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Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

ietf.org

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Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#81

Post by nindalf »

MertsA wrote: post #63
lexman0 wrote: post #18

There are a lot of keyboard warriors in this thread. This guy puts forward a rational argument for big business. Unless you have extensive experience in this area, perhaps you shouldn't be so quick to judge "oh they are just spying on their users". The simple answer to this question is that if a way is not given for businesses to decrypt their own traffic that they generated and encrypted, they simply won't encrypt i…

So my knowledge about how forward secrecy works in TLS is spotty to say the least but the server still has the decryption key in memory AFAIK. Why not sidestep the issue and just create a secure channel between the server and whatever middleboxes there are that need the key and just send the ephemeral key that way? I get that this would be less secure to use in practice because now anyone who gets control over the se…

The person requesting this change controls neither the server nor the client. They control the intermediate network. If they could log the ephemeral keys it would solve the solution, but only the server and client hold that.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#82

Post by saurik »

Welcome to almost two weeks ago? Given how many people seem to be upvoting and commenting on this link, was everyone else on vacation for some holiday I don't celebrate when this came up multiple times before?

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12560284

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12561004

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12563481

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#83

Post by zigzigzag »

jrockway wrote: post #22
zigzigzag wrote: post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The guy's rationale may be kind of dubious but it's clearly stated: there aren't any tools that do DPI on TLS 1.3 sessions right now.

You don't need to do deep packet inspection when you just MITM all the traffic.

You're getting mixed up. DPI on TLS sessions requires a MITM. The problem is (apparently) that there are no enterprise-grade MITM solutions that support TLS 1.3

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#84

Post by doikor »

4ad wrote: post #31
raverbashing wrote: post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> display a very shallow understanding of how secure systems should work. They still ask about mother's maiden name, prevent paste of passwords, took forever to adopt EMV in the US and other idiocies It's security by cargo-culting

> took forever to adopt EMV in the US and other idiocies Totally agree with your comment, but I'll go a little bit on a tangent here. I am an European, all my cards have always had a chip, I have not even seen a card without a chip until I visited the United States. All this reluctance to adopt chips seems so ridiculous to me. But then I spent more time in the United States and with magnetic stripe cards, and boy do…

> insert PIN, wait another 5-30 seconds until the transaction runs, and then get my card back.

Never had to wait that long (unless there is some issue at the bank but usually it just stops working all together when that happens) here in Finland. Also if you use a credit card instead of debit for payments under X euros it doesn't even call the bank just checks on the machine if the pin matches the chip.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#85

Post by askmike »

kybernetyk wrote: post #75
lexman0 wrote: post #18

There are a lot of keyboard warriors in this thread. This guy puts forward a rational argument for big business. Unless you have extensive experience in this area, perhaps you shouldn't be so quick to judge "oh they are just spying on their users". The simple answer to this question is that if a way is not given for businesses to decrypt their own traffic that they generated and encrypted, they simply won't encrypt i…

>Take this example: A regulation says... Then the regulations are faulty and need updating to be on par with reality.

That is not how businesses manages risk, and even less how IT departments of businesses manage risk.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#86

Post by 4ad »

Nursie wrote: post #77
4ad wrote: post #60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> having to wear a safety belt is also an inferior experience but we do it for safety We do it for our safety, but chip cards are for bank's safety. Consumers are not liable for fraud anyway, only the bank wins. Let me put it another way. Americans consumers love their magstripe; they wouldn't if they lost money. At the end of the day, chip or magstripe, the consumer has the same amount of money in his bank account.…

Because otherwise the consumer pays for the fraud and the insurance anyway. Why do you think US credit card transaction fees to merchants are so damn high?

> Why do you think US credit card transaction fees to merchants are so damn high?

Because until recently, the law was that merchants were not allowed to charge discriminatively based on cash vs. card. Since americans love their CCs and unlike in Europe, CCs are a massive part of retail sales, it was not too difficult for the credit card mafia to impose whatever fees on merchants.

Here in Europe, fees are capped through regulations, not out of credit card companies good will.

I mention this because chip cards can only protect against using a physical clone of a card, while the vast majority of fraud happens online, where the card is not present and the chip is not used at all.

The fraud profile is the same in Europe and the US, yet the fees are vastly different. That has nothing to do with chip vs. magstripe.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#88

Post by anonymousDan »

lisivka wrote: post #29
jrockway wrote: post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You don't need to do deep packet inspection when you just MITM all the traffic.

MITM introduces significant delays, yet another single point of failure, adds significant risk of leakage. Current DPI are passive, so they have no such problems.

Could you elaborate a bit on what kind of passive DPI you can usefully do on an encrypted TLS session? Do you mean something like this? https://arxiv.org/pdf/1607.01639v1.pdf

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#89

Post by anonymousDan »

4ad wrote: post #72
anonymousDan wrote: post #21

I don't quite get what they are currently doing. Is it that they have some kind of Internal mitm proxy that proxies every TLS session with external hosts, recording the conversation for later offline analysis? Why wouldn't they still be able to do that? Or are they just worried about their ability to intercept internal conversations? I'd be really interested to know what a typical bank security architecture looks lik…

They don't MITM, they record sessions and later decrypt out-of-band as needed. With TLS 1.3, they would need to MITM, which require infrastructure changes and potentially affects the performance. They are complaining TLS 1.3 forces them to do work they otherwise wouldn't have to do.

But how doe they get access to the keys for the session without modifying the end hosts or MITM'ing the traffic?

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#90

Post by dimman »

ivan_gammel wrote: post #66
blazespin wrote: post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The guy is basically complaining that they have to change all their infra over to MITM versus just decrypting traffic with private keys. He is right, it will be expensive. And he has a right to complain. Should the working group ignore him? It's a tough call. You risk forking standards when you start to do that.

It will be expensive, but there's a big market for that. I'm pretty sure that the costs will fall, as soon as the industry understands the demand.

Most likely yes, the only sad part is that as soon as there's a cost for banks, it's the customers who ends up paying for them one way or another.
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