71–80 of 151 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
There are a handful of environments that can sustain a large, coordinated DDOS attack. Can you sink 10-20Gb/s of traffic forever? Not cost effectively.
If you live in 2002, nah. In 2016? Yes. Bandwidth is cheap and linode has high margins.
I wonder if this is a diversion to keep Linode's security team busy so they won't notice someone compromising the Xen nodes with XSA-185/6/7/8?
It would appear? you'd need to go back for quite a few months of being unpatched to find a genuine issue. Unless something about Amazon's mitigations don't apply universally.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's pretty much the same. You almost never want writes on both sides (now in a failover plan anyway), so as long as you have a switch for which side receives the writes, it's simple.
Site A, insure any writes use odd numbers in unique field. Site B, insure any writes use even numbers for unique field. This avoids conflict.
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Infrastructure to service requests is not (comparitively). Rarely is it trivial to distinguish DDoS traffic from legitimate traffic.
Usually it is and according to linode it is so in this case too. Edit: Not sure what alternate reality the downvoter lives in, but vast majority of the attacks these days are just "dumb" packet floods or even easier to filter reflection attacks. (Linode clarified this to be a mix of dns and ntp traffic on IRC) But hey, go on and find me a layer 7 attack that'll take down entire datacenters :)
I'd imagine it's easier to filter out bogus L3 traffic when the vast majority of your target IP space comes with explicit configuration as to what sort of L7 application traffic is acceptable.
I wonder if this is a diversion to keep Linode's security team busy so they won't notice someone compromising the Xen nodes with XSA-185/6/7/8?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Infrastructure to service requests is not (comparitively). Rarely is it trivial to distinguish DDoS traffic from legitimate traffic.
Usually it is and according to linode it is so in this case too. Edit: Not sure what alternate reality the downvoter lives in, but vast majority of the attacks these days are just "dumb" packet floods or even easier to filter reflection attacks. (Linode clarified this to be a mix of dns and ntp traffic on IRC) But hey, go on and find me a layer 7 attack that'll take down entire datacenters :)
source: been on the receiving end of a several hundred gigabit L7/HTTP DDoS from the aforementioned providers.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's pretty much the same. You almost never want writes on both sides (now in a failover plan anyway), so as long as you have a switch for which side receives the writes, it's simple.
Site A, insure any writes use odd numbers in unique field. Site B, insure any writes use even numbers for unique field. This avoids conflict.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
For our setup we just have master-master replication across two different hosting providers.
I've been wondering about this lately. Is it really feasible for a small (one man?) team to keep master-master MySQL replication over WAN running smoothly?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
For our setup we just have master-master replication across two different hosting providers.
I've been wondering about this lately. Is it really feasible for a small (one man?) team to keep master-master MySQL replication over WAN running smoothly?
I switch between either master with just a DNS update that propagates within 5 minutes.