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The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

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Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#51
post #10
post #3

Imagine that I visit a cloning facility that can flawlessly duplicate a human, memories and all. The techs there put me in a medical gown and sedate me, and a while later I wake up in an empty room. Without any additional information, I have no way to determine if I am the clone or not. I know only that there is another me in the building somewhere, having the exact same thoughts as I am having right now. In fact, I…

This is all basic stuff. Think deeper. You go to sleep every night. When you wake up the next day, how do you know you're the same person as yesterday? What does that mean? Now consider if you didn't have memories of the past. What would make you "you"? The body would be the same but your amnesia would change things, eh? Now what if you knew next week you would lose your memories for sure, but this week you can go on…

Going even deeper, from one moment to another - how do you know that you're you? After all, you're not _exactly_ the same, since each moment brings new experiences, ever so slightly changing your memories. Quantum entanglement, perhaps? If not, aren't we a collection of particles with a certain probability distribution that we're able to influence ourselves?

(Maybe this whole discussion is less interesting to Buddhists trained in not-self thinking. :)

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#52
post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You know you're the same person as yesterday because without you, there is no knowing . A clone is no more you than an identical twin is you. What makes you you is the ability to ask the question in the first place. If you were dead, there would be no question.

I don't follow. You know based on your ability to ask the question that you currently are you and not a clone of yourself, but you don't know that the person yesterday was you and not some other person that you were cloned from.

but you don't know that the person yesterday was you and not some other person that you were cloned from.

The parent did not say anything about this and neither did I. Of course you cannot know whether you are a clone or not. My point is that if a clone is made of you and you are killed, you will be dead, you won't be the clone.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#53
post #17

It's an interesting problem, but I don't feel like this page accomplished much besides calling a position he disagreed with a fallacy and using unexplained appeals to emotion. >To refute this, let’s conduct a thought experiment. Pretend that you can copy a human brain. There are ten copies of me. They are all individually conscious — perfect replicas that only diverge after the point when replication happened. Is it…

If you haven't seen Primer, I recommend it.

MILD SPOILER: If you could make short-lived copies of yourself, you should probably keep a close eye on them. After all, you're clever, they're clever. You're motivated to keep existing, so are they.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#54
post #21
post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is all basic stuff. Think deeper. You go to sleep every night. When you wake up the next day, how do you know you're the same person as yesterday? What does that mean? Now consider if you didn't have memories of the past. What would make you "you"? The body would be the same but your amnesia would change things, eh? Now what if you knew next week you would lose your memories for sure, but this week you can go on…

You know you're the same person as yesterday because without you, there is no knowing . A clone is no more you than an identical twin is you. What makes you you is the ability to ask the question in the first place. If you were dead, there would be no question.

Why is there no knowing without a you? Won't the clone know just as well as you that he's you?

What defines "you"? The matter you're made of?

Is it a particular arrangement of that matter? (Would you care if your neurons were replaced one by one, while keeping the same arrangement?)

Is it your memories, your thoughts, your inclinations?

Or is it something else?

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#55
post #17

It's an interesting problem, but I don't feel like this page accomplished much besides calling a position he disagreed with a fallacy and using unexplained appeals to emotion. >To refute this, let’s conduct a thought experiment. Pretend that you can copy a human brain. There are ten copies of me. They are all individually conscious — perfect replicas that only diverge after the point when replication happened. Is it…

> I wouldn't be particularly shaken up by it.

Given the choice between having one copy disassembled or having both disassembled, I'd choose to have one copy survive, whether or not it was the "I" copy. Both copies would be "me" as far as could be measured (ignoring the last few minutes, where I'm assuming that our experiences would be similar but not identical).

Given the choice of having both of "us" survive though, I'd rather not have either life terminated. I'd be more bothered by the destruction of one of us than by the chance that I'd be the one who chooses to start a new life from scratch (or whatever we decided as our solution). Death is death, whether or not there's a substantially-identical copy. One consciousness would end.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#56

We're chasing our tails here. The definition of the copy function requires both an original and a copy. There is //always// an original and a copy. Thus, exact clones and copies made in teleport machines are always copies, separate from the original. There can be no copy function without an original and a copy. You can think of as many elaborate cloning thought experiments as you like; if they can be reduced to a cop…

The particles that make up your will have a probability of being in a certain place according to some rules. When you move, the particles "disappear" from one place and "appear" at another place. Do you know they are the same particles? Does it matter?

Does it matter more that there's no duplicate particles (ie. no changes of a copy being made)?

In that case, you could device a teleport machine that makes sure to read the state "bit by bit" (particle by particle), then destroys the original particle before creating a new particle in another location. How different would that be compared to what's normally happening to your body?

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#57
post #45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The classic question, if a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, do the air molecules still vibrate?

wait - didnt you just break the question? It's not about molecules vibrating, it's about whether the concept of "sound" has meaning without a hear-er

It's just a throwaway snide remark about expecting metaphysics to have concrete answers for anything (It's not even coherent; if the air molecules don't vibrate without an observer, there probably isn't a tree or a forest either).

(metaphysics is still an interesting and useful exercise, but the state of not having an answer to a particular question isn't much more of a real conundrum than not having asked the question in the first place. I mean, when you are hungry, eating feels pretty good regardless of whether the food exists or not.)

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#58
post #54
post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You know you're the same person as yesterday because without you, there is no knowing . A clone is no more you than an identical twin is you. What makes you you is the ability to ask the question in the first place. If you were dead, there would be no question.

Why is there no knowing without a you? Won't the clone know just as well as you that he's you? What defines "you"? The matter you're made of? Is it a particular arrangement of that matter? (Would you care if your neurons were replaced one by one, while keeping the same arrangement?) Is it your memories, your thoughts, your inclinations? Or is it something else?

Because when I die (or anybody else dies), the universe ends for me (or them). The clone is just a different person who can't tell that he's not me. But he is him.

The only thing you can really know for sure is that you're still alive. When you're dead, you know longer have the ability to know.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#59
post #58
post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why is there no knowing without a you? Won't the clone know just as well as you that he's you? What defines "you"? The matter you're made of? Is it a particular arrangement of that matter? (Would you care if your neurons were replaced one by one, while keeping the same arrangement?) Is it your memories, your thoughts, your inclinations? Or is it something else?

Because when I die (or anybody else dies), the universe ends for me (or them). The clone is just a different person who can't tell that he's not me. But he is him . The only thing you can really know for sure is that you're still alive. When you're dead, you know longer have the ability to know.

I guess my question is, yes, you can know that you're still alive, but how can you know that you're still _you_?

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#60
post #56

We're chasing our tails here. The definition of the copy function requires both an original and a copy. There is //always// an original and a copy. Thus, exact clones and copies made in teleport machines are always copies, separate from the original. There can be no copy function without an original and a copy. You can think of as many elaborate cloning thought experiments as you like; if they can be reduced to a cop…

The particles that make up your will have a probability of being in a certain place according to some rules. When you move, the particles "disappear" from one place and "appear" at another place. Do you know they are the same particles? Does it matter? Does it matter more that there's no duplicate particles (ie. no changes of a copy being made)? In that case, you could device a teleport machine that makes sure to rea…

> Does it matter more that there's no duplicate particles (ie. no changes of a copy being made)?

Yes, it does matter. No copy being introduced means it's just a translation of displacement. That's an entirely different operation.

Quantum tunnelling is fun to think about, but at the scale of atoms it starts to lose any relevance, and at the scale of neurons has no meaning at all.

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