Earlier quoted context omitted.
> but I'm not sure how this illustrates that SHA2 just got even faster, so it illustrates rather well that you wouldn't want to use it for password storage -- of course that was always true, but the improvement drives that point home.
My understanding is that SHA2 is fine for password storage, given a prudent number of hashing rounds.
"We estimate that on [circa-2009] hardware, if 5 seconds are spent computing a derived key, the cost of a hardware brute-force attack against scrypt is roughly 4000 times greater than the cost of a similar attack against bcrypt (to find the same password), and 20000 times greater than a similar attack against PBKDF2."
Specifically, PBKDF2 is a tool to produce mostly-okay password storage hash from crypto primitives that are totally unfit for it, while bcrypt, scrypt, Argon2 are purpose-designed to make certain kinds of attacks difficult, like time-memory tradeoffs, parallelized custom hardware attacks, etc.