Why, oh why do they report times in PDT rather than AEST (the zone of the affected area) or UTC (the standard everything else is based on)? (Mutter, mutter, … something about Americans and their timezones … and northern hemispherians and their seasons …)
Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Sydney Region
21–30 of 41 posts
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Sydney Region
#22Our instances with ap-southeast-2 were out for around 12 hours. We used multiple availability zones and it didn't prevent downtime at all. It's very interesting the difference between AWS and Google outage responses. AWS is down for 12+ hours for some customers, force each customer to chase service level credits and sign off the postmortem with a nameless & faceless "-The AWS Team". Not one person at AWS was willing…
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Sydney Region
#23Our instances with ap-southeast-2 were out for around 12 hours. We used multiple availability zones and it didn't prevent downtime at all. It's very interesting the difference between AWS and Google outage responses. AWS is down for 12+ hours for some customers, force each customer to chase service level credits and sign off the postmortem with a nameless & faceless "-The AWS Team". Not one person at AWS was willing…
Can you explain this a little more? Amazon says this only affected one AZ, and they specifically note:
For this event, customers that were running their applications across multiple
Availability Zones in the Region were able to maintain availability throughout
the event.Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Sydney Region
#24Our instances with ap-southeast-2 were out for around 12 hours. We used multiple availability zones and it didn't prevent downtime at all. It's very interesting the difference between AWS and Google outage responses. AWS is down for 12+ hours for some customers, force each customer to chase service level credits and sign off the postmortem with a nameless & faceless "-The AWS Team". Not one person at AWS was willing…
I wonder if due to the scale of AWS and certain AWS customers, if AWS signs a post mortem with -Fred would a very large AWS customer have the pull to say "Amazon, fire Fred"? Just curious if anonymous postmortems are company policy at certain places and why that might be.
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Sydney Region
#25Our instances with ap-southeast-2 were out for around 12 hours. We used multiple availability zones and it didn't prevent downtime at all. It's very interesting the difference between AWS and Google outage responses. AWS is down for 12+ hours for some customers, force each customer to chase service level credits and sign off the postmortem with a nameless & faceless "-The AWS Team". Not one person at AWS was willing…
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Sydney Region
#26>> The specific signature of this weekend’s utility power failure resulted in an unusually long voltage sag (rather than a complete outage) It is false to assume that the state of the electrical supply is either on or off. This may come as a surprise, but not to me. In 2008, Eskom (South Africa's electricity suppliers) experienced similar faults. The mains supply voltage is 220v here. At one point, some devices start…
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Sydney Region
#27Our instances with ap-southeast-2 were out for around 12 hours. We used multiple availability zones and it didn't prevent downtime at all. It's very interesting the difference between AWS and Google outage responses. AWS is down for 12+ hours for some customers, force each customer to chase service level credits and sign off the postmortem with a nameless & faceless "-The AWS Team". Not one person at AWS was willing…
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Sydney Region
#28I love reading about problems like these, it's great that Amazon is forthcoming about them. There's always some new wrinkle. E.g. in this case, in normal operation, power from the utility power grid spins a flywheel. When the grid fails, the flywheel provides a holdover until Amazon's diesel generators can start. But in this failure the voltage from the grid sagged, rather than going away completely. The breaker isol…
Something else must have failed or was not properly configured, because backup Diesel generators should kick-in after 2-15 seconds of voltage drop, regardless of the flywheel. The flywheel is used in critical systems to cover only that <1m gap.
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Sydney Region
#29Our instances with ap-southeast-2 were out for around 12 hours. We used multiple availability zones and it didn't prevent downtime at all. It's very interesting the difference between AWS and Google outage responses. AWS is down for 12+ hours for some customers, force each customer to chase service level credits and sign off the postmortem with a nameless & faceless "-The AWS Team". Not one person at AWS was willing…
I independently monitor availability of 150 public cloud services and only observed 1.73 hours downtime for this event. This is the first EC2 outage I've observed in any region for over 6 months. According to my stats, in 2015 EC2 was highly available with 6 of 9 regions (including every US and EU region) having no outages, and total average service availability of 99.998% (78% of downtime in sa-east-1). I haven't ob…
While the numbers are nice, if some outages only impact a subset of customers and your monitoring accounts aren't one of them it's hard to determine how good your monitoring data really is. If he was impacted by a 12 hour outage and you only show ~2 hours that's a really significant difference.
I guess it really depends on how you monitor and how comprehensive it is. Do you monitor from multiple ISPs on different network paths in multiple regions/countries? Do you monitor each of the services under different load conditions and monitor multiple accounts? Sometimes "up" only tells part of the story.
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Sydney Region
#30Our instances with ap-southeast-2 were out for around 12 hours. We used multiple availability zones and it didn't prevent downtime at all. It's very interesting the difference between AWS and Google outage responses. AWS is down for 12+ hours for some customers, force each customer to chase service level credits and sign off the postmortem with a nameless & faceless "-The AWS Team". Not one person at AWS was willing…
people vote with their dollars and their votes are overwhelmingly telling amazon they're doing a great job.