Earlier quoted context omitted.
"Reproducing the running state of even a moderately complex distributed system is effectively impossible, so this argument bothers me not at all." That's a feature of the Xen hypervisor.[1] You can even migrate a process from one machine to another without stopping it. [1] http://wiki.prgmr.com/mediawiki/index.php/Chapter_9:_Xen_Mig...
You linked to the migration of a single operating system kernel. That is very different from reproducing the running state of an entire distributed system . Migrating a single kernel is not easy, but straight-forward: you have access to all of the relevant pieces (in memory process state, and state on disks) in one place. With a distributed system, that is not so, since the the running state of a distributed system w…
Can computers become conscious?: My reply to Roger Penrose
111–120 of 161 posts
Re: Can computers become conscious?: My reply to Roger Penrose
#112When Marvin Minsky described one perspective on consciousness as "hey, we don't understand consciousness, and we don't understand gravity, maybe consciousness is made of gravity", I thought he was just mocking the ever-popular idea that "maybe consciousness is made of quantum mechanics". I didn't know that there really was a prominent thinker who postulated gravity ( and quantum mechanics) as the place where subjecti…
I don't think anyone's seriously put forward the idea that consciousness and quantum mechanics are related because they're both mysterious, so that is a straw man. In any case, we do understand gravity and quantum mechanics pretty well, at least compared to consciousness. The reason some people think QM and consciousness are related is that some interpretations of quantum mechanics requires a conscious observer to co…
May I ask, where did you get the part about "conscious observer"? Yes, there's a thing in QM about observation collapsing the wave function, and there's disagreement on what that actually means. But I can't imagine that an interpretation promoted by actual physicists would use a squishy term like "conscious" in their hard science.
Re: Can computers become conscious?: My reply to Roger Penrose
#113Earlier quoted context omitted.
You linked to the migration of a single operating system kernel. That is very different from reproducing the running state of an entire distributed system . Migrating a single kernel is not easy, but straight-forward: you have access to all of the relevant pieces (in memory process state, and state on disks) in one place. With a distributed system, that is not so, since the the running state of a distributed system w…
You might be interested in the Chandy-Lamport snapshot algorithm, which can do what you describe without stopping the system's execution.
Re: Can computers become conscious?: My reply to Roger Penrose
#114Earlier quoted context omitted.
That seems downright nuanced for Chomsky talking about language. Did he really say this? Chomsky considers language to be a thing that physically evolved in humans. Are eyes an emergent property?
"Did he really say this?" That is my interpretation of what he'd said - there's no obvious evolutionary/natural selection ... impetus to it. Doesn't that make it necessarily emergent? Eyes on the front are common to nearly all predators. I think the contrast between octopus eyes and human eyes is used frequently to deduce that eyes are indeed emergent. But we have nothing on the raptors.
Maybe universal grammar isn't a physical fact about the possible ways the human brain can communicate, it's just that if we observe 6,000 variations on an idea with the same[2] origin and try hard enough to sum them up, we'll succeed.
[1] In the original sense.
[2] Or similar origins. Maybe language is a good enough idea to arise multiple times and converge, much like eyes. And I'm not sure whether to count things like Nicaraguan Sign Language as a separate origin of language.
Re: Can computers become conscious?: My reply to Roger Penrose
#115Earlier quoted context omitted.
We're all p-zombies. When we get poked with toothpicks we will scream in agony, the thought of being poked with toothpicks will appear internally, and we will in turn react to that thought, the reaction based on our upbringing. We have our outer senses, sight, touch, and then our inner senses, that can sense the 'thoughts' that were triggered by outer sense stimulation. The thought is just another form of sensory sti…
I'm not that comfortable with the hand wavy physicalist view that consciousness arises from the physical processes of the brain. If that were the case, why can't I simply design an artificial brain, a cyber brain, and upload myself in 1000 bodies? What really spoke to me in Aaronson's entire lecture is the whole quantum no-cloning restriction. Bell State can't help you either, because you can't violate causality. Sup…
We know:
1. Entropy is always increasing.
2. Life is negative entropy gatherer. (It decreases it's own entropy by increasing the entropy of its surroundings, to live.)
3. If we plot all living organisms by their negative entropy, it corresponds roughly to their awareness. The more negative entropy, the more awareness, the more "conscious".
Hypothesis:
Grandparent commenter said Consciousness is the state of being awake, hence able to react normally to sensory stimulation.
Entropy is information, the more entropy the more information there is to process.
Awareness and consciousness is the ability to process information. The more negative entropy the bigger the ability to process information.
Entropy and consciousness are two sides of the same coin. Consciousness, awareness, is negative entropy.
As another commenter said[1]: "The universe splits itself into two parts - an observer and an observed."
Re: Can computers become conscious?: My reply to Roger Penrose
#116The most interesting definition I have seen of consciousness is [1] "the mind thinking about the mind thinking", i.e. some sort of meta-level "diagnostic process". What I find interesting is that this definition supports awareness and an the existence of an 'I', but doesn't imply any sort of control or direct influence on the unconscious mind for which there seem to be experimental evidence against. Instead the resul…
Re: Can computers become conscious?: My reply to Roger Penrose
#117I don't think runaway general AIs must be conscious in order to be a danger, but that might depend on specific definitions of consciousness.
Re: Can computers become conscious?: My reply to Roger Penrose
#118Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not really a definition, but my very personal take on what conciousness is: Evolution has brought about creatures that are more successful (in regard to survival and reproduction), the more predictive power they have about their environment[1]. One could say, the better a species can simulate it's environment, the more likely it will continue to exist and be part of the ongoing evolution. Our brains are of course als…
> Conciousness is the process of simulation of reality. The "better" the simulation or the more complete and closer to "reality" it is (whatever that means) - the higher the form of conciousness. So would you say that a supercomputer in the process of calculating the gyromagnetic ratio of an isolated electron to 12 digits of accuracy is a higher form of consciousness than we are? After all, it is performing a much be…
Re: Can computers become conscious?: My reply to Roger Penrose
#119Earlier quoted context omitted.
You might be interested in the Chandy-Lamport snapshot algorithm, which can do what you describe without stopping the system's execution.
I'm aware of such things, and in fact I work on a system that supports something very similar. (Paper to be published by my colleagues in the industry track of VLDB.) But that is a logical snapshot. Through a clever protocol, and assuming some characteristics of your transport, you can save a state across your system that is logically consistent. That is, if you restored to this logical state, the distributed applica…
To be more precise: any "possible outcome" of the snapshot was also possible at some point during the original execution. And likewise, any "impossible outcome" of the snapshot was also ruled out at some point in the original. So if viewed from the outside, the fact that you took and restored a snapshot is indistinguishable from the normal situation of having an asynchronous network. It can't cause the system to exhibit any behaviors that weren't otherwise allowable.
(Apologies if I'm just restating what you already know; other readers may not be aware of it. This might be the same property that you're calling "integrity".)
This is reminiscent of one of Scott Aaronson's comments from the original article. If quantum effects are significant in the brain, then it's impossible -- even in principle -- to "perfectly" copy it such that the original and the copy are guaranteed to behave identically. But if the original and the copy are statistically indistinguishable, it amounts to the same thing.