This is certainly the worst case scenario - your security officer installing remote access software on developers machines, stealing bitcoins from production, then selling the company source code, access credentials and access to the internal network to a Russian hacker. Building a security system to handle this level of attack is a whole level beyond stopping even determined external attackers. Are there any best pr…
It's extremely expensive. Many banks and companies in the finance industry (hedge funds) do this: Hire at least 2 or 3 people for every job. Have them watch each other whenever touching systems that connect to production or deploying code to production. Never trust any one of them with the private keys or passwords to anything - they can only get half of a secret and their co-worker gets the other half. To do this ef…
This is actually the key one - the more people who need to be corrupt, the harder it is to get away with being a crook. A surprising amount of internal fraud can be completed simply by requiring people to take solid blocks (2 weeks plus) of leave every year.
That "inefficiency" the "lean 10x disruptors" congratulate themselves over does not always end well.