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The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

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Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#161

Post by [deleted] »

IshKebab wrote: post #90
Teever wrote: post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> 1) As per the article, to actually prevent ring -3 malware. The implemented signature is the best way to do this. If we could run our own "libre" code there, so could the attacker. Why can't computers have physical switches that enable/disable writing the memory that this piece of software is located in?

That is actually slightly less secure - sometimes people do have physical access to your machines. For example, the NSA intercepted deliveries of switches and installed their malware on them. Would be easy if there is a physical switch. Not so easy if you need signed firmware (I'm sure the NSA could still do it, but it would definitely be harder).

[deleted]

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#162

Post by throw2016 »

This adds a whole new dimension to 'Intel Inside'. It says exactly what anyone needs to know.

If it's for enterprise features as 'innocently' suggested that those who do not need or want this feature should be able to put it off simply without drama, debate or discussion.

Its not surprising that both AMD and ARM have it. This is an orchestrated effort signifying the win of paranoia and security over privacy in the western world.

This war is being fought on too many fronts by well resourced and paranoid security agencies with all the tools to influence and the only defense would be individuals and our sense of right and wrong. But it seems individuals have been completely disempowered and reduced to survival mode and are not in a position to stand up for the right thing or even talk about it.

If 'moral' individuals can so easily be quietened in well off economies then one wonders what happens in other economies where basic survival is a day to day fight. Who will fight the privacy war? The silence is deafening. It seems all the activism and racket from media, academics, NGOs and human rights organizations only come into play when a western political or strategic objective needs to be met.

There are many who believe that by working with and supporting security agencies they are somehow in the forefront of a nebulous fight of survival and freedom in a dark world. This 'dark world' is a self created and self serving fantasy and comedy for grown, well adjusted and well read individuals to fall for that push humanity into a negative space.

It can be taken for granted unless conclusively proved otherwise with the burden of evidence swaying the other way that any technology coming out of the USA and Europe is compromised completely and the fight for privacy here has been lost.

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#163

Post by dsr_ »

redcap wrote: post #107
digler999 wrote: post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

just like how DVD Encryption ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Scramble_System ) was never reverse engineered because the key was too difficult to crack ?

CSS is only 40 bits, which is ridiculously easy to crack. 56-bit DES keys are pretty unsafe these days, so you want at least 128 bits if you're talking private keys. If it's using 2048-bit RSA, that's perhaps equivalent to a 256-bit private key. So entirely different ballpark to CSS.

It really doesn't matter how many bits, or what cipher they used. The DRM problem is fundamentally broken:

1. Hand the ciphertext to the opponent.

2. Hand the decryption algorithm to the opponent, embedded in a software or hardware device.

3. Hand the key to the opponent, possibly embedded in the hardware.

4. Ask your opponent to decrypt the ciphertext, view the plaintext, and then kindly not copy the plaintext in any other way.

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#164

Post by goodplay »

hoodoof wrote: post #105

If you get a microscope and manage to peer into this secret hidey hole in the CPU you will see a bunch of tiny little NSA spooks, Russian and Chinese hackers scuttle away to hide in other dark hidden secret corners of the Intel CPU.

Yup. It's a good thing that we live in a universe where companies and all their employees are completely trust-worthy, and will flat-out refuse to do something illegal if asked (or incentivised) by others.

It's a good thing that all governments act within the confines of the law (both wittingly and otherwise).

It's a good thing that all software we write is correct and sound, and that no bug ever existed nor the desire to exploit such a bug should it have existed.

Paranoid people with their tinfoil hats. Shesh!

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#165

Post by goodplay »

IshKebab wrote: post #90
Teever wrote: post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> 1) As per the article, to actually prevent ring -3 malware. The implemented signature is the best way to do this. If we could run our own "libre" code there, so could the attacker. Why can't computers have physical switches that enable/disable writing the memory that this piece of software is located in?

That is actually slightly less secure - sometimes people do have physical access to your machines. For example, the NSA intercepted deliveries of switches and installed their malware on them. Would be easy if there is a physical switch. Not so easy if you need signed firmware (I'm sure the NSA could still do it, but it would definitely be harder).

If they have physical access, it's over regardless of what authentication mechanisms are employed.

I'd argue that not being able to modify software subjects you to a higher risk because you wont be able to fix security vulnerabilities yourself.

Software and hardware outlive the companies that produce them.

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#166

Post by userbinator »

creshal wrote: post #114
SXX wrote: post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> GPUs without BLOBs are hard to find Any devices without firmware are hard to find. Even if only some have option to upload firmware almost every device on market have closed-source firmware inside it: NICs, USB controllers, hard drives and especially modern SSD, sound cards, etc.

NICs exist, occasionally: Atheros Wifi chips work with open-source firmwares. And it shouldn't be too hard to find a GBit ethernet NIC without. Everything else is a lost cause right now. Keyboards, mice, displays, … Everything is running proprietary firmware blobs.

And it shouldn't be too hard to find a GBit ethernet NIC without.

I think just about every cheap, "value" (i.e. no advanced features) NIC qualifies; the Realtek ones come to mind.

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#167

Post by userbinator »

nneonneo wrote: post #71

Igor Skochinsky (of IDA Hex-Rays fame, among others) has been studying Intel ME for quite some time. He gave a nice talk at Breakpoint summarizing what he'd discovered (slides here [pdf]: https://github.com/skochinsky/papers/blob/master/2014-10%20%... ). Among other things, he finds that ME is capable of running signed Java code which is pushed to the device. Due to the complexity and size of the Java code, it's quit…

"3 billion devices run Java" indeed.

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#168

Post by tim333 »

jakeogh wrote: post #99
nneonneo wrote: post #71

Igor Skochinsky (of IDA Hex-Rays fame, among others) has been studying Intel ME for quite some time. He gave a nice talk at Breakpoint summarizing what he'd discovered (slides here [pdf]: https://github.com/skochinsky/papers/blob/master/2014-10%20%... ). Among other things, he finds that ME is capable of running signed Java code which is pushed to the device. Due to the complexity and size of the Java code, it's quit…

Very interesting presentation. Is the video available? I had no luck with the standard searches. http://2014.ruxconbreakpoint.com/speakers/#Igor%20Skochinsky

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4kCICUPc9_8 seems to be basically the same talk given at Montreal rather than Melbourne

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#169

Post by Grazester »

ashitlerferad wrote: post #87
morganvachon wrote: post #2

Nice breakdown of how ME works, but nothing new here. Still, I'm glad I hold on to a ton of older, pre Core i-series Intel machines, AMD machines, and ARM boards. If ME is ever truly compromised at least I have a fallback or three.

Watch out for TrustZone. There are definitely flaws in it too, for example: https://bits-please.blogspot.com/2016/06/trustzone-kernel-pr...

Seems like this has already been patched

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#170

Post by qb45 »

digi_owl wrote: post #160
tremon wrote: post #154

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Trustzone in itself is not closed though, and FAFAIK is not a separate engine. Trustzone is more like IOMMU on steroids, and runs on the main processor (it relies on hardware support to fence off system resources).

And i think the variant found on Qualcomm SOCs were recently cracked open.

If you mean CVE-2015-6639

The Widevine QSEE TrustZone application in Android 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49F and 6.0 before 2016-01-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that leverages QSEECOM access, aka internal bug 24446875.

then it's not strictly TrustZone that have been cracked, but some software running within, already patched. TrustZone itself is a hardware mechanism, basically a new level above the usual user/kernel modes.

But sure, this hack reportedly gave possibility to run arbitrary code as "trusted" and mess up any other software running on the CPU, trusted or not.

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