Live data from Hacker News

ORWL – The first open source, physically secure computer

crowdsupply.com

101–110 of 195 posts

Re: ORWL – The first open source, physically secure computer

#101
post #6

> If someone has physical access to your computer with secure documents present, it’s game over! Err, why? Is AES encryption not sufficient? And the key is secure in my head - not something someone could steal. So, why is this even a thing?

if someone has physical access to your computer with secure documents present, and then you use it again, it's game over.

Re: ORWL – The first open source, physically secure computer

#102

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You have to account for Moore's Law within the few trillions GP mentioned

Bruce Schneier and others[1] have done the math on brute forcing 256 bit keys: even with a perfectly efficient computer using the least amount of energy possible, you would have to deplete the entire energy content of the Sun to just iterate over a 225 bit keyspace once, let alone do anything meaningful with those keys. Moore's Law doesn't really factor into it. [1] http://security.stackexchange.com/a/6149

Sure it does. It just happens to necessitate our transition to Kardashev III.

Re: ORWL – The first open source, physically secure computer

#103

This doesn't seem all that secure. Against an Evil Maid attack, your best mitigation is to be able to keep everything, OS and all, on a portable drive which is self-encrypting; essentially an encrypted PE.

Does that work? Can't the evil maid install a malicious hypervisor to dump interesting pieces of memory every few minutes?

Re: ORWL – The first open source, physically secure computer

#104
post #7
post #6

> If someone has physical access to your computer with secure documents present, it’s game over! Err, why? Is AES encryption not sufficient? And the key is secure in my head - not something someone could steal. So, why is this even a thing?

Unless you also want to perform the AES operations in your head, you have to rely on the hardware and software of your computer to perform them. An attacker could then replace the AES routine you use with one that stores a shadow copy of your key, or exfiltrates it over some covert channel.

Well yeah, but this assumes I don't know the fact the physical access had place and proceed to enter the passphrase revealing the key unawaringly afterwards. If this is what "having physical access" means - then yes, I agree, game over, and ORWL solves it.

But if I know the attack took place (FBI broke into my house, the computer is locked in a safe etc.) - the data should be secure.

Re: ORWL – The first open source, physically secure computer

#105

Earlier quoted context omitted.

NSA Engineer: Hey boss, this one's using a 256 bit key. NSA Manager: Connect it to the quantum computer that doesn't "exist". Five minutes later.. NSA Engineer: We now have access.

quantum computers, at best, divide the bit-strength of a symmetric key like AES in half[1]. Brute forcing a 128 bit key is theoretically possible (in the sense that you can do it if you marshal the entire world energy output to the cause, you could crack 1 key/yr), but not a 5 minute process. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grover%27s_algorithm

that is assuming that there is no better quantum algorithm for aes specifically. grover's algorithm is only optimal if brute force search is the only possible approach and there are no other exploitable properties.

considering that there already theoretical attacks that (marginally) faster than brute force on classic computers who knows how much more one could squeeze out with quantum algorithms.

Of course those are fairly speculative concerns.

Re: ORWL – The first open source, physically secure computer

#107
Now this is really cool! Though as with all things wireless I'd worry about working and somehow the key fob getting interfered with and boom computer locks up or if a sensor thinks I'm moving the computer when it's really just an Earth quake or maybe even my cat jumping on the table and then the encryption key is deleted.

So I love the idea but not sure of the practicality. Those sensors has to essentially work perfectly at all times and I'm not convinced until it's released and reviewed.

Re: ORWL – The first open source, physically secure computer

#108

How do they deal with the intel management engine in all intel chips? https://libreboot.org/faq/

In order for the Management Engine to really do much, you need to have a network card that the management engine knows how to talk to. If you don't have such a network interface, the ME can't do all that much, and any adverse security risks are near zero. Add to that things like the firmware write line being controlled by a completely separate microcontroller, and the big things that are discussed are completely infe…

In order for the Management Engine to really do much, you...

...have to trust Intel's publicly available documentation. In other words, this has to be taken on pure faith that it does exactly what they say it does in exactly the way they say it does it, and no more.

The problem with ME is that it consists of unauditable code that could be doing literally anything on the computer, completely transparent to the user. Furthermore, even if there is nothing untoward happening when the chip leaves the fab (again, must be taken on faith), a documented threat is having hardware interdicted, modified, and sent on its way.

Re: ORWL – The first open source, physically secure computer

#110

Now this is really cool! Though as with all things wireless I'd worry about working and somehow the key fob getting interfered with and boom computer locks up or if a sensor thinks I'm moving the computer when it's really just an Earth quake or maybe even my cat jumping on the table and then the encryption key is deleted. So I love the idea but not sure of the practicality. Those sensors has to essentially work perfe…

The SSD encryption key will only be deleted in case of a tamper event, NOT when the unit is moved. Tamper events are: * freezing the unit * drilling the secure enclosure or other wise breaking the traces on it * prying the enclosure off the PCB So I don't think you have to be too worried about a false trigger of a key erasing.
Post reply on HN