
anonymousDan wrote: post #89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But how doe they get access to the keys for the session without modifying the end hosts or MITM'ing the traffic?

> without modifying the end hosts They have full control of the end hosts. That's why the group policy forces you to use Internet Explorer instead of letting you use Firefox.

Hmm, but why can't they just then record the session keys as before even for forward secure TLS (presuming we are talking about clients inside the bank initiating TLS sessions to external parties)?

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#99

Post by ghshephard »

akvadrako wrote: post #37
perlgeek wrote: post #23

Isn't it pretty much standard for such organizations to have decrypting and re-encrypting proxy, with their own CA that clients have to trust? If they do, I don't see how forward secrecy changes much, and they just have to tap the plain text from the proxy. If they don't, I'm seriously surprised.

The original message does make dubious claims, but a little later in the thread, the real issue becomes clear. from https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/1n1tQSGKMBJKsmuCe-... "With TLS 1.2 we can ask the end user to take a Wireshark trace and then decrypt it with the RSA private key. With TLS 1.3 we will have to rely on the SSLKEYLOGFILE feature in Firefox and Chrome, so we want it to be available. Unfortunately…

If you control the server, you can decrypt any time you want, because obviously if you were able to decrypt at one time, you can do so later.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#100

Post by je42 »

lexman0 wrote: post #18

There are a lot of keyboard warriors in this thread. This guy puts forward a rational argument for big business. Unless you have extensive experience in this area, perhaps you shouldn't be so quick to judge "oh they are just spying on their users". The simple answer to this question is that if a way is not given for businesses to decrypt their own traffic that they generated and encrypted, they simply won't encrypt i…

There should internal standards to always encrypt; even internal traffic. Instead of just drop TLS altogether; they could at least reencrypt to a secure protocol that they still support.
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