Earlier quoted context omitted.
Especially with Americans new found willingness to accept overreaching law enforcement measures. So long as one of the right trigger words (terrorism, children) is used, the average purchaser of certificates won't blink at the idea that law enforcement completely subverted the chain of trust that enables their customers to believe they are dealing with who it says on the certificate.
Court order? Your argument might make sense if it was law enforcement making the request. But do you really think companies should ignore court orders?
Law Enforcement Appliance Subverts SSL
31–40 of 42 posts
Re: Law Enforcement Appliance Subverts SSL
#32Re: Law Enforcement Appliance Subverts SSL
#33PGP is nice in that it bundles key distribution together with authentication, so you can at least be sure that the person you spoke to first is the same person you're speaking to now, assuming nobody's taken a $5 wrench to their knees. Unfortunately, PGP and all other factoring based key distribution methods are only secure for a limited time. People often say things like, "Secure for 1000 years assuming..." What they don't tell you is those assumptions (e.g. crackers only use classical computers with Moore's law scaling resources and currently known algorithms") are ridiculous. In general, advances in algorithms alone accelerate things greatly. Messages you send in PGP today will probably be trivial to crack within a decade, and that's not even accounting for quantum computing! Note: If you are interesting enough, this translates to messages you send today will be logged, archived, and cracked within 10 years. This is fine for credit card transactions. Not so fine for government secrets. (If you ever hear of a government employee transmitting state secrets using PGP, you are well justified to freak out.)
Quantum Cryptography promises to at least get rid of that problem, since the impossibility of cloning quantum information means that keys cannot be archived and cracked at a later time. However, authentication with a party you have not physically met remains a bit of a pickle.
Re: Law Enforcement Appliance Subverts SSL
#34I've always assumed that the government possessed the capability of creating false certs, but it is perhaps more troubling that boxes like these could be available to anyone .
Re: Law Enforcement Appliance Subverts SSL
#35Earlier quoted context omitted.
If a CA is compelled to issue a false certificate by court order, this destroys their credibility completely. If I ran a CA, I'd rather face the consequences, and let the court ask another listed CA, rather than destroy my entire business model.
Watch what happens when we find out which CA's did this. My money is on "they do not go out of business". Give it a few months.
The question is how WebTrust would treat this type of theoretical issue.
Re: Law Enforcement Appliance Subverts SSL
#36Earlier quoted context omitted.
Court order? Your argument might make sense if it was law enforcement making the request. But do you really think companies should ignore court orders?
Can a court order you to commit a fraud?
Re: Law Enforcement Appliance Subverts SSL
#37If a CA is issuing bad certificates then they need to be removed from the default CA list. Mozilla was worried about this with China a little while ago. http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/mozilla-debates... The real news will be if anyone can prove that a default CA has been compelled by court order to generate a fake certificate.
The idea was that the client would install this device on their perimeter, generate a CA certificate for the device (on the device itself) and then install this CA cert on all internal clients. In other words the clients were assumed to be cooperating.
From the technical perspective it was a piece of cake. The project got shelved still, but only because they have failed to close the sale of the product.
Re: Law Enforcement Appliance Subverts SSL
#38Earlier quoted context omitted.
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~perspectives/firefox.html
A nice idea. But isn't the path from you->notaries still vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks? You would have to use CA authentication to verify the "notaries" you are talking to aren't fake.
Re: Law Enforcement Appliance Subverts SSL
#39Earlier quoted context omitted.
A nice idea. But isn't the path from you->notaries still vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks? You would have to use CA authentication to verify the "notaries" you are talking to aren't fake.
It comes with a list of the notaries and their public keys. So, the only concern is if your initial download is MitM'ed. http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~perspectives/notary_list.txt