61–70 of 154 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It seems like 'buying first stage engines from Russia' will have a hard time undercutting the 'reuse the first stage entirely' strategy, no?
ULA has an engine reuse plan. If they can get it working it'll be much more efficient than the hoverslam approach.
This is exactly how the market is supposed to work - SpaceX is delivering the same service for a lower price and now ULA is finally forced to put serious effort into competing. I'm curious what they intend to do once the reusable first stage program gets going and launch costs drop even further.
This is exactly how the market is supposed to work - SpaceX is delivering the same service for a lower price and now ULA is finally forced to put serious effort into competing. I'm curious what they intend to do once the reusable first stage program gets going and launch costs drop even further.
You're exactly right, except that I don't think ULA is going to have much trouble matching SpaceX's prices. They were in a monopoly situation before where they could name their own price (not really, but close enough). I could see even ULA's pricing pendulum swing all the other way: they could start bidding for contracts at a loss, using their other business sectors to prop up the space division until they drive Spac…
THAT has to end. Then let's see them compete.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
>If that argument actually carried any weight, then ULA wouldn't exist, but Martin, McDonnel Douglas Aerospace, and GD Convair would. Times have changed. I think Congress may have seen the error of its ways on this one.
At the time ULA was formed it wasn't an error. The US had a serious problem with rocket reliability and lost more than a few very expensive satellites. The devlopment or reliable and on demand access to space was a matter of national security.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I seem to remember that in the 1950's the US tried to design unitary multi-role fighter and it failed.
Not in the 1950s - that would have been the F-4 Phantom, and it was actually quite successful, in production from 1959 to 1979, and probably still flying (albeit totally hotrodded) by lots of air forces. You might be thinking of the F-111, which was supposed to be all things to all services. That was the 1960s. Or maybe the failed A-12, which was supposed to be an attack plane for all services. But you're correct, un…
Multirole capability is primarily a function of the weapons an aircraft can employ. This wasn't true in the 70s when targeting pods were binoculars and effective employment of aircraft in strike roles required decent performance in low-and-slow flight regimes, but we've been living with pods and PGMs coming out of our ears for 25 years now. Design tradeoffs for multiroles today are primarily those of cost and maintainability. You can pay out the ears and get larger twin-engine multiroles that strain logistics and wallets, opt for a single-engine F-16alike multirole that'll do everything nearly as well except for flying really high and really fast, or inexplicably go Eurocanard to pay F-22 prices for sub F-35 capabilities. Anyway, the point is that it's next to impossible not to make a multirole these days even if you're trying; if you can employ weapons with your jet, you're multirole.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
ULA has an engine reuse plan. If they can get it working it'll be much more efficient than the hoverslam approach.
How?
It's certainly not obviously more efficient or quicker reuse, it's likely to be slower and far more costly if they actually do manage it, so saying it is more efficient is just a way for ULA to try to sound like they are still a contender, even out their launches are still significantly more expensive and they haven't even tried to reuse engines.
This is exactly how the market is supposed to work - SpaceX is delivering the same service for a lower price and now ULA is finally forced to put serious effort into competing. I'm curious what they intend to do once the reusable first stage program gets going and launch costs drop even further.
You're exactly right, except that I don't think ULA is going to have much trouble matching SpaceX's prices. They were in a monopoly situation before where they could name their own price (not really, but close enough). I could see even ULA's pricing pendulum swing all the other way: they could start bidding for contracts at a loss, using their other business sectors to prop up the space division until they drive Spac…
Not to mention the supply of those engines is highly predicated on maintaining a solid relationship with Russia for what that's worth.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Beyond that, a logical argument can be made against putting all the national space eggs in one basket. If that argument actually carried any weight, then ULA wouldn't exist, but Martin, McDonnel Douglas Aerospace, and GD Convair would. That is, the DoD and the defense companies trot out any arguments they feel like, and hope that Congress accepts them. I concur on your analysis of companies that are fat and happy bid…
>If that argument actually carried any weight, then ULA wouldn't exist, but Martin, McDonnel Douglas Aerospace, and GD Convair would. Times have changed. I think Congress may have seen the error of its ways on this one.
Either that or Congress realized they can't sweep under the rug how much taxpayer money they could be saving.