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Didn't know about this. They should have gone with AMD.
If you want to get away from that kind of thing, right now I think you're options are POWER8: https://www.raptorengineering.com/TALOS/prerelease.php AMD has something similar to the Intel Management Engine: https://libreboot.org/faq/#amd
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They explicitly address several attacks here: https://www.crowdsupply.com/design-shift/orwl#specific-attac...
None of those are evil maid attacks.
Where does the name come from? When pronouncing it I can't help but notice it's very close to "Orwell"
How do they deal with the intel management engine in all intel chips? https://libreboot.org/faq/
Didn't know about this. They should have gone with AMD.
It seems like a lot of the security of the device depends on active scanning (e.g. the LDS clamshell mesh, the IMU, the temp sensor, etc.), which stops working after 6 months. Is the vector of a malicious actor taking the device and waiting 6 months before breaking in considered not worth protecting against?
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/SEv2-c16.pdf
Best route is just to clone that thing somehow. IBM themselves already depreciated it in favor of a new product. Might still try to patent sue you or pull some other crap but worst case should be Chinese clones becoming available after new design is published. :) Designers of ORWL should try to copy more of the IBM thing's techniques to close gap between the two.
Far as design itself, I like that it's relatively simple, leverages a secure IC, easy to disassemble, will allow low-level modifications like firmware, and can run standard software. The next step will be a model that replaces the Intel chip with OpenSPARC, OpenPOWER, or RISC-V multicore with added components for trusted boot or I/O protections. Some are available with some coming online. Next step is using crypto to protect confidentiality & integrity of anything leaving SOC boundary so RAM is untrusted. There will be a lot of money involved for initial development and prototyping of even the first, open chip. So, I understand if they're taking it one step at a time. That's cool as long as they keep the advertising honest about risks they're keeping in for compatibility, etc.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you want to get away from that kind of thing, right now I think you're options are POWER8: https://www.raptorengineering.com/TALOS/prerelease.php AMD has something similar to the Intel Management Engine: https://libreboot.org/faq/#amd
Not SPARC?
http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/systems/opensparc/openspar...
The ASIC implementation was nice:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UltraSPARC_T2
On a 65nm node... very outdated one... it might get 8 threads in 8 cores at 1.6GHz each with hardware RNG, crypto accelerators, and hypervisor support. That's the kind of implementation that would be useless for an open-source, secure workstation, server, or HPC node. ;) Especially if one slightly increased single-core performance or cache when porting it to 45nm.
Forget that, though. Let's see what IBM will charge for their admittedly-faster pile of complicated silicon that only certain people can see which they've already turned into non-backdoored chips for you. ;)
How do they deal with the intel management engine in all intel chips? https://libreboot.org/faq/
> The battery itself is projected to last about six months without being connected to power. It seems like a lot of the security of the device depends on active scanning (e.g. the LDS clamshell mesh, the IMU, the temp sensor, etc.), which stops working after 6 months. Is the vector of a malicious actor taking the device and waiting 6 months before breaking in considered not worth protecting against?