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The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

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31–40 of 92 posts

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#31
post #17

It's an interesting problem, but I don't feel like this page accomplished much besides calling a position he disagreed with a fallacy and using unexplained appeals to emotion. >To refute this, let’s conduct a thought experiment. Pretend that you can copy a human brain. There are ten copies of me. They are all individually conscious — perfect replicas that only diverge after the point when replication happened. Is it…

The long-running space opera comic "Schlock Mercenary" actually has treatments of this topic that are frequently clever (and humorous). As example, here [http://www.schlockmercenary.com/2004-08-23] is an instance of an AI making copies of itself to act as the smart guidance in warship-killing high-energy munitions. If the munition survives impact, it can be refurbished and used again; if not, the AI shard dumps a 'gestalt' of new experiences back to the core before the munition breaks up.

Since the AI copies are crafted by the master AI, they don't generally exhibit divergence from its will or an independent survival instinct.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#32
post #12
post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Look at it like this: You are placed in a box. Moments later, you are told, "We have successfully made a copy of you. We are sending it home now. You must be disposed of." Will you allow them to dispose of you? This is the question being posed, not whether a copy will have no idea if it is the original. The point is that it isn't relevant if one is a copy. No one was moved, it's only that a second person now exists a…

I think the fact that the original is kept around (and asked a question) might be complicating things. For example, what if you were taken apart, your molecules were sent to Mars, and then you were reassembled exactly as they were? Would that be continuous consciousness? If so, how is that different from the cloning option if your clone were assembled on Mars and the original were completely destroyed at the very sam…

This reminds of some of the thought experiments in Sam Harris' book Waking Up.

This particular one reminds me of the teleporter example which is in this excerpt: https://www.getflashnotes.com/waking-up-by-sam-harris/ (just control-f for teleporter).

Basically our reasoning about identity is poorly evolved for duplicates. The closest we can come to feeling comfortable with it is going to sleep and waking back up. I think mostly because we're just used to doing that (since otherwise going to sleep and waking back up is similar to dying and coming back slightly different).

Was an interesting book overall - I'd recommend it.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#33
post #10
post #3

Imagine that I visit a cloning facility that can flawlessly duplicate a human, memories and all. The techs there put me in a medical gown and sedate me, and a while later I wake up in an empty room. Without any additional information, I have no way to determine if I am the clone or not. I know only that there is another me in the building somewhere, having the exact same thoughts as I am having right now. In fact, I…

This is all basic stuff. Think deeper. You go to sleep every night. When you wake up the next day, how do you know you're the same person as yesterday? What does that mean? Now consider if you didn't have memories of the past. What would make you "you"? The body would be the same but your amnesia would change things, eh? Now what if you knew next week you would lose your memories for sure, but this week you can go on…

Your comment made me recall this classic comic: http://existentialcomics.com/comic/1

I personally try to resolve this quandary in my head by defining my consciousness not as a single state at an instant in time, but rather a pattern over a time continuity - just as mass and matter occupies a continuum of space instead of a single point.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#35
One's position in space-time is an inextricable component of "the self". Even in theory, a perfectly replicated individual has already fundamentally diverged from the original just by virtue of its existence as a duplicate (since duplication implies a distinct position in space-time). Ultimately, what I'm saying is that the idea of a "perfect duplicate" is something of a contradiction, and any theory of mind that attempts to define one's "homunculus" in terms of a physical brain state is in some ways moot because although our human senses might indicate that we are dealing with two identical individuals we are actually dealing with two fundamentally distinct beings, despite the apparent similarities.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#36
post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think the fact that the original is kept around (and asked a question) might be complicating things. For example, what if you were taken apart, your molecules were sent to Mars, and then you were reassembled exactly as they were? Would that be continuous consciousness? If so, how is that different from the cloning option if your clone were assembled on Mars and the original were completely destroyed at the very sam…

The fact that the original is kept around is the entire point. Let's say your molecules were taken apart... and that's it. That's called "dying".

Yes, and if we actually had a way to disassemble and reassemble humans, the reassembled beings would tell you that the experiment works and their consciousness goes back to their first memories as a child. But the disassembled person would have been destroyed and therefore unable to share their opinion on the matter.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#37
post #17

It's an interesting problem, but I don't feel like this page accomplished much besides calling a position he disagreed with a fallacy and using unexplained appeals to emotion. >To refute this, let’s conduct a thought experiment. Pretend that you can copy a human brain. There are ten copies of me. They are all individually conscious — perfect replicas that only diverge after the point when replication happened. Is it…

This is something I've thought about frequently, and I completely agree. The "purpose" of my existence would be maintained, so why would I care which one you choose?

We all do this without thought on a daily basis with files on our filesystem. A particular document encodes a set of information; if we duplicate that document, we now have two identical copies of the same information. By the original author's argument, they are unique and distinct, because they occupy different blocks on our storage medium! But common sense makes it clear that which one we delete doesn't matter, because they serve the same purpose - provided that we preserve at least one copy.

(To those that argue that the file system metaphor is flawed, because consciousness is "different" or "special" in some way, I reference the inverse of Clarke's Third Law: Any sufficiently understood magic is indistinguishable from technology.)

Now, if those documents continue to evolve and change over time, such that they no longer match, now you are left with a version control problem, and one that seems to be nigh-impossible to solve with a consciousness. In my opinion, this is a situation worth avoiding if we can, as it becomes very sticky very quickly, since the uniqueness of the experiences produces an infinite gradient that makes deciding on an appropriate cutoff of termination very difficult.

As for the continuity of thought, we certainly don't see falling asleep at the end of the day as the "death" of our current consciousness, or waking up in the morning as the "birth" of our new consciousness, despite the (perceived) discontinuity. So why would your source or target self perceive it that way?

Fortunately, regardless of how you feel about the whole "continuity of thought" argument, the solution is very simple - users would simply not be required to make use of these new products/services. Don't want to get faxed to Mars? No problem! Users are not currently required to make copies of files, or transmit files, or make backups of files, after all.

Anyway, that was longer than I had intended. Hopefully someone finds that somewhat interesting, although I suppose it's really all moot anyway until we're even remotely close to the technology required to implement this.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#38
post #17

It's an interesting problem, but I don't feel like this page accomplished much besides calling a position he disagreed with a fallacy and using unexplained appeals to emotion. >To refute this, let’s conduct a thought experiment. Pretend that you can copy a human brain. There are ten copies of me. They are all individually conscious — perfect replicas that only diverge after the point when replication happened. Is it…

> I'm not even sure which is the original

> I wouldn't be particularly shaken up by it

You are begging the question. Who is "I" in this case, when there are two beings in existence? You are presuming that "you" exists as a singular thing, even when there are two physical bodies. But that is no longer true the moment that you are cloned. There are now two separate entities that diverge slowly, as even a slight difference in location will mean different inputs to your senses and different events occurring that change your respective paths.

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#39
I think that if you want to copy a conscious being, you'd have to copy the body as well.[1]

There are a lot of 'memories' stored in the body, and the brain and body (and endocrine system) are inseparably intertwined in my opinion.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embodied_cognition

Re: The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy

#40

One's position in space-time is an inextricable component of "the self". Even in theory, a perfectly replicated individual has already fundamentally diverged from the original just by virtue of its existence as a duplicate (since duplication implies a distinct position in space-time). Ultimately, what I'm saying is that the idea of a "perfect duplicate" is something of a contradiction, and any theory of mind that att…

See William Riker and Thomas Riker from Star Trek.

http://memory-alpha.wikia.com/wiki/Thomas_Riker

William Thomas "Tom" Riker was a result of a transporter accident in 2361 that created two William Thomas Rikers, genetically indistinguishable from each other, with personality and memories identical up to the point of the duplication. One of the duplicates continued to be known as William Riker. The other chose to use his middle name and be known as Thomas Riker.

Thomas and William clashed almost immediately due to the resentment each felt towards the other. The eight years of living different lives made them entirely different men – William evolved into a cautious and duty-driven officer while Thomas remained impulsive and reckless. As a result of conflicts with William – who was by that time a superior officer (a commander) – Lieutenant Riker decided to leave the Enterprise. He chose to use his middle name, Thomas, to distinguish himself from his counterpart. Captain Jean-Luc Picard managed to get Thomas a posting on the USS Gandhi where he could continue his Starfleet career. Upon Thomas' departure, William seemed to have accepted Thomas' existence and gave him his trombone as a parting gift. (TNG: "Second Chances")

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