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WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

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Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#341
post #78

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You could inspect the packets yourself to see that they are encrypted.

how do i know they aren't sending the chat log in a side channel, encrypted?

It's worse to use an encrypted but potentially compromised channel than a plain text one only when you assume the encryption is not in fact compromised, which you shouldn't do.

So I fail to see the problem. It still likely protects you from nosy neighbors or nasty non tech savvy competitors, even if it doesn't protect you from state level actors or from Facebook itself.

The above, in addition to the fact that open source is neither required for auditing, nor guarantees proper auditing occurring (see OpenSSL having vulnerabilities for years before anybody released them to the public)

Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#342
post #164
post #87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think this is a reasonable analysis. I would refine it this way (examples are only for illustrative purposes): Tier 1 secure messengers: all possible tradeoffs in favor of security made; use for worst-case adversaries: - Signal/TextSecure - Pond - PGP† - OTR Tier 2 secure messengers: serious secure messaging protocols that make some tradeoffs in favor of adoption and usability; use for normal messages of low sensit…

I would place Signal in the same tier as WhatsApp here (Tier 2). They both upload your contacts to an intermediate server that gives you their public key, which you can optionally verify afterwards. This means a malicious server could both store away your contacts and try to MITM you, risking detection if you do verify your fingerprint with the other party. A messenger that really did "all possible tradeoffs in favor…

> I would place Signal in the same tier as WhatsApp here (Tier 2). They both upload your contacts to an intermediate server that gives you their public key, which you can optionally verify afterwards.

The last time this came up, inspired by a post by pbsd, I submitted a detailed write-up of a protocol Signal could use to avoid requiring users to submit their contact information: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11289223

It's a solved problem.

> A messenger that really did "all possible tradeoffs in favor of security" would force you to verify the recipient, either in person or via a web of trust. I think not doing that is a perfectly acceptable tradeoff to protect 1 billion users from passive mass surveillance.

Except it introduces another point of security failure. I would prefer to use a system like SDSI/SPKI's friend-of-a-friend naming, with a contact-sharing mechanism so that I could, say, know that I was talking to 'Sheila's Dad' or 'My Boss's Jim's Phone' (presented in a somewhat more user-friendly way, maybe 'My Boss → Jim → Phone' or something).

Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#345
post #338

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're describing Noise. WhatsApp uses Noise Pipes, which is one of many instances of the Noise framework. You're right that it's not a good idea for generalists to pick up Noise and go to town with it. Noise isn't misuse-proof.

> You're right that it's not a good idea for generalists to pick up Noise and go to town with it. Noise isn't misuse-proof. Nor is SSL. Couldn't an opinionated SSL library (supporting exactly one protocol version, one cipher only, etc) provide the same simplicity of use while remaining interoperable and reusing an already-validated protocol?

Simplicity of use isn't the only benefit they get from Noise Pipes; they also get increased security, in a couple of important ways.

It's not the choice I would have made, but I am not as good as Moxie or Trevor.

Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#346
post #235
post #179

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's easy to shoot yourself in the foot with TLS (see: OpenSSL). Also, TLS has roots in a time where we knew much less in terms of crypto; as time went on and flaws were discovered, SSL/TLS was patched all around, meaning it has become much harder to implement correctly. Noise starts from a clean state with modern knowledge of cryptography and modern cryptography. Much easier to understand and replicate, much harder…

> It's easy to shoot yourself in the foot with TLS I would argue it's easier to shoot yourself in the face trying to re-implement/re-design something like TLS.

The mind behind Noise (Trevor Perrin) is one of the minds behind Axolotl (actually Noise can be seen as a generalization of the Axolotl's cross-signing of DH keys, see this post: https://whispersystems.org/blog/simplifying-otr-deniability/) so I would likely be comfortable with it. Although it is completely true that it's been far less used and studied than TLS.

Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#347

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What's worse is that I am nowhere close to the best crypto security person on HN, and (unlike me) the best crypto people here don't brag about it.

Could you share some links about Snowden & Cryptocat story you mentioned above?

Here is one reference: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptocat. Additional googling will show more.

Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#348

Great news. I'm just wondering why Facebook/Zuck is doing this. Is he fearing the competition–all the other E2E messengers out there? I'm asking because I could imagine that Whatsapp might get banned in some countries soon (as recently happened in Brazil) and thus, lose market share.

I also wonder how Facebook will monetize WhatsApp with e2e now.

They'll monetize Facebook with the phone numbers they get from WhatsApp users.

Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#349

Okay, first off: This is great. The most popular messaging app finally gets the security it needed. And we've just rolled out E2E to 1b 'monthly active users'. However, I have always wondered one thing about WhatsApp: How does it generate any kind of meaningful revenue? Apparently they've ditched the old $1 subscription model [0], and even that was so loosely enforced that I have never paid a single cent for WhatsApp…

They get your phone number from WhatsApp which they can then use to connect customer surveys you've done in the last, which have phone numbers, names, email addresses. Even absent some of this info they can often discover who you are.

Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#350
post #230

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No, it is not safe to assume that. Edward Snowden already proved that we cannot trust large US corporations.

Thats what I said. You have to trust them. As far as we know they can not read it. Its fully possible that its not true but its far more likely that it is true. If the work together with the NSA then its more likly that they deploy bad updates to individuels rather then deploying a backdoor to everybody. That is to easy to detect and it would be a marketing desaster.

No, you said it is safe to assume they can't read your messages, which is the exact opposite to what Snowden said. What you personally think is true, likely etc is irrelevant. Facebook could be compelled to release private keys/data to the US government and not tell anyone and you'd be none the wiser.
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