Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think Tor Browser tries to do this for some types of fingerprinting.
The Tor Browser does not send misinformation; it just blocks. A solution would probably be a browser where every version, on every platform reports the exact same things, always the same way.
Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis
221–230 of 272 posts
Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis
#222Coauthor here. I lead the research team at Princeton working to uncover online tracking. Happy to answer questions. The tool we built to do this research is open-source https://github.com/citp/OpenWPM/ We'd love to work with outside developers to improve it and do new things with it. We've also released the raw data from our study.
When everybody was running Windows on a smorgasbord of hardware / patchlevel / plugins / fonts, it was easy to fingerprint. Are we moving towards a more monolithic landscape where fingerprinting is less able to track individual users? * If I have a fleet of Chromebooks running the same version of Chrome OS, will they all have the same fingerprint? * Will, say, all iPhones 6 with the same hardware parts, running the s…
Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis
#223Google has a vested interest in information leakage. I have a suspicion that the Chromium project expresses a strategic desire to shape the direction of browser development away from stopping those leaks. The idea of signing into the browser with an identity is a core feature and in Google's branded version, Chrome, the big idea is that the user is signed into Google's services. Google only pitches the idea of multip…
This is why Firefox is gaining momentum; they seem to be the only browser interested in user privacy. Users are definitely interested.
Zooming is such a basic thing... i don't understand why they implement it in such a crappy way. Certainly doesn't attract users.
Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis
#224Earlier quoted context omitted.
> If you can set cookies, the user has already expressed their consent by enabling the cookies in the browser. As long as cookies' existence is common knowledge (it is by now), there is no need to duplicate browser UI within every website. Wrong. If I disable cookies in my browser, I can't log in to websites anymore, so they need to be allowed. A whitelist would be very inconvenient. On top of that, it's not explicit…
You can enable session cookies only, even in the current UIs. Ditto for third-party cookies. Duplicating UI in a website is a solution looking for a problem. The web devs can nag the 0.01% who don't have cookies enabled, and leave the 99.99% who have them enabled alone. It has never been enforced that way to my knowledge, anywhere in the EU. Which law or court decision says that it is actually illegal?
How does my browser know that one PHPSESSID is used for tracking, and another is a session? You probably mean until I close the browser, which would be never -- at least, I would never want to, but I do every few months for browser updates. (My laptop always goes in suspend/sleep mode.)
> Ditto for third-party cookies
I don't know what third-party cookies are anyway, and I bet my peers could not give me an accurate description either. We're all in the software business, be it game development or general software development or something.
Two gave a rough description but couldn't answer a question about whether embedded Like buttons would work if the user is logged into Facebook. Another just said "I don't know".
I'm not sure "the public is informed about all their options by now". The ones who really care generally use uBlock, ABP, Self-Destructing Cookies, Ghostery, etc., the rest just click "ok" because the sites do not inform them about these aforementioned possibilities: that wouldn't be in their interest.
> Duplicating UI in a website is a solution looking for a problem
Oh I agree it's an issue, I hate this cookie wall as much as anyone. I would love for there to be no need to ever see this wall.
> It has never been enforced that way to my knowledge, anywhere in the EU. Which law or court decision says that it is actually illegal?
I am not sure fines have been dealt, but the Dutch ACM ("authority for consumer and markets", literally translated) did give out warnings to non-compliant sites and they subsequently places cookie walls.
The law simply says no such cookies may be placed, it doesn't say "for a few months while users are unaware, and after that, oh well, have some fun picking your own privacy laws as you wish."
And yes, I know functional cookies and simple tracking is allowed if you don't invade a person's privacy. This means practically every major website knowingly tries to invade your privacy, because they have these walls in place. What do people say? "Fucking government does not understand the internet, look at all these walls." What should we be saying? "Wait why are they trying to create detailed profiles of me in the first place?"
Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis
#225Earlier quoted context omitted.
> For WebRTC, browsers could block local addresses. That would defeat a huge selling point of WebRTC, the ability to create in-browser p2p connections over the user's local network.
I'm not familiar with WebRTC. What's the use case there? I can't remember ever wanting to create an in-browser p2p connection on my local network. What would it be used for?
Others have pointed out this behavior has changed in Chrome 48. You don't get the local IP unless the page asks for access to the mic/camera which the user has to give permission for.
Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis
#226Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think the logical conclusion of that argument is to also disable all CSS. Fonts are styling for text, CSS is styling for markup. I think most the arguments against disabling CSS can be used against disabling fonts (barring that people do crazy shit with CSS most often now, so it complicates the issue). Really, in the end, all input accepted from the remote side (including text/html) needs to be vetted and processed…
I've considered what might be necessary to dispose of server-side CSS. A set of standard page templates could do it. Clients could then choose their preferred client-side CSS to apply. Article, index page, image gallery, catalog entry, search result, etc. Seems a finite set should cover most needs. Which ought be available from a few fairly standard sources (CMS, blogging engines, frameworks).
Not to mention I don't think it's a solution that's viable given economic principle and how much people value expression. We'd just be back to the equivalent of Flash sites again, with whatever takes over for flash (canvas?).
Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis
#227Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've considered what might be necessary to dispose of server-side CSS. A set of standard page templates could do it. Clients could then choose their preferred client-side CSS to apply. Article, index page, image gallery, catalog entry, search result, etc. Seems a finite set should cover most needs. Which ought be available from a few fairly standard sources (CMS, blogging engines, frameworks).
As I see it, the web is the most vibrant medium of expression and innovation we have today. While I don't doubt there would be gains in security to limiting it in many aspects, I question whether the specific level of security gain would be worth the loss of innovation and expression. I think there are many areas we could focus on instead that would increase security without the same level of negative consequences, s…
GitHub and gmail are prime examples for sites that broke a lot of things in the process.
Maybe what we need instead are real APIs and custom clients.
Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis
#228Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've considered what might be necessary to dispose of server-side CSS. A set of standard page templates could do it. Clients could then choose their preferred client-side CSS to apply. Article, index page, image gallery, catalog entry, search result, etc. Seems a finite set should cover most needs. Which ought be available from a few fairly standard sources (CMS, blogging engines, frameworks).
As I see it, the web is the most vibrant medium of expression and innovation we have today. While I don't doubt there would be gains in security to limiting it in many aspects, I question whether the specific level of security gain would be worth the loss of innovation and expression. I think there are many areas we could focus on instead that would increase security without the same level of negative consequences, s…
There's a risk / frequency trade off with all of these. Privacy can be quite possibly costly or fatal, though slightly more rare. Not so rare though that 20% of all Web users in a US Department of Commerce survey (see my recent comments history) report known credit card fraud. That's many tens of millions of affected users.
The security risks are similar but also extend to organisations which might stand to lose control over their own (validly) private information, or control over systems (see for example concerns over SCADA infrastructure, or industrial process control).
Usability and adaptability issues pose lower risks, but have a much larger affected field.
It goes well beyond the visually disabled, illiterate, and cognitively challenged. Anyone who's landed on a desktop site that's unusable on mobile has encountered a usability challenge. Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon are all rapidly pushing us, some kicking and screaming (I include myself) to an audible Web -- one in which the primary control and response interfaces are spoken.
What landing on a small set of templates does is provide for clearly parseable and understandable content. In a world where the goal isn't to read a full page but to extract and convey a useful item of information from it, wading verbally through megabytes of unparsable and nonexcludable content isn't particularly useful (and yes, figuring out how much a data reference is worth to the data-rerference intermediary is another question worth considering).
More generally, in my case, with only modest perceptual impairments (reading small, low-contrast type is among the earlier signs of your impending death), I've come to conclude for some years now that Web design isn't the solution, Web design is the problem. There are only so many ways you can present content that doesn't fuck with readability. I try, very hard, to ensure I'm not doing this on my own modest designs (look up "Edward Morbius's Motherfucking Web Page", a riff on a popular refrain, for my own principals in action).
My most common response when landing on a website is to sigh, roll my eyes, and dump it to something more readable. Firefox's Reader Mode. Pocket. Straight ASCII text. w3m.
And no, "novel graphic design" isn't conveying vast new amounts of information. I grew tired of hearing that argument 30 years ago, it's not got fresher since. Bloomberg, The New York Times, and the BBD are all experimenting with high-concept article formatting. In my experienct, without exception, it simply Gets In The Fucking Way.
My half-serious response to this is to create a new web browser embodying these and a few other principles. The working title is "the fuck your web design browser". FYWD for short.
Ninnies may opt to call it the Fine Young Western Dinosaurs browser as an alternative.
Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis
#229So what exactly is the research contribution being made here? What's new and interesting?
Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis
#230Earlier quoted context omitted.
Thanks for the explanation. I missed it because I never though these settings could be that unique.
Just imagine, if the audio stack exposes the volume level, that's roughly 7.5 bits of uniqueness to contribute to the 33 required to uniquely identity any person on Earth (not that you can expect it to be uniformly distributed, and thus fully usable).