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Browserprint: are you uniquely identifiable?

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31–40 of 47 posts

Re: Browserprint: are you uniquely identifiable?

#31
post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If I understand it correctly, the way this fingerprinting works is just by using questions you need to show the website properly. 'What is your screen resolution? What HTML5 features do you support? Do you have this font/plugin?' Bar giving up all those facilities, the best you can do is ask and hope they comply....

There's browser extensions that will fake all of those to a standard value. The tricky part is that with fingerprinting, depending on your chosen faked value you could end up being more identifiable, if not enough people use it. For instance, you can change your user agent and headers to some generic Windows Chrome one but a savvy tracker will fingerprint your TCP connection and realise you are actually on a Mac, and…

...collaborating with law enforcement to deanonimise Tor users (think pedophiles, not drugs)

It would be interesting to see some reports on that question. Of course, the Law would never abide such accountability, but one can dream...

Re: Browserprint: are you uniquely identifiable?

#32
post #7

Just wondering - would it be possible to send a header back to webservers forbidding them to fingerprint my browser? Would that have any chance legally?

No, that doesn't work. 1. If this were purely based on a 'may I do this' concept, the server would simply ignore you. 2., it's actually 99% client-based, it's using questions that you can't really deny since it makes rendering any webpage useless. Unless you like empty screens as websites, it will be possible to fingerprint you.

Since these questions are primarily used on the client side, better clients simply wouldn't forward the answers to the server.

Re: Browserprint: are you uniquely identifiable?

#33

Why do the browsers let the website know which plugins I have? There are some things like Flash that should identify themselves, but those are few and far between, and the check should be feature specific and handled by the plugin. Allowing every site to build a profile based on plugins [that is: a) fingerprint, and b) profile based on the plugins I use] is just an egregious violation of privacy. At the very least, i…

> Why do the browsers let the website know which plugins I have?

Just a guess: perhaps because sometimes, those plugins need to be interacted with from within javascript?

Re: Browserprint: are you uniquely identifiable?

#35
post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's browser extensions that will fake all of those to a standard value. The tricky part is that with fingerprinting, depending on your chosen faked value you could end up being more identifiable, if not enough people use it. For instance, you can change your user agent and headers to some generic Windows Chrome one but a savvy tracker will fingerprint your TCP connection and realise you are actually on a Mac, and…

...collaborating with law enforcement to deanonimise Tor users (think pedophiles, not drugs) It would be interesting to see some reports on that question. Of course, the Law would never abide such accountability, but one can dream...

Well, in my experience it was done in a case-by-case basis and led through the great work of NGO "Thorn" (the one founded by Ashton Kutchen & Demi Moore)

I don't know about accountability, but we provided support in a proactive way and never more than we were comfortable with (no carte blanche access to data for LEOs, etc.)

Re: Browserprint: are you uniquely identifiable?

#36
post #16

So the "Do not track" header is another data point in the fingerprint worth ~1bit on its own. Has it actually had any benefits or should we just get rid of it?

DNT can't protect you against bad actors really. These are the people/companies that are honoring the DNT clause.

http://donottrack.us/implementations

Re: Browserprint: are you uniquely identifiable?

#37
post #17

The Firefox "Random Agent Spoofer"* helps with this site at least. The biggest leak that needs to be plugged is the browser plugin details. Any obscure plugins at all are worth a lot towards unique identification. Why any script should be able to enumerate all plugins is beyond me. * https://addons.mozilla.org/en-us/firefox/addon/random-agent-...

Using panopticlick, system fonts seem to be worth a lot as well, which is strange to me as i feel like very few people ever touch their system fonts? or do they change with different OS updates/patches?

Re: Browserprint: are you uniquely identifiable?

#38
post #17

The Firefox "Random Agent Spoofer"* helps with this site at least. The biggest leak that needs to be plugged is the browser plugin details. Any obscure plugins at all are worth a lot towards unique identification. Why any script should be able to enumerate all plugins is beyond me. * https://addons.mozilla.org/en-us/firefox/addon/random-agent-...

Using panopticlick, system fonts seem to be worth a lot as well, which is strange to me as i feel like very few people ever touch their system fonts? or do they change with different OS updates/patches?

Often applications come with their own fonts as well.

Re: Browserprint: are you uniquely identifiable?

#39

if you are so worried, tha you are identifiable - just use your iphone, same hardware, same browser - same fingerprint(beside ip which can be dynamic & useless) - so literally all iphone users are the same user. (i was trying to make some start-up which required fingerprinting, but we pivoted =))

what's your startup doing now?

Re: Browserprint: are you uniquely identifiable?

#40
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Using panopticlick, system fonts seem to be worth a lot as well, which is strange to me as i feel like very few people ever touch their system fonts? or do they change with different OS updates/patches?

Often applications come with their own fonts as well.

ahh, ok, thanks
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