Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm no security expert, but I was under the impression that HSTS pinning would make that hard to do, especially on sites like google.com. And I can't quite parse your sentence to know if you're implying that all companies do... (or just that I shouldn't be so naive as to assume none are), but I can see the cert chain for google.com in my browser at ${big_company} and it doesn't seem like I'm being MITM'd.
It relies on HTTPS, which relies on certificates telling the browser that the website is what it claims to be, which relies on a list of trusted root CA certificates installed on your computer, which the company controls. Most companies will install a trusted root CA cert that is themselves onto employee computers (otherwise you'll get SSL errors when accessing internal HTTPS pages since they're not signed with those…
Ruin My Search History
61–70 of 211 posts
Re: Ruin My Search History
#62Earlier quoted context omitted.
I can't find any information about this. Can you point me at some additional information? Thank you in advance!
Here's a good write-up on how to see if your company is listening in on your encrypted web traffic: http://security.stackexchange.com/a/2920 (Note: MITM is just one way companies monitor employees, but by no means the only way. If your company provided your work computer to you, or if they installed anything on your BYOD computer, I would treat everything you do on that computer as cc'ed to your boss by default.)
None of that speaks to HSTS/Pinning... which is the feature meant to protect against this sort of thing. I'm specifically asking about how a company can bypass HSTS/Pinning without modifying my local browser.
Everything I'm reading indicates that's not possible.
Re: Ruin My Search History
#63Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm no security expert, but I was under the impression that HSTS pinning would make that hard to do, especially on sites like google.com. And I can't quite parse your sentence to know if you're implying that all companies do... (or just that I shouldn't be so naive as to assume none are), but I can see the cert chain for google.com in my browser at ${big_company} and it doesn't seem like I'm being MITM'd.
It relies on HTTPS, which relies on certificates telling the browser that the website is what it claims to be, which relies on a list of trusted root CA certificates installed on your computer, which the company controls. Most companies will install a trusted root CA cert that is themselves onto employee computers (otherwise you'll get SSL errors when accessing internal HTTPS pages since they're not signed with those…
Re: Ruin My Search History
#64Re: Ruin My Search History
#65Earlier quoted context omitted.
Are there really people that believe there's a possibility that they don't?
I'm no security expert, but I was under the impression that HSTS pinning would make that hard to do, especially on sites like google.com. And I can't quite parse your sentence to know if you're implying that all companies do... (or just that I shouldn't be so naive as to assume none are), but I can see the cert chain for google.com in my browser at ${big_company} and it doesn't seem like I'm being MITM'd.
Re: Ruin My Search History
#66Warning: people should know this is NSFW for anyone with a company that monitors your web usage. I also wouldn't run this from an authoritarian country where local officials may not appreciate the joke.
Do companies really MITM SSL traffic in order to watch employees surfing habits?
Re: Ruin My Search History
#67Earlier quoted context omitted.
Here's a good write-up on how to see if your company is listening in on your encrypted web traffic: http://security.stackexchange.com/a/2920 (Note: MITM is just one way companies monitor employees, but by no means the only way. If your company provided your work computer to you, or if they installed anything on your BYOD computer, I would treat everything you do on that computer as cc'ed to your boss by default.)
I mean, that's how I MITM SSL traffic on a daily basis to do development. None of that speaks to HSTS/Pinning... which is the feature meant to protect against this sort of thing. I'm specifically asking about how a company can bypass HSTS/Pinning without modifying my local browser. Everything I'm reading indicates that's not possible.
>Firefox (and Chrome) disable Pin Validation for Pinned Hosts whose validated certificate chain terminates at a user-defined trust anchor (rather than a built-in trust anchor). This means that for users who imported custom root certificates all pinning violations are ignored.
That last sentence is key. From Wikipedia: some browsers "disable pinning for certificate chains with private root certificates to enable various corporate content inspection scanners and web debugging tools. The RFC 7469 standard also recommends disabling pinning violation reports for such certificate chains."
Re: Ruin My Search History
#68Earlier quoted context omitted.
How to reverse the damages: 1) Go to https://history.google.com/history/ 2) Select the offending searches 3) Click delete on the top right (then click delete again)
I'm pretty sure Google won't actually delete any of them from their internal profile of you though.
Re: Ruin My Search History
#69Earlier quoted context omitted.
I mean, that's how I MITM SSL traffic on a daily basis to do development. None of that speaks to HSTS/Pinning... which is the feature meant to protect against this sort of thing. I'm specifically asking about how a company can bypass HSTS/Pinning without modifying my local browser. Everything I'm reading indicates that's not possible.
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Public... >Firefox (and Chrome) disable Pin Validation for Pinned Hosts whose validated certificate chain terminates at a user-defined trust anchor (rather than a built-in trust anchor). This means that for users who imported custom root certificates all pinning violations are ignored. That last sentence is key. From Wikipedia: some browsers "disable pinning for c…