This is a very good Post-Mortem. As I assumed it was kind of a corner case bug meet corner case bug met corner case bug. This is also why I am of afraid of a self driving cars and other such life critical software. There are going to be weird edge cases, what prevents you from reaching them? Making software is hard....
Post-Mortem for Google Compute Engine’s Global Outage on April 11
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Re: Post-Mortem for Google Compute Engine’s Global Outage on April 11
#272Earlier quoted context omitted.
And a really fun read. If someone here decides to get this book, get the sequel as well - Daemon ends on kind of a cliff-hanger.
Freedom (TM) is the sequel, and the author (Daniel Suarez) has a few other near-term what-if-this-all-goes-skynet books which are equally good.
Re: Post-Mortem for Google Compute Engine’s Global Outage on April 11
#273In this event, the canary step correctly identified that the new configuration was unsafe. Crucially however, a second software bug in the management software did not propagate the canary step’s conclusion back to the push process, and thus the push system concluded that the new configuration was valid and began its progressive rollout. Classic Two Generals. "No news is good news," generally isn't a good design philo…
It may not be good design, but it might be necessary / practical design. If you have enough machines that some percentage of them are down or unreachable at any given time, you can't wait for full go-ahead before proceeding; you'll never get full go-ahead. So you're left with probabilistic solutions, and as T approaches infinity the expectation of more than zero false-positives approaches 1.
Re: Post-Mortem for Google Compute Engine’s Global Outage on April 11
#274Earlier quoted context omitted.
Well, this bug took down the entire system. What happens when self-driving software hits a similar bug? I don't think that there is any precedent for that sort of thing with manually driven cars. The scale could easily be larger than 100-car pile-ups due to poor weather conditions.
>I don't think that there is any precedent for that sort of thing with manually driven cars. A stroke or heart attack while driving?
A "Perfect Storm" of bugs could cause a systemic failure that has the possibility to affect all cars everywhere (well, probably limited to a single car-maker / model / etc). This has the possibility to affect millions. Claiming that a stroke or heart attack while driving has the possibility of a similar scope / reach doesn't make sense.
Re: Post-Mortem for Google Compute Engine’s Global Outage on April 11
#275I'm waiting for the time when they push over the air updates to airplanes in flight. "You can fly safely, we have canaries and staged deployment" A year forward: "Unfortunately because the canary verification as well as the staged deployment code was broken, instead of one crash and 300 dead, an update was pushed to all aircraft, which subsequently caused them to crash, killing 70,000 people." I'm not 100% sure why t…
Re: Post-Mortem for Google Compute Engine’s Global Outage on April 11
#276Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've been itching to release this terror movie plot into the wild: It's 2025 and more than 10% of the cars on the road in the US are self-driving. It's rush hour on a busy Friday afternoon in Washington, DC. Earlier that day, there'd been a handful of odd reports of self-driving Edsels (so as not to impugn an actual model) going haywire, and the NTSB has started its investigation. But then, at 430pm, highway patrol u…
This is a good movie plot, it just has one huge plot hole: >It's rush hour on a busy Friday afternoon in Washington, DC. >each phalanx moving towards the Clara Barton Parkway >all converging DC rush hour? Moving cars? Please. Independence Day made me suspend less disbelief.
Re: Post-Mortem for Google Compute Engine’s Global Outage on April 11
#277Earlier quoted context omitted.
Are BGP updates for Google's own router configurations really so frequent that they can't pay an engineer to at least monitor the propagation of configuration changes? In this case, a human would have instantly seen that the update was a) rejected (as explained in the postmortem), and b) holy shit, WHY DID THE ROUTER CHANGE ITS OWN CONFIGURATION TO BLOW AWAY ALL OF THE GCE ROUTES!?! I'm all for automation, but WTF? I…
First of all, BGP is core to Google's load balancing architecture. So within a single datacenter you probably have at least a few dozen devices down stream from each edge router. Secondly, I'm seeing just shy of 500 individual prefixes, 282 directly connected peers (other networks), and a presence at over 100 physical internet exchanges, just for one of Google's four ASes. Would you be able to read over that configur…
Re: Post-Mortem for Google Compute Engine’s Global Outage on April 11
#278Earlier quoted context omitted.
> auto-pilot in a plane needs to be 100% reliable, or everyone dies Actually it is much more simpler than a self-driving car. And if there is a problem it disengages.
Autopilot in a plane usually doesn't involve autonavigation, whereas autodrive in a car generally requires navigation. Autodrive in a car without navigation is basically 'cruise control'.
Re: Post-Mortem for Google Compute Engine’s Global Outage on April 11
#279Re: Post-Mortem for Google Compute Engine’s Global Outage on April 11
#280I'm waiting for the time when they push over the air updates to airplanes in flight. "You can fly safely, we have canaries and staged deployment" A year forward: "Unfortunately because the canary verification as well as the staged deployment code was broken, instead of one crash and 300 dead, an update was pushed to all aircraft, which subsequently caused them to crash, killing 70,000 people." I'm not 100% sure why t…
These safeguards include a canary step where the configuration is deployed at a single site and that site is verified to still be working correctly
This sounds very unprofessional imho. "Touch this cable to see if there is electricity running" sort of thing.
Is that really how its should be done?