Is there any (uncontroversial) theory that rigorously defines what a 50 % probability for heads and tails means? It certainly doesn't mean that in the long run you will obtain the same number of heads and tails because there is a (vanishing) chance that you will always get heads even though the coin is actually fair. And just saying that you will obtain the same or at least similar number of heads and tails with high…
> ‘When I toss a coin, the probability for heads is one-half.’ [...] the issue is between the following two interpretations:
> (A) ‘The available information gives me no reason to expect heads rather than tails, or vice versa – I am completely unable to predict which it will be.’
> (B) ‘If I toss the coin a very large number of times, in the long run heads will occur about half the time – in other words, the frequency of heads will approach 1/2.’
These are not the same except for special circumstances like controlled experiments. Frequentism usually assumes or restricts itself to those special circumstances. The long run here means `for any ε > 0, the probability that the observed frequency n/N lies in the interval (1/2±ε) goes to 1 as N goes to infinity'.
There is no such thing as an intrinsic probability, a coin only has a chance of landing heads when tossed. If we know everything about the coin and how it is tossed we could calculate the result. Some ways of tossing a fair coin are biased. Some coins are biased when tossed in fair ways. A fair coin toss exaggerates factors that are difficult to know and control exactly, like the force that we apply on the coin with our finger.
Jaynes thinks that `true randomness' such as is postulated by conventional quantum physics is unscientific (10.7). In any case it doesn't matter for calculating, and I don't think many Bayesians lose sleep over whether it's unknown, unknowable or `true randomness'.
If the Bayesian has an informative prior, they won't be mislead too much. If a Bayesian is 100% sure beforehand with a δ(x - 0.5) prior they won't be mislead at all, but of course no one is ever 100% sure (Cromwell's rule). On the other hand a frequentist might say p<0.05 and be mislead.