SIL usually deals with complete systems and deals with probability that the system will deviate from it's designed behavior, whether such designed behavior is actually correct is somewhat orthogonal problem that is often mostly ignored. (same thing applies to attempts to apply formal proofs to software). The wikipedia article lists some of the problems with SIL rating itself, and I've personally seen multiple instances of "running two redundant SIL N systems produces SIL N+1 system", often with the original N being derived by wishful thinking (this seems to be especially prevalent with engineers with railway signalling background, where I accept that for systems based on relays with redundant coils it holds, but it's complete BS for things with non-trivial software).
Various attacks on car ECUs cleanly show what the problem with current relevant certification processes is: each component is certified separately and nobody cares about the complete resulting system (head unit is not safety critical, engine ECU is, but has no untrusted inputs and there is bunch of things in between that are classified as one of these two categories). What is ironic in the automotive case is that the whole reason why there is immense number of separate ECU's in typical car[1] is safety (ie. limiting impact of one ECU completely failing) and safety certification.
[1] my car has separate ECU for each door even though rear doors does not have power windows and central locking uses dedicated wires. I assume that only purpose of said ECU is that diagnostics system can detect when the door is missing.