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The Case Against Reality

theatlantic.com

111–114 of 114 posts

Re: The Case Against Reality

#111
post #110

But when you do a split-brain operation, a complete transection of the corpus callosum, you get clear evidence of two separate consciousnesses. Is there any evidence supporting that claim?

That there is a strong effect is fairly well documented:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Split-brain

Whether there are two full consciousnesses I think is not established.

Re: The Case Against Reality

#112
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I disagree that math is that great. A mathematical model is a formal description of some sort, but a mental model is just a different kind of ontological descriptor; both are merely machines to process inputs and produce some sort of output. You might argue that it's better to be able to observe and tweak the mathematical model than to use one built on purely human semantics, but, mathematical models, by virtue of th…

> I disagree that math is that great. A mathematical model is a formal description of some sort, but a mental model is just a different kind of ontological descriptor; both are merely machines to process inputs and produce some sort of output. That doesn't say much though. A cheap numeric calculator (not turing complete, the plain type) and a high end PC are both "merely machines to process inputs and produce some so…

Newton's theory is a simple three-variable model that describes a simple power law relationship between them. Holy fuck, would it be fantastic if ANY ASPECT of biochemistry or biology could be modeled with such a simple description. As a biologist I can tell you this is very far from the case. This is a huge problem with the field of biology, actually, that the models (and ideas of complexity) we have to bring to bear were developed in physics where the parametrizations are simple and clean and provide high predictive value.

This math simply doesn't work when you throw it against a biology problem. Precise formulations don't exist when you're dealing with, say, the interactions between two 100-amino acid folded proteins. Physics operates on simple rules that work everywhere; biology operates on complex rule sets that are often broken. The math is just not up to snuff, here.

Re: The Case Against Reality

#113

I get really suspicious when I see quantum physics used in this way. It seems like a misdirection. Given the information in the article, it's impossible to evaluate his claims--we don't have access to the computer models he uses, or the expertise to evaluate his proofs. But there are a lot of gigantic red flags all throughout. Like when he says he's mathematically proved that "an organism that sees reality as it is w…

I think what he's trying to express may have some value, but I agree that he's misreading quantum physics in a number of ways to try and use it to prop up his philosophical ideas. The observer affecting the outcome of the experiment is an interesting property of quantum physics, but it only affects very small objects that have reached the point where they are almost at the edge of perceptible reality. And it really h…

I hear your argument against these sorts of quantum physics inspired models of consciousness, but I could never understand them. Since you imply a greater understanding of quantum physics than the author, perhaps you could help me answer these questions:

If properties like non-locality, position uncertainty, etc are real at the small scale, how are they not real at the large scale? Isn't the macroscopic world just a large number of these oddly behaving particles averaging out into emergent forms and behaviors? And arent these macroscopic forms and behaviors no more real than tiger depicted on a computer screen, which is really just a conglomeration of pixels? Or is there some special aspect of the universe that exists at the macroscopic level and not the small scale?

Re: The Case Against Reality

#114
It isn't necessarily necessary to invoke QM to make sense of this, though QM and GR have their place in the detailed formulation of various functions.

With a good read and a little work, one finds that one's experience of the "world" (whatever that is; fortunately, we don't need to know; cf below) can be summarized as:

  Xi = ΣPjiIj
  Ai = Di(Xi)
  Iij = ΣPijAi
Your experience (Xi) is the probability-weighted sum of the impacts (Ij) of all actions, yours and others, aka, "the world", which we model as a space of actions; this includes your digestion, my writing this, your reading this, the temperature in your surroundings, what happened to each of us yesterday, etc.

Your actions, Ai, result from a decision function (Di) that takes your experience-space as its only input; the decision function is arbitrarily complex, but has order likely less than O(nc), since you make decisions in real time (dithering is still a decision, in this sense; you are choosing to continue to attempt to choose to act)... ...unless we are a tightly coupled simulation in NP space and achieve momentary "consciousness" (whatever that means) whenever the simulation reaches "consensus" (but that's overly complicated, so let's use Occam's Razor and stick with the simpler model... ...at least until it fails).

In this case, the limit on "c" would be set by your wetware: Evolutionarily, we are optimized for decisions with order less than

  O(n**c)
Any other decisions get us eaten by tigers (because we took too long). The better our wetware, the more complex and thorough can be Di and still produce result(s) in time to keep us alive.

This means our basic decision-making apparatus is short-term optimized, suggesting that many of our decisions for long-term effects will be "bad", i.e., sub-optimal, because we decide for survival and fitness, not optimal - or even good - long-term consequences.

Your impact on anything, including yourself (i) and everything else (Σj), Iij, is the probability-weighted sum of your actions.

This is an even simpler view than the article expresses: He suggests it when discussing that positing the existence of a world, W, is unnecessary, but then digresses to a theory of conscious agents... ...which is also unnecessary, but which may be illuminating.

In the above formulation, a world, W, is replaced with probability-weighted mappings of actions (of one's self and of others) as impacts (on one's self and on others). These probability-mappings may be arbitrarily complex; determining their order is a real poser....

At the very least, any Ij that takes more than time T to "reach" you does not impact your current Xi (though it may impact future Xi).

Interesting. The probability mapping could have a time-based (light cone?) component, or the simple formulation could be replaced with one involving Xif(Xic, Ijic).

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