MitM Attack against KeePass 2’s Update Check • Hacker News Board

Re: MitM Attack against KeePass 2’s Update Check

#61

Post by SkyMarshal » Wed, Jun 01, 2016, 10:32 PM UTC

jc4p wrote: post #7

That's wild, I didn't expect any security-centric website in 2016 to be HTTP-only! The reasoning for not doing it is weird too, they could at the very least move the update logic over to a separate SSL endpoint. Anyway, I'm not quite sure on the differences between them but I've been using KeePassX for years and recommend it thoroughly (as long as you're not looking for a easily synced or multi-user product): https:/…

/second keepassx, been using it for years too. Portable encrypted database file and cross-platform = excellent.

Re: MitM Attack against KeePass 2’s Update Check

#62

Post by Zuider » Wed, Jun 01, 2016, 10:43 PM UTC

zokier wrote: post #38

Zuider wrote: post #35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That could make sense OP dual-booted and the KeePass app and database were installed on the NTFS partition.

How exactly is that supposed to make sense?

The advantage is that you get to keep your passwords on a single database rather than having a separate copy of the database for each operating system. Synchronizing two separate copies of the database would be painful.

An alternate solution is to keep a single password database on a FAT32 formatted partition or thumbdrive which is readable from both Operating systems.

Re: MitM Attack against KeePass 2’s Update Check

#63

Post by stcredzero » Wed, Jun 01, 2016, 10:46 PM UTC

pfg wrote: post #15

revelation wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The answers here are off the mark. You can obviously have the update channel use HTTPS and keep your website at HTTP (not recommended, but certainly possible). Or just sign the updates and version information.

The way the update system works (according to the article) is that it shows a pop-up with the new version, and that pop-up opens their site (via HTTP). It is conceivable that they'd rely on the impressions coming from update dialogs for their ad revenue, so the argument they used (which - just to clarify - is not my argument) would apply here as well. Switching to HTTPS (or some other signing mechanism) for the updat…

The MitM on the automated update check is by far more dangerous.

Re: MitM Attack against KeePass 2’s Update Check

#64

Post by 0x4a42 » Wed, Jun 01, 2016, 10:51 PM UTC

cyphar wrote: post #34

jbob2000 wrote: post #2

It's free software; You have no right to complain or dictate priorities when you aren't paying for it. You aren't the customer, KeePass 2 advertisers are. Use 1password and pay $5 a month if you want the right to complain.

> It's free software; It is not free software, it's proprietary. Please don't use the phrase "free software" in this context, as it confuses people. It has a very specific meaning in the context of software.

On the homepage it says: "KeePass is really free, and more than that: it is open source (OSI certified). You can have a look at its full source and check whether the encryption algorithms are implemented correctly.".

Why do you say it's proprietary?

Re: MitM Attack against KeePass 2’s Update Check

#65

Post by stcredzero » Wed, Jun 01, 2016, 10:52 PM UTC

bqe wrote: post #51

teilo wrote: post #49

Couldn't this be solved by signing the update file? But the excuse of the dev is bogus in any case. In is trivial to have that single file transferred via HTTPS. His ad revenue excuse makes me thing something fishy is going on here.

That would help, but an attacker being able to deliver an arbitrary website by MITM is still something that should be avoided.

Signing the update file and having a separate page for the SHA256 hash of the binary would win back a lot of my confidence at this point.

Re: MitM Attack against KeePass 2’s Update Check

#66

Post by 3pt14159 » Wed, Jun 01, 2016, 11:34 PM UTC

deftnerd wrote: post #18

crypt1d wrote: post #10

"Received response from Dominik Reichl: The vulnerability will not be fixed. The indirect costs of switching to HTTPS (like lost advertisement revenue) make it a inviable solution." Well the indirect costs of not fixing it just got a lot bigger. Now a lot of people will realize that their passwords are not as safe as KeePass claims they are and will switch to a different product. So this way they loose both their mon…

That response is crazy. If he's so set at keeping the homepage http, then make a download.keypass.com site and keep the downloads on there, with https required.

Eh. Still vulnerable to HSTS attack. To me HTTPS without HSTS is only protection to programmers. To the public, HTTPS without HSTS protection is essentially useless against MITM attacks.

Re: MitM Attack against KeePass 2’s Update Check

#67

Post by cyphar » Thu, Jun 02, 2016, 7:33 AM UTC

0x4a42 wrote: post #64

cyphar wrote: post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> It's free software; It is not free software, it's proprietary. Please don't use the phrase "free software" in this context, as it confuses people. It has a very specific meaning in the context of software.

On the homepage it says: "KeePass is really free, and more than that: it is open source (OSI certified). You can have a look at its full source and check whether the encryption algorithms are implemented correctly.". Why do you say it's proprietary?

Ah sorry, I was wrong. I thought that KeePass was proprietary and that KeePassX was a free software replacement. :P

Re: MitM Attack against KeePass 2’s Update Check

#68

Post by breakingcups » Thu, Jun 02, 2016, 9:46 AM UTC

See a more detailed (but still very wrong in my opinion) response from Dominik here: https://sourceforge.net/p/keepass/discussion/329220/thread/e...

Re: MitM Attack against KeePass 2’s Update Check

#69

Post by ultramancool » Thu, Jun 02, 2016, 1:14 PM UTC

crypt1d wrote: post #10

"Received response from Dominik Reichl: The vulnerability will not be fixed. The indirect costs of switching to HTTPS (like lost advertisement revenue) make it a inviable solution." Well the indirect costs of not fixing it just got a lot bigger. Now a lot of people will realize that their passwords are not as safe as KeePass claims they are and will switch to a different product. So this way they loose both their mon…

> Now a lot of people will realize that their passwords are not as safe as KeePass claims they are and will switch to a different product.

Not really.

Just check the package you download is signed by the developer and you're safe. Authenticode signatures are present on all KeePass releases on Windows and most Linux users probably get it from a distro package manager anyways.

Re: MitM Attack against KeePass 2’s Update Check

#70

Post by wtbob » Thu, Jun 02, 2016, 1:15 PM UTC

dmoy wrote: post #36

Well I'm glad I switched off of keepass awhile back. Anyone know any good password managers that have web login and support U2F? Lastpass does not :(

I just use a gpg-encrypted org-mode file (I can transparently decrypt it with emacs). It's remarkably convenient, and I don't have to worry about software going out of support.