Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis • Hacker News Board

Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis

#211

Post by vitd » Thu, May 19, 2016, 5:45 PM UTC

jsprogrammer wrote: post #194

amluto wrote: post #117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The browser vendors could start taking the idea of asking for permission seriously. For WebRTC, browsers could block local addresses. uBlock Origin can do this on Firefox already. For battery: browsers could treat it like location and ask for permission. Why does the average site need to know my battery status? For fonts: browsers could standardize a list of system fonts available on each platform. It's 2016 already:…

> For WebRTC, browsers could block local addresses. That would defeat a huge selling point of WebRTC, the ability to create in-browser p2p connections over the user's local network.

I'm not familiar with WebRTC. What's the use case there? I can't remember ever wanting to create an in-browser p2p connection on my local network. What would it be used for?

Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis

#212

Post by hackuser » Thu, May 19, 2016, 5:58 PM UTC

englehardt wrote: post #49

crispyambulance wrote: post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I can see how you would be led to believe that interpretation. Looking at the "fingerprinting" webapp however, details that sound is NOT actually recorded-- only the uniqueness of your machine's audio processing stack. At least I hope that's the case. The idea of a microphone recording without permission upon visiting a website would cause quite a broo-ha-ha. https://audiofingerprint.openwpm.com/ > "This page tests b…

Yes, no sound is recorded. Access to the user's mic isn't possible without a permission. If there are sections of the website or paper that seem to imply that, let me know and we'll clarify.

The front page [1] doesn't say either way, and I wondered the same thing when I read it. A few words or a link to an explanation would be helpful.

[1] https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/index.htm...

Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis

#213

Post by hackuser » Thu, May 19, 2016, 6:04 PM UTC

randomwalker wrote: post #88

Freak_NL wrote: post #80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What can be done by the browser vendors such as Mozilla, Google, and Microsoft? To prevent fingerprinting, your browser has to disable all sorts of useful modern JavaScript API's (e.g., WebRTC) by default, prevent spurious HTTP requests (e.g., to prevent abusing @font-face to find out which fonts are installed), and pretend you are an American using the most popular web browser of the moment (i.e., hide the user's pr…

Personally I think there are so many of these APIs that for the browser to try to prevent the ability to fingerprint is putting the genie back in the bottle. But there is one powerful step browsers can take: put stronger privacy protections into private browsing mode, even at the expense of some functionality. Firefox has taken steps in this direction https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2015/11/03/firefox-now-offers-... Tr…

> there are so many of these APIs that for the browser to try to prevent the ability to fingerprint is putting the genie back in the bottle.

I disagree. If there were billions to be made from this new tech, secure browsing, then the browser vendors would be moving rapidly toward it. Certainly, more difficult technical challenges are overcome regularly.

Surveillance was implemented without users' knowledge and without public debate, presented as a fait accompli, and now the latest tactic is to say there's nothing that can be done about it. People accept that because they feel helpless, but I don't think we should be perpetuating this rhetoric of inevitiability. There's no technical reason it can't be done.

Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis

#214

Post by manigandham » Thu, May 19, 2016, 6:05 PM UTC

cpeterso wrote: post #198

manigandham wrote: post #160

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I could talk about this for hours. Fundamentally, identity is important for the ad industry but it's not about your personal info, it's just a reliable ID that we're all after. A reliable ID allows for storing your ad history and interests to show you better ads and less of the same. This is proven since it's all math and data science and we can see the increase in metrics with better targeting. By the way, clicks ar…

> if there was a standardized ID like IDFA but for browsers (or even better at the OS level) and privacy regulation that's actually enforced, that would be a good compromise. Sites and ad networks get a reliable ID and you get control over when and how that ID is refreshed. To detect ad fraud, would the ID need to be the same on all sites? Instead of sites dropping cookies on clients, what if browsers generated their…

Yes the ID would have to be the same, just like it is on mobile (Android Advertising ID, iOS IDFA) and would be best at the device level but browser would be a start.

If it's unique to every site then it's nothing new, networks can already set IDs today with 1st party cookies. It's being able to have a internet-wide ID that's valuable and is what 3rd party cookies allow(ed).

The ID itself doesn't matter, it's just random characters and mapped in various ways by networks. It's the reliability and consistency on a device level that's needed. Having something like this would make a massive difference - all the cookies/tracking junk would be obsolete, along with the hundreds of pixel sync tags, and would make everything faster, more accurate, more private and more secure.

Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis

#215

Post by benevol » Thu, May 19, 2016, 6:05 PM UTC

Freak_NL wrote: post #187

benevol wrote: post #173

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Google has explicitly WontFix'd bugs on the subject of expanding incognito to be hardened against fingerprinting Obviously. Google is in the business of destroying your privacy: Advertising revenue is maximized when the consumer is/remains completely tracked and profiled at all times. Other browser vendors which are not in the ad business could use this as an opportunity to differentiate themselves from Google: Int…

Or just let the user decide at the start of a private session. Firefox already does this with tracking protection. If Mozilla decides to improve tracking protection at the cost of usability (such as hiding you preferred language), than offering that as a toggle-able option on that page might be sufficient to empower the user to decide for on his own.

> offering that as a toggle-able option on that page might be sufficient

Technically speaking yes.

From a marketing/communication standpoint, I would separate this "feature" clearly from the 2 known browsing experiences. It not only clearly communicates to the user that a different browsing experience is about to start. By selling it as "the third browsing mode", it definitely also adds more perceived value to the product.

Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis

#216

Post by dredmorbius » Thu, May 19, 2016, 6:11 PM UTC

kbenson wrote: post #195

cm3 wrote: post #174

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Fonts are different in that they're not as crucial to the content as images. You cannot replace an image with an alternative text form while retaining the content, but you can display the content completely with WOFF missing.

I think the logical conclusion of that argument is to also disable all CSS. Fonts are styling for text, CSS is styling for markup. I think most the arguments against disabling CSS can be used against disabling fonts (barring that people do crazy shit with CSS most often now, so it complicates the issue). Really, in the end, all input accepted from the remote side (including text/html) needs to be vetted and processed…

I've considered what might be necessary to dispose of server-side CSS.

A set of standard page templates could do it. Clients could then choose their preferred client-side CSS to apply. Article, index page, image gallery, catalog entry, search result, etc.

Seems a finite set should cover most needs. Which ought be available from a few fairly standard sources (CMS, blogging engines, frameworks).

Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis

#217

Post by slac » Thu, May 19, 2016, 6:15 PM UTC

amluto wrote: post #117

Freak_NL wrote: post #80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What can be done by the browser vendors such as Mozilla, Google, and Microsoft? To prevent fingerprinting, your browser has to disable all sorts of useful modern JavaScript API's (e.g., WebRTC) by default, prevent spurious HTTP requests (e.g., to prevent abusing @font-face to find out which fonts are installed), and pretend you are an American using the most popular web browser of the moment (i.e., hide the user's pr…

The browser vendors could start taking the idea of asking for permission seriously. For WebRTC, browsers could block local addresses. uBlock Origin can do this on Firefox already. For battery: browsers could treat it like location and ask for permission. Why does the average site need to know my battery status? For fonts: browsers could standardize a list of system fonts available on each platform. It's 2016 already:…

For WebRTC, this behavior is now default in Chrome since version 48. Please see the release notes here: https://groups.google.com/d/msg/discuss-webrtc/_5hL0HeBeEA/H...

Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis

#218

Post by slac » Thu, May 19, 2016, 6:16 PM UTC

vitd wrote: post #211

jsprogrammer wrote: post #194

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> For WebRTC, browsers could block local addresses. That would defeat a huge selling point of WebRTC, the ability to create in-browser p2p connections over the user's local network.

I'm not familiar with WebRTC. What's the use case there? I can't remember ever wanting to create an in-browser p2p connection on my local network. What would it be used for?

Please read the Chrome 48 release notes, WebRTC's default behavior has changed. https://groups.google.com/d/msg/discuss-webrtc/_5hL0HeBeEA/H...

Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis

#219

Post by englehardt » Thu, May 19, 2016, 6:16 PM UTC

hackuser wrote: post #212

englehardt wrote: post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, no sound is recorded. Access to the user's mic isn't possible without a permission. If there are sections of the website or paper that seem to imply that, let me know and we'll clarify.

The front page [1] doesn't say either way, and I wondered the same thing when I read it. A few words or a link to an explanation would be helpful. [1] https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/index.htm...

Thanks, I've added a clarification.

Re: Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis

#220

Post by englehardt » Thu, May 19, 2016, 6:18 PM UTC

dccoolgai wrote: post #56

englehardt wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Other co-author here. Unfortunately there are good performance reasons for allowing WebRTC to access the local IP, see the lengthy discussion here: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=959893 . One use case is allowing two peers behind the same NAT to communicate directly without leaving the local network. The working group recommendation that we linked in the paper ( https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ie…

Thanks for the response! If you're interested and it would be useful for your research, I have some really, really interesting privacy findings regarding Service Workers I'd be happy to share. I'm strongly in favor of an enhanced Open Web, but I'm not comfortable with the opaque nature in which tracking/privacy can be likewise enhanced with little user interaction or notification. Keep up the good work.

Feel free to email us at the addresses listed on the bottom of the linked site.