Hi HN — Ben from Dropbox here on the desktop client team. Wanted to clarify a few things — - Clearly we need to do a better job communicating about Dropbox’s OS integration. We ask for permissions once but don’t describe what we’re doing or why. We’ll fix that. - We only ask for privileges we actively use -- but unfortunately some of the permissions aren’t as granular as we would like. - We use accessibility APIs for…
I removed the Dropbox app from my iPad when they started to require a active GPS to upload files. [about two years ago] If you disallow GPS for that app, it disallows you to upload files. Stupid decisions!?
How Dropbox Hacks Your Mac
351–360 of 435 posts
Re: How Dropbox Hacks Your Mac
#352Earlier quoted context omitted.
> - We never see or store your admin password. The dialog box you see is a native OS X API (i.e. made by Apple). To clarify for others: In /Library/DropboxHelperTools, you'll find a folder for each user full of setuid tools which run as root and do various privileged things. I assume that the client is presenting the normal OS X "ask for elevated access" UI and then using that elevated access to configure and install…
> @newhouseb, I don't have Office, so I've turned off the badge. Is Dropbox now going to leave my accessibility permissions the way I set them? Or is it going to reactivate a permission behind my back that it no longer even needs? Yep, we’re going to fix this so that if you uncheck it, we leave it unchecked. > This fiasco has probably made it more likely that Apple will further lock down the accessibility APIs, possi…
Re: How Dropbox Hacks Your Mac
#353Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's a good thing Dropbox isn't doing that, then.
Then please explain how it manages to set the accessibility privilege at every login after the user explicitly revokes it. I can see only two options: 1) the Dropbox client stores the password and uses it to hack the accesses db at every login. 2) the Dropbox client runs as root and does the same thing. Both options are simply terrible from a security point of view
[1]: https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Securi...
Re: How Dropbox Hacks Your Mac
#354Earlier quoted context omitted.
One example that comes to my mind, is that you won't be able to copy any data from keychain. In fact, no one can access protected keychain data, if any app that is not in Accessibility "listens to keyboard". http://apple.stackexchange.com/questions/212622/keychain-won...
Well, that's obviously a bug in OSX. I'm not saying that accessibility enabled apps can't do any harm, of course they can. My point is that they can't do more damage then regular applications you run on your mac. The only way to run third party apps in a kind of secure environment is sandboxing. All this accessibility api lockdown stuff from Apple is just pseudo-security.
Well, they can autoconfirm Keychain prompts with simulated keyboard events (and access all the keychain data in general), for one. This is something non-accessibility apps can't do after some update.
Keylogger can't steal your password, if it's in keychain, even though it knows your root password. But I guess now it'll add itself into accessibility, so… waiting for Sierra :)
Re: How Dropbox Hacks Your Mac
#355Earlier quoted context omitted.
I removed the Dropbox app from my iPad when they started to require a active GPS to upload files. [about two years ago] If you disallow GPS for that app, it disallows you to upload files. Stupid decisions!?
wat. I just checked, I have Location Services set to 'Never' on Dropbox and it uploads files fine.
Re: How Dropbox Hacks Your Mac
#356Anybody know a good OS X app to scan the file system for suid binaries? I guess I could do this with find from the shell, but a little utility app with a nice ui (and possibily some integration with a database to hide or categorize by threat level) seems like a smart thing to have on my system and run every so often.
http://commandlinemac.blogspot.com.es/2008/12/find-suidsgid-...
Re: How Dropbox Hacks Your Mac
#357Earlier quoted context omitted.
Well, that's obviously a bug in OSX. I'm not saying that accessibility enabled apps can't do any harm, of course they can. My point is that they can't do more damage then regular applications you run on your mac. The only way to run third party apps in a kind of secure environment is sandboxing. All this accessibility api lockdown stuff from Apple is just pseudo-security.
> My point is that they can't do more damage then regular applications you run on your mac. Well, they can autoconfirm Keychain prompts with simulated keyboard events (and access all the keychain data in general), for one. This is something non-accessibility apps can't do after some update. Keylogger can't steal your password, if it's in keychain, even though it knows your root password. But I guess now it'll add its…
Simulating keyboard (and mouse) events is easily possible for non-accessibility apps (CoreGraphics CGEvent api). In fact, AXUIElementPostKeyboardEvent is just a simple wrapper around CGPostKeyboardEvent.
Re: How Dropbox Hacks Your Mac
#358Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's a good thing Dropbox isn't doing that, then.
Then please explain how it manages to set the accessibility privilege at every login after the user explicitly revokes it. I can see only two options: 1) the Dropbox client stores the password and uses it to hack the accesses db at every login. 2) the Dropbox client runs as root and does the same thing. Both options are simply terrible from a security point of view
And this is what they actually do.
% ls -l /Library/DropboxHelperTools/Dropbox_u501
total 256
-r-s--x--x 1 root wheel 9632 Sep 8 20:10 dbaccessperm
-r-s--x--x 1 root wheel 116668 Sep 8 20:10 dbfseventsd
(Note the SUID bit and the root owner, meaning that these binaries will run with the root UID when started by a normal user.)Re: How Dropbox Hacks Your Mac
#359Earlier quoted context omitted.
Dropbox isn't hacking anything. They show the legit OS dialog requesting permission, and the user complies blindly.
Hence why I put hacking in quotes...? I'm just pointing out that Dropbox is arguably jumping through hoops to get access to functionality that Windows gives to basically anything that gets a toehold on your system.
Re: How Dropbox Hacks Your Mac
#360It looks like in 10.12 Apple has added TCC.db to SIP, so this will no longer work — Dropbox will, hopefully, actually be forced to request accessibility access like they're supposed to. I'm sure they'll still demand your admin password via a dialog that tries super hard to look like a system one to use for whatever other more or less nefarious purposes. Would be nice if there was an alternative that actually syncs as…
There was no other way to do what they did. The only reason Apple added API was because Dropbox came up with an idea that demonstrated the need for such an API to exist.