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Browser Fingerprinting

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Re: Browser Fingerprinting

#31

Post by hrjet »

marco1 wrote: post #12

In Firefox, you can control a lot via the `about:config` directives. You can put all that into a `user.js` for portability and reference, like this: https://github.com/delight-im/Secure-Firefox But unfortunately, there are so many things that can contribute to identification of your browser, and many of them cannot reasonably be blocked. The important section of the Chromium list is "(2) Machine-specific characterist…

There is one more called Firefox Debloat: https://github.com/amq/firefox-debloat/

... though it hasn't been recently updated.

We are developing `gngr` in the belief that privacy should be engineered into the browser, not worked around:

https://github.com/UprootLabs/gngr

Re: Browser Fingerprinting

#32

Post by chatmasta »

hrjet wrote: post #30
chatmasta wrote: post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why is that surprising? That's going to be a unique fingerprint in most datasets. The average user is not using Qubes, Firefox or Linux. Qubes isn't designed to blend into all other users; it's designed to make you unlinkable to your other Qubes instances. A better experiment would be to run the test in two of your Qubes instances. Hopefully they will both be unique.

Isn't Qubes OS just a hypervisor? The hosted OSes shouldn't leak that they are running under Qubes.

Yeah, but the point still stands most people are not running all the unique programs within the guest OSes (Linux, Firefox, Tor, ...).

But granted it may be surprising there was no collision with another HN user.

Re: Browser Fingerprinting

#33

Post by gcp »

dao- wrote: post #14
marco1 wrote: post #12

In Firefox, you can control a lot via the `about:config` directives. You can put all that into a `user.js` for portability and reference, like this: https://github.com/delight-im/Secure-Firefox But unfortunately, there are so many things that can contribute to identification of your browser, and many of them cannot reasonably be blocked. The important section of the Chromium list is "(2) Machine-specific characterist…

Hidden prefs are hidden for a reason and can be a foot-gun. The warning when opening about:config is no exaggeration, and copying-and-pasting a bunch of hidden prefs from an untrusted source is not a good idea. For instance: > user_pref("network.cookie.cookieBehavior", 1); If I remember correctly, this may break some sites. > user_pref("dom.battery.enabled", false); Questionable value for privacy / fingerprinting. If…

>> user_pref("dom.battery.enabled", false);

In current Firefox this is AFAIK whitened exactly to prevent fingerprinting. Disabling it will increase your footprint because it's not the default.

Re: Browser Fingerprinting

#34

Post by rnhmjoj »

the8472 wrote: post #24

Mozilla and Tor devs are currently working on upstreaming some Tor Browser patches[0] that reduce fingerprinting surface. E.g. cookie isolation based the domain shown in the URL bar[1] and making canvas readback opt-in[2] [0] https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Tor_Uplift/Tracking [1] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1299996 [2] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=967895

What about these? https://www.browserleaks.com/firefox https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=863246 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=903959

Re: Browser Fingerprinting

#37

Post by fractal618 »

Retr0spectrum wrote: post #8
0xmohit wrote: post #3

https://panopticlick.eff.org/

My font set was completely unique, which I partly expected. However, my canvas fingerprint was also completely unique, which did surprise me.

Any idea where we can find the most common subset of system fonts?

Isn't canvas fingerprint linked to your window size, if you maximize your browser, does that help?

Re: Browser Fingerprinting

#38

Post by sspiff »

fractal618 wrote: post #36

I just tried this out, and it seems that "system fonts" are the biggest identifier of mine. Any idea where I can find the most common subset of system fonts?

I'd love a settings checkbox saying something like "Disable user-installed fonts".

Re: Browser Fingerprinting

#39

Post by orthogon »

marco1 wrote: post #12

In Firefox, you can control a lot via the `about:config` directives. You can put all that into a `user.js` for portability and reference, like this: https://github.com/delight-im/Secure-Firefox But unfortunately, there are so many things that can contribute to identification of your browser, and many of them cannot reasonably be blocked. The important section of the Chromium list is "(2) Machine-specific characterist…

  Privacy is not easy.
Please don't adopt this tagline. This quick catchphrase is the shortest path to lies.

This kind of thinking basically helps powerful people erode the idea that they are not entitled to anybody's personal details.

Privacy is as easy as not shooting yourself in the foot.

You just have to not point the gun at your foot.

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