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The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

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Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#81
post #69

I think this is time for AMD or IBM's POWER8/9 to step in. If anything a little good PR vis-a-vis the "rootkit nightmare waiting to happen in your server" would be nice.

AMD have their counterpart, called Platform Security Processor (PSP)

see https://libreboot.org/faq/#amdpsp for more info.

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#82
post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Now, is the ME chip a threat? Possibly, not not as much as your cell phone's baseband modem is. The baseband modem can talk to outside networks, ME can't unless it is paired with a NIC it can talk to (Intel does not require mobos that have this; and generally, motherboards meant for AMT ship Intel NICs, but not always). The last ~dozen regular (gigabyte/asus/asrock/...) desktop PC motherboards i've seen have all use…

Intel NICs are considered a premium feature on desktop boards, it is not a common sight.

It's a lot more common than it was 2-3 years ago. ASRock, ASUS, and Gigabyte are using Intel NICs even on some boards with the low-end B150 chipset, and it's extremely common on Z170 motherboards. I can't be bothered to check the rest of the manufacturers, but it's clear that Intel NICs are popular.

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#83
post #69

I think this is time for AMD or IBM's POWER8/9 to step in. If anything a little good PR vis-a-vis the "rootkit nightmare waiting to happen in your server" would be nice.

Since 2013 AMD have it's own technology called "Platform Security Processor" (PSP) which is ARM TrustZone core running signed closed-source code. It's efficiently have all the same access ME have.

Of course any processor that have PSP support not going to work without PSP firmware.

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#85

Almost makes you want to get a Lemote Laptop like Richard Stallman.

Yeah, between this and the power saving bugs in the last few generations of i-core processors I'm really feeling deflated about the last 2 laptops I bought. I used an Acer c710 w/coreboot+seabios and it worked so well. Good battery life, and mostly open bios. IIRC, me blobs were compiled in to coreboot but at least it worked without disabling hardware features.

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#86
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Maybe I'm missing something, is this chipset on the motherboard? The article makes it seem like its coupled with the cpu.

I don't know how its actually implemented, but normally to enable AMT you have to have both a compatible motherboard and processor. Intel calls it VPRO. Most desktop consumer boards do not have this feature, but quite a few of the i5 processors do.

> Most desktop consumer boards do not have this feature, but quite a few of the i5 processors do.

Considering how many firmware updates I've installed on gaming-oriented motherboards with Z-series chipsets that have included ME firmware payload, it's worth looking in to what it means for those boards to not have the feature. We know that all the transistors are physically present on both CPU and chipset. Are they truly permanently disabled with on-chip fuses, or are they just left uninitialized on boot when the microcode checks the model numbers? Are there required traces on the motherboard that are definitely being omitted/disconnected?

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#87

Nice breakdown of how ME works, but nothing new here. Still, I'm glad I hold on to a ton of older, pre Core i-series Intel machines, AMD machines, and ARM boards. If ME is ever truly compromised at least I have a fallback or three.

Watch out for TrustZone. There are definitely flaws in it too, for example:

https://bits-please.blogspot.com/2016/06/trustzone-kernel-pr...

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#88

Nice breakdown of how ME works, but nothing new here. Still, I'm glad I hold on to a ton of older, pre Core i-series Intel machines, AMD machines, and ARM boards. If ME is ever truly compromised at least I have a fallback or three.

You use three different platforms and every have backdoors in it.

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#89
post #80
post #77

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You don't have to. Libreboot is available for some Thinkpads. I use an X200s. There are businesses that offer Libreboot flashing services or sell refurbished Laptops with Libreboot installed.

Except libreboot doesn't help. ME executes below BIOS/UEFI.

That's not the case. ME code is large and not bundled inside CPU. On old systems it's was possible to not provide ME firmware while keep CPU operational.

On modern systems it's will just poweroff every 30 minutes if ME firmware not present and this is why libreboot won't support any newer hardware.

Re: The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited

#90
post #55
post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As stated in the article, some researchers have managed to unpack it, and it can now be dissembled. You can't (and hpefully won't) be able to execute your own code there. There are 2 good reasons for this: 1) As per the article, to actually prevent ring -3 malware. The implemented signature is the best way to do this. If we could run our own "libre" code there, so could the attacker. 2) I bet this firmware controlls…

> 1) As per the article, to actually prevent ring -3 malware. The implemented signature is the best way to do this. If we could run our own "libre" code there, so could the attacker. Why can't computers have physical switches that enable/disable writing the memory that this piece of software is located in?

That is actually slightly less secure - sometimes people do have physical access to your machines.

For example, the NSA intercepted deliveries of switches and installed their malware on them. Would be easy if there is a physical switch. Not so easy if you need signed firmware (I'm sure the NSA could still do it, but it would definitely be harder).

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