Earlier quoted context omitted.
That wouldn't really be a proper salt, although technically it would fulfil the purpose of a salt, which is to prevent lookup tables being used.
Oh I agree, but I've seen too many "clever" systems which derive the salt from something like the username or another field or fields in the DB. Just because there is no obvious salt now doesn't mean it's not there. Only Dropbox knows how it worked at this point.
The Dropbox hack is real
211–220 of 557 posts
Re: The Dropbox hack is real
#212It was pretty obvious the dropbox hack was real several years ago, because lots of spam mail started arriving at my dropbox-unique email almost immediately after the breach. I changed my email to another unique address quickly back then. Unique-per-service email addresses work pretty well as a canary for breaches. Just make sure there is more uniqueness than just the service name to such addresses, or someone could s…
I cannot agree more, I do the same, and invite everyone else to do so. - Useful as a canary of which website has been breached - Useful as a canary of which website sold your details - and if your details are in the wild, you can stop the spam by deleting the address Credit cards should work the same way: a unique authorization code specific to this vendor or this transaction and useless to any other actor.
(Yes, I know about the '+' in gmail, but I suspect the word is out on it)
Re: The Dropbox hack is real
#213It was pretty obvious the dropbox hack was real several years ago, because lots of spam mail started arriving at my dropbox-unique email almost immediately after the breach. I changed my email to another unique address quickly back then. Unique-per-service email addresses work pretty well as a canary for breaches. Just make sure there is more uniqueness than just the service name to such addresses, or someone could s…
Re: The Dropbox hack is real
#214It was pretty obvious the dropbox hack was real several years ago, because lots of spam mail started arriving at my dropbox-unique email almost immediately after the breach. I changed my email to another unique address quickly back then. Unique-per-service email addresses work pretty well as a canary for breaches. Just make sure there is more uniqueness than just the service name to such addresses, or someone could s…
I do the unique address thing, but I also have another system for giving out temporary email addresses. If I want to hand an email address which I know should not receive email after say, this Saturday, I'll just give them "2016-09-03@tmp.grepular.com" - I don't have to do anything to set that up, it will accept mail as long as the date isn't after 3rd September 2016. I blogged it up a while ago here: https://grepula…
Re: The Dropbox hack is real
#215> As for Dropbox, they seem to have handled this really well. I'm biased, but I can't agree with this. From what I can tell, there are two communications from Dropbox -- one in 2012 [1] and one last week [2]. In 2012 they did not disclose that hashes were stolen, so I don't see how it's really relevant. In the latest communication, they don't actually explain the risk to the user. They say it is "purely as a preventa…
> I'm biased, but I can't agree with this. From what I can tell, there are two communications from Dropbox -- one in 2012 [1] and one last week [2].
Especially given that 2012 they assured me that no credentials were lost and this time they didn't even inform me since my account was deleted in the mean time. So it's more or less luck that I know that my old password was compromised.
Re: The Dropbox hack is real
#216Earlier quoted context omitted.
I really dislike password managers and there's good news: you don't need one to have unique password per site. A good password algorithm is very useful: http://penguindreams.org/blog/my-accounts-been-hacked-no-it-... The article is dated. I'd suggest a longer minimum and 2 factor for services that support it. The advantage is unique passwords that you don't have to look up.
I used to do this before switching to a password manager; the problem with pattern-based passwords is that while in paper it sounds better than password reuse (unique passwords for each site/service while still being able to remember them, yay!) in practice you are still using the same pattern for all of them. A potential smart adversary could figure out the pattern used and then apply it to every site/service much l…
Re: The Dropbox hack is real
#217Earlier quoted context omitted.
While an offline password manager is inherently more secure, at some point you're either going to have to store the database on a cloud somewhere or worry about constantly keeping your databases in sync. Whether you store it in Dropbox/OneDrive/Google/etc. or use LastPass or another service, there's always going to be some risk. At present I still recommend LastPass because that way you can easily have everything syn…
I just sync my 1Password via WiFi between my phone, work computer and personal computer. It's really not that much work either. Well worth keeping the vault of the internet.
Re: The Dropbox hack is real
#218Earlier quoted context omitted.
With Google Mail (and Apps) anything after a + in the first part of the address is ignored, so foo+dropbox@gmail.com would be routed to foo@gmail.com. That's the easiest way to do it that I know of. No need for managing separate aliases.
Whilst great info, unfortunately most of the sites that one would actually try to use this on don't accept addresses containing a "+" as valid. Another Google Mail trick is to use periods. Not as useful as the +, but for those sites that don't accept +, one can usually add in a few extra periods to place sites into buckets (multiple adjacent periods don't work). m.y.e.m.a.i.l@example.com
Re: The Dropbox hack is real
#219Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm pretty sure they do know a `+` is allowed...
I've had sites reject an email containing +.
[0] http://girders.org/blog/2013/01/31/dont-rfc-validate-email-a...
Re: The Dropbox hack is real
#220Earlier quoted context omitted.
Password manager + two factor authentication whenever possible. As for the former: Opinions here differ but my recommendation would be not to trust a "cloud" password manager and employ an offline password manager instead. KeePass works great for instance and is open source and cross-platform.
While an offline password manager is inherently more secure, at some point you're either going to have to store the database on a cloud somewhere or worry about constantly keeping your databases in sync. Whether you store it in Dropbox/OneDrive/Google/etc. or use LastPass or another service, there's always going to be some risk. At present I still recommend LastPass because that way you can easily have everything syn…
Even if Google or your Google drive is hacked, assuming you are using a strong passphrase for keypads, you are still OK.
If Lastpass is hacked, that's a different story.