The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy • Hacker News Board

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#61

Post by [deleted] » Wed, Jun 22, 2016, 9:48 PM UTC

SilasX wrote: post #50

vectorpush wrote: post #35

One's position in space-time is an inextricable component of "the self". Even in theory, a perfectly replicated individual has already fundamentally diverged from the original just by virtue of its existence as a duplicate (since duplication implies a distinct position in space-time). Ultimately, what I'm saying is that the idea of a "perfect duplicate" is something of a contradiction, and any theory of mind that att…

Do you say the same thing about copies of a program (and their corresponding hardware)?

[deleted]

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#62

Post by chongli » Wed, Jun 22, 2016, 9:51 PM UTC

snom380 wrote: post #59

chongli wrote: post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because when I die (or anybody else dies), the universe ends for me (or them). The clone is just a different person who can't tell that he's not me. But he is him . The only thing you can really know for sure is that you're still alive. When you're dead, you know longer have the ability to know.

I guess my question is, yes, you can know that you're still alive, but how can you know that you're still _you_?

What a weird question. You're always you, until you die. Even if you became totally paralyzed, blind, deaf, etc. (total sensory deprivation) you'd still be you. All that is you is just the voice in your head, the ability to ask the question, and to think about an answer.

As for what happens to your body or anything else in the world? You can't ever get rid of those doubts. The only thing you can know without a doubt is that a doubter exists. Cogito ergo sum, as Descartes wrote.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#63

Post by CapTVK » Wed, Jun 22, 2016, 10:04 PM UTC

I'm reminded of this cartoon about an inventor who demonstrates a teleportation device. Shows you don't have to go all technical or write an economic treatise about emulated humans for important philisophical questions. It can be fun as well.

"To be" (by John Weldon) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc

For a more serious answer to these questions (or at least some) you can look up the work " i am you" By Daniel Kolak.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#64

Post by vectorpush » Wed, Jun 22, 2016, 10:05 PM UTC

SilasX wrote: post #50

vectorpush wrote: post #35

One's position in space-time is an inextricable component of "the self". Even in theory, a perfectly replicated individual has already fundamentally diverged from the original just by virtue of its existence as a duplicate (since duplication implies a distinct position in space-time). Ultimately, what I'm saying is that the idea of a "perfect duplicate" is something of a contradiction, and any theory of mind that att…

Do you say the same thing about copies of a program (and their corresponding hardware)?

I would, yes, though I'd be careful about drawing comparisons in this regard between computer programs (as we know them today) and the phenomenon that we call consciousness, since the framework of computation deliberately extricates the essence of a program from the physical phenomena that underpins its existence.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#65

Post by gyardley » Wed, Jun 22, 2016, 10:08 PM UTC

khedoros wrote: post #48

gyardley wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sure, as much as it makes sense to worry about the fate of any other independent human being - and perhaps even more so, if you feel more affinity with your copies than you do with random strangers. I wouldn't use a facility that killed a stranger at random every time I used it, and I sure as hell wouldn't use a facility if it killed a living person who was identical to me. Frankly, I don't see what your 'essence' ha…

> Killing people is morally wrong. What about it, though? For the sake of argument, I'm not taking a position on whether it is or isn't wrong, I'm just looking for the "why". Ending a consciousness without either a defense motive or the permission of that consciousness (as in, violating the consciousness's right to life)? Depriving the world of a unique being? Causing damage to the human race by needlessly ending a h…

> What about it, though?

Violating the consciousness's right to life. I could be missing something, of course, but whether we can make an exact duplicate of a person at a given point in time doesn't seem relevant to this.

I'm curious why the answers to questions of this genre usually seem obvious to me, but clearly aren't obvious for everyone. I'm not implying any value judgement either way - perhaps I'm just a dullard. But I do wonder what the difference in mindset is.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#66

Post by SilasX » Wed, Jun 22, 2016, 10:31 PM UTC

vectorpush wrote: post #64

SilasX wrote: post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Do you say the same thing about copies of a program (and their corresponding hardware)?

I would, yes, though I'd be careful about drawing comparisons in this regard between computer programs (as we know them today) and the phenomenon that we call consciousness, since the framework of computation deliberately extricates the essence of a program from the physical phenomena that underpins its existence.

Okay, but then you're just moving the debate over a few feet rather than addressing the core point: can a human likewise be abstracted away to some substrate-independent program such that we lose nothing by deleting some running copies? Can we build a box that gives us the same answers Bill Gates would, and causes us to deem it "another Bill Gates" without confusion, modulo having a body and physical access to the world?

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#67

Post by TheCoelacanth » Wed, Jun 22, 2016, 10:49 PM UTC

chongli wrote: post #52

TheCoelacanth wrote: post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't follow. You know based on your ability to ask the question that you currently are you and not a clone of yourself, but you don't know that the person yesterday was you and not some other person that you were cloned from.

but you don't know that the person yesterday was you and not some other person that you were cloned from. The parent did not say anything about this and neither did I. Of course you cannot know whether you are a clone or not. My point is that if a clone is made of you and you are killed, you will be dead, you won't be the clone.

You both did.

> When you wake up the next day, how do you know you're the same person as yesterday?

> You know you're the same person as yesterday

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#68

Post by vectorpush » Thu, Jun 23, 2016, 12:15 AM UTC

SilasX wrote: post #66

vectorpush wrote: post #64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would, yes, though I'd be careful about drawing comparisons in this regard between computer programs (as we know them today) and the phenomenon that we call consciousness, since the framework of computation deliberately extricates the essence of a program from the physical phenomena that underpins its existence.

Okay, but then you're just moving the debate over a few feet rather than addressing the core point: can a human likewise be abstracted away to some substrate-independent program such that we lose nothing by deleting some running copies? Can we build a box that gives us the same answers Bill Gates would, and causes us to deem it "another Bill Gates" without confusion, modulo having a body and physical access to the wo…

> can a human likewise be abstracted away to some substrate-independent program such that we lose nothing by deleting some running copies

Oh. Well, assuming our current model of computation, I think a "substrate-independent" human program is essentially non-human by definition (that is to say, lacking the particular qualities of 'consciousness' that we commonly ascribe to humans), so I'd conclude that "nothing is lost" insomuch as "nothing existed" in the first place. In theory, it seems plausible that we could create a program that could consistently pass a "Bill Gates" Turing test, but it is easy for a programmer to imagine how such a program could exist without actually being conscious.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#69

Post by gwright » Thu, Jun 23, 2016, 12:30 AM UTC

lazzlazzlazz wrote: post #14

cakoose wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think the fact that the original is kept around (and asked a question) might be complicating things. For example, what if you were taken apart, your molecules were sent to Mars, and then you were reassembled exactly as they were? Would that be continuous consciousness? If so, how is that different from the cloning option if your clone were assembled on Mars and the original were completely destroyed at the very sam…

The fact that the original is kept around is the entire point. Let's say your molecules were taken apart... and that's it. That's called "dying".

And yet the atoms in your body are recycled over time. Your future self consists of an almost entirely different set of atoms as your current self.

I'm not sure how to reconcile this with the nature of consciousness, but it certainly makes for an interesting thought experiment.

https://www.quora.com/How-long-does-it-take-for-most-of-the-...

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#70

Post by curioussavage » Thu, Jun 23, 2016, 12:44 AM UTC

aappleby wrote: post #3

Imagine that I visit a cloning facility that can flawlessly duplicate a human, memories and all. The techs there put me in a medical gown and sedate me, and a while later I wake up in an empty room. Without any additional information, I have no way to determine if I am the clone or not. I know only that there is another me in the building somewhere, having the exact same thoughts as I am having right now. In fact, I…

There are a few problems I see with this. Each individuals perspective is limited. That is only reason why your 'clone' might not know or care about those things.

As third party observers in that situation we would know that one is a 'copy' and we (or at least I) would care (and even object) to the killing of either one. From my perspective I can see that there are two distinct unique individuals having different thoughts saying different things and doing different things. Its when the 'clones' are still alive that you can tell that you have two different people now. Since they occupy separate space they will have different perspectives and experiences and different lives.