Don't just plaster Lenovo with this - they're getting the splatter because Cr4sh has been researching their firmware, but this is a multi-vendor issue. A few important notes from the article and the releaser's blog post: * This is not a Lenovo problem so much as a problem for multiple vendors who used BIOS based on Intel's reference information. The original problem was with source code provided by Intel. The same pr…
Perhaps financial compensation was indeed not Cr4sh's motivation for this zero day, but I felt it's a stretch to call this disclosure responsible. Also his name-calling (ThinkPwn) campaign was inappropriate and premature when the root cause was later discovered in Intel's reference code and propagated to IBVs's products.
ThinkPwn: System Management Mode arbitrary code execution
111–120 of 154 posts
Re: ThinkPwn: System Management Mode arbitrary code execution
#112Re: ThinkPwn: System Management Mode arbitrary code execution
#113Earlier quoted context omitted.
Well, physical access ranks higher than administrative. If an attacker has physical access, no system is secure, if only because the interface to the system is no longer.
OK, mind telling me how to get root on my iPhone, then? BTW, I have physical access.
Re: ThinkPwn: System Management Mode arbitrary code execution
#114Earlier quoted context omitted.
I dislike how it does not do microcode updates though.
You could certainly do the microcode updates yourself.
Re: ThinkPwn: System Management Mode arbitrary code execution
#115Earlier quoted context omitted.
Lenovo has always maintained a higher standard for their Think products, Superfish was only an issue on the Idea line. Doesn't excuse the debacle, but ThinkPad's are their professional line of notebooks and they make every effort to keep a positive image.
Lenovo only maintained the "standard" for their ThinkPads because it was an explicit condition of IBM when they sold the ThinkPad line to Lenovo.
Re: ThinkPwn: System Management Mode arbitrary code execution
#116Earlier quoted context omitted.
Well, physical access ranks higher than administrative. If an attacker has physical access, no system is secure, if only because the interface to the system is no longer.
its not longer fair to call game over with physical access; indeed countermeasure like full disk encryption, computrace and Mac firmware passwords are all examples of things we do to raise the difficulty for a physical attacker.
Re: ThinkPwn: System Management Mode arbitrary code execution
#117What are we up to now? Three preloaded spyware scandals, possible remote execution via the Intel stack and now this vulnerability. That's just what we know about, who knows what else exists. I don't think I can buy another one, which is sad as I think it was a timeless and great design.
I plan on using my quad core T520 for probably another 5+ years. All of their laptops after the T520 series have the full size keyboard with numberpad which off-sets the center of the keyboard, so now your typing is mostly happing on the left side of the keyboard and that causes wrist strain. Having a numberpad is really lame on a laptop. I won't buy one and I know of no one else that likes the numberpad either.. sad…
Re: ThinkPwn: System Management Mode arbitrary code execution
#118Earlier quoted context omitted.
Perhaps financial compensation was indeed not Cr4sh's motivation for this zero day, but I felt it's a stretch to call this disclosure responsible. Also his name-calling (ThinkPwn) campaign was inappropriate and premature when the root cause was later discovered in Intel's reference code and propagated to IBVs's products.
I'm much more upset with the vendors that thought UEFI was a good idea and pushed it, than security researches who discover vulnerabilities in UEFI, no matter how they choose to disclose it.
Re: ThinkPwn: System Management Mode arbitrary code execution
#119> First is the FCC vs WIFI channel selection in firmware. They want the choice to interfere be removed from the user in this occasion. Fuck 'em. > Second is cell carriers are not wild about unknown basebands conversing with their networks. Fuck 'em. > In theory the network should defend against bad phones but they'd rather not test that. ... hard.
Re: ThinkPwn: System Management Mode arbitrary code execution
#120T450S user here. What exactly does this mean for me? I get it's a security issue, but that's about all I understood...
The example exploit is run from an UEFI shell which requires physical control of the device. It mentions exploitation from the OS as a possibility however one would expect that the OS shouldn't allow such operations as a non root user.